The Island Politics

Book Review of K. M. de Silva's two volume edition of the End of Empire with reference to Ceylon.

by Alfred Jeyaratnam Wilson
K. M. de Silva's (Kingsley) two volumes of British Documents on the End of Empire with special reference to Sri Lanka, Part 1: The Second World War and the Soulbury Commission 1939-1945 and Part II: Towards Independence 1945-1948 (both published by the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 1997) are models of serious historical writing and are worth reading line by line for the riveting story that is unfolded by this talented historian. These two volumes show Kingsley at the zenith of his career as a historian of great skill.

Part. I, pages 1 to Lxxxvi contain a splendid sweep of what the documents contain. Here is what might be called a Primer on Sri Lanka's politics before independence. The premier Conservative Sinhalese statesman, D. S. Senanayake (D.S.), must have been a man with mountains of patience who had to impress on Whitehall the need for complete independence in the face of attacks from the flanks by the Marxist groupings which were at their most formidable in these times and from the doubting Thomases and ultra Sinhalese nationalists led by S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike (S.W.R.D.B.) who it becomes pretty clear is in competition with D.S. for the leadership, and of course for the prime ministership in due course; D.S. fought an uphill battle.

He was assisted by two formidable lieutenants. Oliver Goonetileke and Sir Ivor Jennings. The latter was fully acquainted with the ins and outs of the ramifications of Whitehall and it was probably his idea that D.S. took up, at considerable risk, to trade military bases for independent statehood-a real boon to obtain in return of 25000 square miles of real estate for the small beer of Katunayake and Trincomalee.

Intriguing O.E.G.
The role of Oliver Goonetilleke is intriguing. Though the historian does not come to such a sharp conclusion, my own assessment of Oliver hanging around the corridors of Whitehall and seeking. Oliver Twist like, for more and more concessions, is that he was trying to impress on the imperial masters that he was a safer bet than D.S. himself. Kingsley takes the reader through the maze of negotiations, the trials, disappointments and frustrations of D.S. before D.S. finally prised independence from Whitehall. But what a fight and what a price to pay?

It was just sheer luck for D.S. that circumstances changed in the UK in 1945 with the displacement of the Conservatives by Labour, and in the subcontinent where Gandhi and his Congress successfully won independence. Britain did not have any cogent reason to deny Sri Lanka its freedom after the grant of independence to India and Burma.

Fifty-fifty
There was at this time the raging fifty-fifty campaign of the flamboyant G. G. Ponnambalam (G.G.P.) who was conquering everything before him except for D.S. G.G.P. failed to understand the dynamics of the path to independence namely that Whitehall would sell the minorities down the river for military bases and safeguards for the commercial interests of the island's Britishers. G.G.P. for no fault of his also failed to impress Governor Sir Andrew Caldecott who wrote in his 1938 Despatch to Whitehall:

"I have made known my opposition to what is called here the 'fifty-fifty' demand. That is that seats in the State Council should be apportioned. Half to the majority community i.e., the Sinhalese, and half to the 'minority communities'. I am similarly opposed to the 'sixty-forty' demand and to any other form of fractional representation on a race basis. The elected seats must in my opinion continue to be filled on a franchise. ... My reason for opposition to the fifty-fifty demand or to any modification of it is that any concession to the principle of communal representation would perpetrate sectionalism which I believe to be anathema to thinking people in Ceylon (of all races) and preclude the emergence of the political issues..."

Although all these prognostications have been proved false notwithstanding Jennings, D.S. the Soulbury Commissioners and other such sanguine optimists, G.G.P. and his wise men should have realised that their fifty-fifty demand was as dead as the dodo. They should have switched tack for a comprehensive bill of rights, with an independent judiciary, and if not, stepped up their demand for a federalized polity. This indeed was a glaring instance of missing the bus.

There are fifteen reproductions of Caldecott's "notes" to Whitehall referred to as the "Things Ceylonese" series. If not for anything else they should be read for the sheer delight of the Governor's impressions of the various Ceylonese players at this time. The odd titillating line contains penetrating insights. It is quite obvious that Caldecott was the recipient of many a pearl of wisdom from his Ceylonese friends and acquaintances. In the historian's words the Governor was not above retaining gossip about his ministers personal offers". But flaws and all, these commentaries are a unique source of information on the island's affairs at this time."

