by Shamindra Ferdinando
The Army has initiated an ambitious effort to re-build under strength battalions by re-deploying deserters in their original formations. Infantry battalions which have suffered heavily as a result of high intensity engagements in the ongoing Wanni offensive, Jayasikuru will be able to increase their power with the re-deployment of deserters."We are confident of re-building the existing battalions," said Brigadier K. B. Egodawela of the Directorate of Personnel Administration on Thursday.

He placed the number of deserters who surrendered during the six day amnesty period at 5892.The amnesty ended on May 10. Between May 11 and upto six am yesterday 1928 deserters have been arrested.

Senior Deputy Inspector General of Police Gamini Gunewardene said that arrests were continuing. He said that private security firms too have been requested to hand over deserters if they have been employed by them. "We had a meeting with them on Thursday," he said.He did not give details.

Both brigadier Egodawela and senior DIG Gamini Gunewardene said that the ongoing operations to arrest deserters will be suspended from 8am to midnight tomorrow [Sunday] with a view to permitting remaining deserters to surrender.They were replying questions asked by reporters at an Army Headquarters gathering Thursday night.

Deputy Defence Minister and Kandy District MP Anuruddha Ratwatte, Army Commander Lieutenant General Rohan De S Daluwatte, Navy Commander Vice Admiral Cecil Tissera, Adjutant General Major General Wasantha Perera,military spokesman brigadier Sarath Munasinghe and the President's media advisor, Sanath Gunatilake were among the present.

According to available records with the Army Headquarters, approximately 15,000 soldiers have deserted their posts. Of them 7820 deserters have returned by 6 am yesterday leaving approximately 8000 still at large. There was evidence to suggest that some deserters have joined the police and other services."We are aware of that,"admitted Brigadier Egodawela.

Asked whether they intended to take action against those who have joined police and other services, the brigadier said "not at the moment,".

Asked whether any new infantry battalions are to be formed, Lieutenant General Daluwatte replied in the negative. "We are trying to fill existing vacancies in battalions," he said adding that he was confident of raising strength of fighting battalions with the re-deployment of deserters.

Replying another question, he said that the majority of mortar casualties could return to active duty. Troops engaged in Jayasikuru offensive have suffered considerable losses in mortar and artillery attacks.

The Army has deployed three Divisions [53,55 and 56] for the Wanni offensive.However shortage of troops has considerably affected over one year old offensive, undoubtedly the bloodiest in the Eelam conflict.

Almost all the Infantry Regiments, Sri Lanka Light Infantry,Sinha,Gemunu Watch, Vijayaba , Gajaba and Sri Lanka National Guard [SLNG] have suffered considerable losses in the past three years particularly.

Apart from the infantry, both the special forces and commando battalions too have suffered heavy losses."Since August 95 we have been on the move," said Daluwatte. Troops brought the Jaffna peninsula, Vavuniya-Mannar road, Elephant Pass-Kilinochchi sector and large areas of Wanni under their control in operations since August 95 todate.

At the moment there were 44 regular and 41 volunteer infantry battalions.These figures do not include special forces and commando battalions.

At the moment some other specialised troops were used as infantrymen. The sixth regiment of the Sri Lanka Armoured Corps [SLAC] was engaged in infantry duties. Approximately 1300 soldiers had died in the ongoing Wanni offensive. The LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran in a special clandestine Voice of Tigers [VOT] broadcast monitored in Vavuniya on May 13 admitted that 1300 cadres were killed in Jayasikuru battles.

Thousands have been wounded from both sides.

Minister Anuruddha Ratwatte, replying a question said that despite on and off terrorist activity, troops were in firm control of the Jaffna peninsula.He said that terrorists were engaged in hit and run attacks in the deep south [Yala] and Moneragala district while carrying out covert operations elsewhere to upset the government's military strategy.He explained that there was no need to change the current strategy. The minister said that the security forces were continuing operations to weaken terrorist power in the Wanni. He said that previous strategy involved the deployment of bulk of forces in the Eastern theatre of operations and so called border areas. "Today we are on the offensive," he said insisting that troops were on the correct path.

Navy's billion rupee white elephant

By our Defence Correspondent
At a time when the government is struggling to find men and money to fight the war, one of the Sri Lanka Navy's biggest warships, costing nearly a billion rupees, has been lying virtually unused for years in the port of Colombo.

The ship's name is SLNS Parakramabahu, but unlike the great and illustrious king who once bore that name, this vessel has done almost nothing to justify its existence and expenditure.

