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The partial myth of
scientific objectivity It is commonly held today that scientific knowledge is the only sure and certain form of knowledge. Part of this conviction is driven by the idea that the natural sciences are founded on objective observations; that subjective experience is eliminated by the inductive scientific method of observation followed by generalisation and theory formation. There are two assertions made by the above opinion: the first is that the scientific method eliminates subjectivity; the second is that subjectivity is a hindrance to true knowledge. It is often said that the objectivity of scientific knowledge will liberate us from the bonds of superstition. The purpose of this article is to examine the above claims for scientific objectivity. The roots of science go as far back as ancient Greece. The Greek philosophers however admitted only the rationality of the universe. Their propositions about the world were based largely on mental constructs or ideas, and the deducations that followed. These constructs were coloured by notions concerning perfection or idealism; for example they believed that heavenly bodies moved in circular orbits because the circle was a perfect or ideal geometric form. There was little or no attempt to discover facts about nature or indeed to verify their theories through investigation. This view of science changed dramatically during the Reformation in sixteenth century Europe. Especially in Britain, there was great emphasis on experimentation and observation, giving rise to the inductive method. The inductive method, formalised by Francis Bacon (17th cent) consists of the following steps: (i) observation and experiment, (ii) inductive generalisation, (iii) hypothesis, (iv) attempted verification, (v) proof or disproof, (vi) knowledge. The notion of scientific objectivity gained currency in the wake of the above priority of observation and experimentation, also called empiricism. It also gave rise to the philosophycal school of logical positivism, which treated as meaningless all propositions that could not be potentially verified via sense data. This led to the devaluation of all things metaphysical, such as religious beliefs. The Crisis in Objectivity The inductivity method, while being tremendously successful in terms of progress in scientific knowledge, ran into philosophical problems from its early days. The philosopher David Hume (18th cent) posed the problem that "just because past futures have resembled past pasts, it does not follow that all future futures will resembles future pasts". The reason we expect them to is psychological, as opposed to logical. In addition, the principal of induction assumes the regularity of nature, which cannot be empirically demonstrated. Immanual Kant (18th cent) was another philosopher who cast some doubt on objectivity. His thesis was that sense data from the external world is apprehended by us through a "grid" of mental concepts and categories (e.g. concepts of space and time) with which all humans are born. This means that the "objectives purity" of sense data is "contaminated" by the subjectivity of our innate ideas. It was Sir Karl Popper who finally proposed an alternative to the inducitive method. Following on from Hume's objection to induction, Popper said that scientific theories can never be verified; rather they could only be falsified. In fact he used this as a criterion of demarcation to distinguish between science and non-science; if a body of knowledge was to be treated as a science, it had to contain testable propositions which scientists could set out to falsify. He also said that the growth of scientific knowledge took place because of falsification, since the falsification of an existing theory would give rise to better and more comprehensive theory - e.g. in the way that Einstein's theories subsumed Newton's laws of motion. Where observation was concerned, he too echoed Kant by saying that all observation was theory laden. Even the choice of what we should observe was determined by an a priori mental disposition, in fact, by the problems inherent in existing theories. Popper therefore presented a deductive approach to science, consisting of the following steps: (i) problem, (ii) proposed solution - a conjecture, (iii) deduction of a testable proposition (iv) tests - attempted refutations, (v) preference established between competition theories. When we look at science in the above way, there is considerable scope and indeed necessity for subjectivity, because the key step in the process is the formation of a conjecture - one of Popper's book is titled "Conjectures and Refutations" (1963). Conjecture is the truly creative step in the above process. It requires our imagination and cannot be easily described. Scientists arrive at conjectures or theories in various ways not least of which is the process of analogy. For example, the spherical structure of large carbon molecules was proposed by drawing analogies with footballs and the architectural domes designed by Buckminster Fuller. Kepler is supposed to have been inspired by the Christian doctrine of the Trinity - Father, Son and Holy Spirit, in making an analogy with the sun, planets and gravitational force respectively, when proposing his theory of planetary orbits. Today some scientists draw inspiration from Fritjof Capra's parallels between particle physics and Eastern religious teaching - notably that of the Tao; hence his book titled "The Tao of Physics" (1975). Taken to an extreme however, these latter paralles can be unhelpful, as discussed later. Thomas Kuhn (who like Popper lived and died recently in this century) was critical of Popper's idea of problem solving. According to him, most scientists do not approach science with a