S.W.R.D.
The series begin on "inter-communal relations in Ceylon prior to outbreak of war", with humorous irony on the reaction to G.G.P.'s ill-advised remarks about "Sinhalese Ancestry". Mr. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and A.E. Goonesinha quickly retorted by associating G.G.P. "with Timbuctoo and with a Simian prelude" (p. 1).

The two Sama Samajists (Philip and NM) are referred to as "the two Muscovy Ducks" A.E. Goonesinha is a funny bird.

The Governor refers to AEG's campaign against the Indians by encouraging the opening of Sinhalese barber shops and at the premises undergoing a public shares as an inaugural ceremony.

In an intriguing reference to D.S. Senanayake in the second "Things Ceylonese" Periodical Report Caldecott: states "D.S. is a genuine representative of the political Sinhalese in being a 100% racialist" (p. 7). There is no further explanation for this uncharitable remark.

In the third "Things Ceylonese" Periodical Report (pp. 9-11) Caldecott pours bitter scorn on D.S. when after question from D.S. there is the biting sentence "Senanayake's scope of vision is no less limited from his power of expression (p. 11). If Jayatilaka, (Don Baron) fails negatively to lead. Senanayake would positively mislead" (p. 11).

In the Fourth Periodical Report Caldecott makes the insightful observation that Natesan Iyer, the member for Hatton is a "subtle and clever brahmin" (p. 27). A shrewd and clever observation is made of G.C.S. Corea on his election to the presidency of the Ceylon National Congress. Corea is stated to be "a Christian; to a and is married "a Tamil lady". He might "if he could only develop the personality and the leadership have a very salutary influence on Ceylon politics" (pp. 27-0). D. S. Senanayake reportedly made a similar observation. He had said "Claude must be watched" and Dr. N. M. Perera remarked that G.C.S. Corea had been "sidelined" (in a public speech).

Continuing Sir Andrew observed in his Third Periodical Report that Jayatilaka (Sir D.B.) "is played out" and more significantly in the good year 29 December 1939 adds that "Senanayake is too often off side to captain any team" (p. 28). Thus even in 1939, Ceylon had not produced a leader with whom the British could do business. Major (later Sir) John Kotelawala is minuted by an official, G.E. Ghent of the Colonial Office as having recurrent stupidities.

Village bully
"Things Ceylonese Report" Number 21 deals with labour problems among the Indian estate workers and nothing else very special while in the Sixth in the Series (Number 24) Senanayake comes in for more scathing criticism, possibly a case of the Governor overreacting. Senanayake is referred to as a "Sinhalese village bully whose characteristics (like the spots on a black panther) show through the ministerial veneer of Jungly John" (p. 44) and the criticism reaches a crescendo when Caldecott commenting on Senanayake's "effusions" his recent letter to the Governor as being similar to the observation in the Customary Law of Negri Sembilan as that of "the language of the mud-buffalo to snort and to bellow."

The Eighth Periodical Report ("Things Ceylonese") Document No: 34 deals mainly with the labour problems of Indian estate workers (pp. 62-67) and the sociology of their presence in the island as a case of "Indophobia".

The Ninth Periodical in the Series (No. 44 pp. 82-88) contains a highly critical assessment of the Indian presence. It is said "to have gripped the islanders". not only the Sinhalese because even the Jaffna Tamils had complained to the Governor that "only one Jaffnese business house remains in Jaffna town, all the rest having been bought up by Indians" (p. 64).

In the Ninth Periodical Report (Document 46) there are scathing remarks about the Sama Samajists whom the Governor calls and were generally referred to as "Communists". Philip Gunawardene is probably "pukka scarlet", and "nasty piece of work of the village bully type" (p. 85). Dr. N. M. Perera and Dr. Colvin R. de Silva (who largely finances the party, sic) are "A shade of red" (ibid. but alas for the Governor "I shall never have any personal knowledge of them because they boycott Queen's House" (ibid.).