We must pose the question of why this ship was purchased, and who is responsible for this massive wastage of money, which occurred four years ago, and has left the present navy top brass with nothing but a headache.

When the ship, classified as a "submarine chaser" type gunboat, arrived in December of 1994, there were high hopes that it would prove to be devastating against the LTTE, and play a significant part in ending the war.

But since then, it never been in battle with Sea Tiger boats, and the only time is guns and rockets have been fired against the enemy have been two occasions when it took part in bombardments of LTTE coastal positions, both of which were highly unsuccessful.

Meanwhile, it is high on the list of LTTE targets, and is anchored where there is no naval war going on, rather than off the northern and eastern coasts where other navy warships are engaged in a daily tussle for control of Sri Lanka's coast.

Worse still, it requires a crew of seventy-five officers and men, all of them highly skilled and trained, who are spending their time in the war cooped up on a useless ship, instead of being useful to the war effort.

The problem is that the ship is an easy target. At six hundred tons, it is the largest ship in the navy, and would doubtless fall prey to Sea Tiger suicide boats very quickly, if it spent a lot of time in the northeast.

By gunboat standards, it is a bit slow, and cannot match the fast Sea Tiger craft. It is much slower than the light gunboats of the navy which are usually called Fast Attack Craft.

Even the Fast Attack Craft, which are nearly fifteen miles per hour faster than Parakramabahu, have guns which have effective fire power. Some of the Sea Tiger craft have 14.5 mm weapons.

Its is thus patently clear that Parakramabahu's weaponry is puny indeed.

In case anyone puts forth the argument that this vessel was always intended for shore bombardment, and is therefore not supposed to fight enemy craft, we must point out here that its gun is not a bombardment weapon.

It rockets are also short ranged, and have never been used effectively.

About a decade ago, the navy's planners recognized the need for a warship with a large artillery gun, capable of firing on inland targets from beyond the horizon of the beach.

Due to other considerations, it took a while for this to take priority. But in the early nineties, a series of land battles on the beach, and amphibious landings by the army, underlined the need for massive gunfire support.

At the time, the navy was negotiating to buy gunboats and landing craft from the People's Republic of China. The order for a shore bombardment vessel was also included with them.

The warship is designed to chase down submarines, but it was apparently decided that it could be fitted with a gun and be used for bombardment instead. Unless, of course, the navy was interested in chasing down non-existent LTTE submarines!

The vessel would cost a stupendous 13.7 million U.S. dollars. This compared to the 3.5 million dollars which a heavy gunboat would cost.

But there was a legitimate need for a bombardment vessel, and the money was cleared by the Ministry of Defence.

But when a team of senior officers to China in 1993 to sign the deal with much ceremony, the gun was strangely down sized to only a 56 mm weapon.

Still, 56 mm was larger than the existing gunboats, so it would be an addition to the fleet's weaponry, although not the ideal size. The deal was signed, with Sri Lanka's ambassador to China being in attendance.

But somehow, in the months that followed, while the ship was under construction, the Chinese suggested to the navy that the ship should have a 37 mm gun, and not even a 56 mm one!

Why the navy bought this line of thinking is the billion rupee question.

Worse. It was supposed to have the rockets, but it turned out that the rockets were not ready, and would take another eight months to arrive!

During those eight months, something disastrous happened.

On July 18, 1996, the LTTE attacked the army garrison at Mullaittivu.

Nearly 1,400 soldiers, sailors and policemen fought for their lives for four days, hanging on grimly in the belief that help would arrive from the sea.

The army had quickly assembled a force of commandos and infantrymen to be landed from navy landing craft. But the LTTE had anticipated this, and massed guns on the beach which prevented the landing craft from getting close.

The LTTE gunpowder was too great for even the navy's heavy gun boats and fast attack craft.

What was needed was a shore bombardment vessel, and just such a vessel was at hand, at least in theory, in the form of the Parakramabahu, which had sailed all the way from Colombo.

But its rockets still hadn’t arrived from China, and were useless. Its heavy gun was only a 37 mm, and even more useless.

In desperation, the Navy pushed forward with its other warships. This resulted in the gunboat Rana Viru being sunk, and no landing being done.

Commandos landed by helicopter but were beaten back, and could only try to stop being wiped out themselves.

Finally, four days after the attack began, an amphibious landing was made.

But it was too late.

When they reached the camp, there was nothing left. Nothing, and nobody. Parakramabahu stayed out of arm’s way, out of sight from land. A white elephant then. A white elephant now.