view to falsifying existing theories. In most cases, the current theory is assumed as valid and scientists try to apply that theory to an ever increasing range of phenomena - Kuhn called this puzzle solving. It is only when a large number of phenomena cannot be explained by the current theory that the scientific community looks for an alternative theory that can better explain them. There is then competition between the two (or more) theories, leading to what is virtually a revolution in scientific thinking -Kuhn's seminal book is called "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" (1962). Some of the differences between Popper and Kuhn can be resolved, but that is beyond the scope of this article. Whatever their differences however, there are some major negative implications for scientific objective in Kuhn's analysis. First, the acceptance of the current theory or more correctly paradigm, is made by scientists not on the basis of independent investigation, but rather on trust. It would be impossible for science to progress if every scientist verified the ruling paradigm for himself. Rather, he is schooled into that paradigm initially by a rigorous procedure of formal training (at least upto a university degree) and later by working alongside an accepted practitioner (e.g. during a PhD). This sound very much like the sort of religious training that was and is imparted in monasteries. Hence, although science and religion are often thought to be poles apart, there are striking similarities in the way they are practised. It is true of course that scientific paradigms can be changed and better ones introduced. Until that happens however, there is almost an element of personal faith in the ruling paradigm - a far cry from the strict objectivity espoused by many popularisers and early historians of science. Furthermore, in the practice of science there are "high level paradigms" that can virtually never be overthrown, for to question them would negate the entire scientific enterprise; for example the premise that it is possible for homo sapiens to discover truth about nature despite being part of it, and the premise that the physical universe is "real" and intelligible. The other major implications for objectivity is the fact that Kuhn held that there were no rules for choosing between two competing theories during a paradigm shift. Apart from the ability to explain phenomena, paradigm choice is also based on elegance and simplicity, and promise for the future, concepts that are better appreciated by artists and visionaries respectively! In the past (and the present) the reputation and influence of personalities and scientific schools, not to mention that pressures of research funding, have also played their part in theory choice. Anti-science: Jettisoning Objectivity Completely We have then come a long way from the unquestioned objectivity of science to a position where this objectivity has been undermined and the need for subjectivity acknowledged. Although we should accept and even welcome the loss of absolute objectivity in science, it is quite another thing to jettison objectivity completely. That would in fact spell the death of science. There are two distinct movements that are attacking sicnece in this manner. The first attack is from what is called the "strong programme" of the sociology of knowledge. The idea of a sociology of knowledge is that knowledge is conditioned by our social context and interests (see cartoon). While this idea is true and illuminating to a certain degree, to claim, as some do, that all knowledge is relative and hence that nothing in the external world can be objective known, is clearly excessive and leads to absurdity. For example, is the expression E = mc2 true only for German Jews, because it was originally propounded by a German Jew? Apart from this, how about the statements made by the "strong programme" sociologists of knowledge themselves? Are they also true only for social scientists in Edinburgh (where one such school of sociologists is based)? The second attack is form an appeal to modern physics, primarily to Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, which states that we cannot at one and the same time both the exact position of a (sub-atomic) particle and its exact momentum. This principle is stretched to infer that matter has no real existence and that reality is created by the observer. Such inferences are clearly gross extrapolations and cannot be sustained; if they were however, we would not have any shred of objectivity left. It is true that the "Cartesian wall" that had been constructed between the observer and the world he observes, also called Cartesian Dualism after Rene Descartes (17th cent), has been breached. It has been breached however, not so much by Heisenberg, but rather by a progression of philosophers from Hume through Kant to Popper and Kuhn. Personal Knowledge: A way to do Science What then is the correct mix of subjectivity and objectivity that is required to do science? A Popperian would perhaps say that Conjecture should be characterised by subjectivity and Refutation by objectivity. Another perspective has been presented by Michael Polanyi, the title of whose first book "Personal Knowledge" (1958) offers a clue towards an answer. To Polanyi the external world is real; it has an independent existence, apart from that of an observer. Objectivity is therefore affirmed. In order to obtain knowledge about the world however, the observer has to acquire for himself certain "apparatus", not merely in the narrow sense of experimental equipment, but in the wider sense of becoming schooled in the ruling paradigm (to borrow a concept from Kuhn). Such knowledge needs to be "interiorised" in the observer, in the same way as a tool becomes an extension of a workman's hand; this