There are six other "Things Ceylonese", the last one (Fifteenth Periodical Report) dated 23 August 1941 after which the random thoughts of a much troubled Governor in politically heavily mined waters come to an end.

The most interesting features of the Governor's communications to the Colonial Office are his shrewd, insightful and not seldom nasty observations of the political figures who roamed the political landscape then. For example how close the Governor's ears are to the ground can be gauged from his observations on 'Our George' E. de Silva. "Our George" he writes is generally liked for his honesty of speech and action. In a character so volatile and undisciplined by restraints of rhyme or reason such honesty is somewhat hard to distinguish from irresponsibility (p. 181). Elsewhere "Our George" is pursued.

In a Report by Mr. T. W. Davies on his stay in Ceylon he described "Our George" as "an amusing buffoon" (p. 158). But S.W.R.D. B. is unfairly portrayed as one who "used to be a Christian, recently turned Buddhist" to gain political kudos. He usually wears Buddhist dress but today exceptionally was in European clothes. As always with me, he was friendly, affable and even amusing. He has a wild look in his eye. I understand there is madness in his family (quite unfair, I would say). He is quite irresponsible shouts everyone else down when he is excited, is hated by European officials... (pp. 159-160).

'Young Banda'
S.W.R.D.B. is always referred to by the Governor as "young Banda" an abbreviation which it is said he (S.W.R.D.B.) would not have liked. The Governor has high hopes for S.W.R.D.B.'s future after his marriage. He writes in his "Things Ceylonese" of 18 October 1940 (the Twelfth in the Series): I attended the wedding of "Young Banda" to Miss Ratwatte (daughter of Dissawa Barnes Ratwatte and niece of the late Sri Cudah) at Balangoda and after their ceremonial home-coming to Sir Solomon Bandaranaike's residence near Veyangoda.

"The marriage is of great sociological and political importance. Whatever opinion one may hold of young Bandaranaike as Minister of Local Administration or as founder and leader of the Sinhala Maha Sabha, or as a pervert (sic, probably convert) for political purposes from Christianity to Buddhism or as a master of nationalistic rhetoric one is bound to admit that he has taken to himself a wife who appears thoroughly nice, placid and sensible and that this union between a first-rank family of the lowlands with a first-rank family of the Kandyan highlands represents an accretion of considerable political influence to the Sinhala Maha Sabha. This is already noticeable in the parental attitude towards the happy pair" (P.132).

What follows is more interesting and intriguing if not amusing: "when I first met Sri Solomon (three years ago) and Barnes Ratwatte Dissawa (two years ago) both were examples of the "old gang" and their first topic of conversation was the rottenness of the State Council and of Ceylon politics in general..." (pp. 132-133).

George E. de Silva again appears to be Governor Caldecott's bete noire. In his communication to Lord Lloyd on 22 October 1940, George is described as being "notoriously irresponsible" (p. 136).

In his Fourteenth 'Things Ceylonese", Governor Caldecott returns to the question of "Young Banda", a term which people use "as if some allowance were permissible for youth and immaturity" (p. 171). The Governor states, "should be realised however that he is a man of forty and has never yet shown any signs of acquiring principle or constancy. He possesses eloquence, the power of quick and telling repartee and agility in debate. If he were not indolent, he would also exercise a considerable mental capacity..."

And again the Governor proceeds to retail unnecessary gossip which has no relationship to the serious political problems facing him (the Governor) and Ceylon.

He refers to S.W.R.D.B.'s mother recently deceased (a member of the aristocratic Obeysekera family) was generally recognised as volatile and irresponsible so that her son may perhaps owe these traits to inheritance" (p. 172). Governor Caldecott's most telling and prophetic observation on S.W.R.D.B. is the sentence written on May 1941 (fifteen years before S.W.R.D.B. placed himself at the head of Sinhalese Buddhist political militancy (P 172)

I fear that in any estimate of Ceylon's political future he must be set down as an undependable factor likely to upset the most careful calculations.