knowledge is what Polanyi calls "personal" or "tacit" knowledge. This then can be considered as being the subjective part of the scientific enterprise - the trusting of one' personal knowledge. Science progresses when this tool of tacit knowledge is brought to bear on the world. There are two ways in which the above approach is saved from uncritical subjectivity. First, although the tool is used primarily to explore the world, because the scientists is tacitly aware of the tool, the tool (of personal knowledge) is being "judged" too. If and when it is considered inadequate, it has to be replaced with a better one, Secondly such personal knowledge is not merely "personal to the holder" but is shared among a scientific community. Although it is held personally, it is held with "universal intent". It is the scientific community therefore that qualifies the subjectivity involved in science. It is also very important that this qualifying is not done in a centralised authoritarian manner but rather by the various forms of distributed authority that govern scientific activity - e.g. conferment of research degress, peer-review of scientific papers, open discussion of journal articles, scientific conferences etc. Subjectivity and Objectivity in Engineering Science is primarily analytical in nature - i.e. breaking up a whole into its parts in order to improve our understanding of it. This is why objectivity, albeit qualified objectivity, continues to be the chief hallmark of the scientific approach. Engineering is however primarily a synthetic process - i.e. combining constituent elements in order to create a product or process having desired specifications. Engineering is also very goal-oriented, and the achievement of those goals has to be realised in the context of resource and performance constraints. Virtually every engineering project has its specific combination of goals, constraints and uncertainties, and each practitioner may have a unique way of approaching it. All this requires a great deal of creativity and hence engineering has to be much more subjective than science. Most of this subjectivity is subsumed under the concept of "engineering judgement". This is something that an engineer acquires, not so much through his technical training, but rather through his practice of engineering in real world situations. The collective practical knowledge of engineers is formalised in the form of "rules of thumb". These two strands of knowledge - the theoretical and the practical or heuristic - are both equally important of the engineering practitioner. Of course engineering is objective too, in the sense that its artefacts have a real existence and indeed purpose in our social fabric. The subjectivity by which these artefacts are created has to be evaluated objectively in terms of their performance and functionality. However this evaluation is not carried out as rigorously as in science. For example, we do not try to "falsify" engineering theories or models by setting up a "disconfirming instance". We cannot do this in the real world, because such a disconfirming instance in structural, aeronautical or nuclear engineering could lead to the loss of hundreds of lives. Engineers are more interested in the safety and reliability of their artefacts than in the "truth" of their theories or models. The Dethroning of Scientific Objectivity - Some Implications The partial loss of scientific objectivity means that we should no longer treat science as the most important or only trustworthy form of knowledge. Other forms of knowledge are equally valid for their own purposes, including more subjective forms such as the humanities and the liberal arts. Even forms of knowledge that are based on faith or belief cannot be devalued. We often critique such forms of knowledge by posing the question "Is it scientific? We have seen however, that science itself is both subjective and dependent to an extent on a kind of faith. However, just as scientific knowledge is held with "universal intent" all other forms of knowledge must also be brought into the market place of ideas, so that they can be publicly debated. One of the features of modernity (which is based very much on logical positivism) is that it has consigned religious knowledge to a world of private belief. While this appears to promote the apparently desirable spirit of "tolerance" (since public debate on differing religious traditions could become acrimonious) what it has actually done is to devalue all religions. At the same time, the spirit of materialism that has accompanied modernity has tended to denigrate the arts and the humanities because of their lack of utilitarian value. Furthermore, the arts and the humanities have also suffered a similar fate to religious knowledge in being fragmented into separate compartments, especially in countries such as the United States (e.g. "Afro-Caribbean Studies", "Hispanic Studies" "Women's Studies" etc. No longer are religion and the humanities used as sources for common values. This has created a surfeit of "facts" and a vacuum of shared values in our modern society. The time has come for this to change, because the philosophical underpinnings of modernity have been clearly undermined; exactly how these changes should and will take place is not very clear, especially in societies that have a plurality of religious and cultural traditions. What is clearer is that scientists and indeed engineers could benefit by a broader education that includes more subjective or intuitive forms of knowledge. Not only will this give them a broader knowledge base from which to apply analogies in their conjectures, theories and models, but it will also encourage in them more creative styles of thought that will enhance their practice. |
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