Governor's wrath
The reason for S.W.R.D.B. incurring the wrath of the Governor and probably the mandarins of the Colonial Office was the decision of the Executive Committee of Local Administration to withhold its sanction to contributions to war funds by local bodies,..." (p. 172). The Governor seriously considered dismissing the Minister but thought otherwise because

the results have been his submission to my demand for a cancellation of the decision of this Executive Committee, a number of speeches in which he has said that he has been misunderstood and that he wants us to win the war... (p. 172).

The Ministers equally disliked the Governor. T.W. Davies, a visitor to the island in a report to the Colonial Office dated 14 February 1941 wrote rather uncomplimentary (p. 195).

I am told the Ministers now hardly treat Sir Andrew with common politeness: for instance at a recent meeting Mr. Bandaranaike walked in very late without either apologising or taking his pipe out of his mouth.'

D, S. Senanayake was a different kettle of fish. Caldecott did not like him at first. He was quick to understand that there was some rivalry between Senanayake and Sir Baron Jayatilake. It is quite amazing the D.S. faced the mountains of rebuffs and obstacles from the Colonial Office and yet maintained his composure. A Colonial Office mandarin G.E.J. Ghent minuted on the basis of Caldecott's "Things Ceylonese" of 4 October 1939 (Second Periodical Report).

Mr. Senanayake, the Minister of Agriculture and Lands is a genuine representative of the political Sinhalese in being a 100% racialist.

A footnote qualifies "racialist" with the explanation that "Mr. Senanayake is in the main anti-European " (ibid.)

In his Third Report ("Things Ceylonese") Caldecott on October 1939 is much more acerbic. He states (p. 11).

Senanayake's scope of vision is no less limited than his power of expression. If Jayatillake (Don Baron) fails, negatively, to lead. Senanayake would positively, mislead.

As one proceeds turning the pages of these documents, it becomes very clear that Senanayake's was far from being a primrose path. Instead the Sinhalese leader had three insuperable obstacles which he overcame with commendable elan.

Minority reaction
Firstly there was the problem of the minorities led by the "redoubtable" (as the Colonial Office referred to him) G. G. Ponnambalam. We learn here for the first time the authentic version of the extent to which the British government was concerned about the reaction of the minorities. That reaction was only stilled once the Whitehall mandarinate was assured that D.S. would look after the minorities. It did not imply by any means that Whitehall was deceived or that D.S. deliberately pursued such a course.

D. S. it transpires, genuinely felt that the minorities would support him. It may be that the latter were convinced that the safeguards in the Soulbury Constitution were adequate and that their failure to obtain "fifty-fifty" representation in the legislature would not mean that they would throw out the baby with the bathwater. A solemn balance was doubtless achieved with weightage in representation for the minorities, Section 29 and the reserve powers to be vested in the Governor.

It was the question of citizenship rights and the franchise for the Indians that became a stumbling block. The Board of Ministers took on themselves, given the intransigent and too promising Sinhalese mood, the task of seeking an agreed settlement with the Viceroy's government and in these they failed miserably. As time progressed, the Viceroy's government became an insurmountable impediment. The problem was left unresolved as the responsibility of a future semi-responsible government of the Sinhalese. The effect would have been more salutary had the imperial government arbitrated on the question even imposed what they thought was an amicable settlement.'

Instead the Indian problem continued as a festering sore in the post-independence years much to the discomfiture of few political Sinhalese of the post independence years and to the concerns of the Sri Lankan Tamils. The Viceroy's government had thus evolved as a third component and obstacle in the negotiations leading to independence, the frustrations of D.S. and his Man Friday Oliver Goonetileke, notwithstanding.

Dynamic less Leftists
The second impediment was the agitational potential of the burgeoning left wing movement. The documents indicate that Whitehall itself was deeply concerned that D.S. could be outmanoeuvred in the game of political rivalry by the dynamic leftists. So they were conscious of the need to provide D.S. with something more akin to the genuine article. Thus the Soulbury Constitution was chipped away and a new constitution was fashioned out from the fragments of the old which Whitehall hoped would find acceptance from the vast middle ground of the political Sinhalese.

Lastly, the defence and external affairs agreements required tremendous patience and formidable skills before they could be fitted into the general scheme of things. It was D.S. who came up with the bright idea of concluding a mutually advantageous agreement with H.M. government. Whitehall eagerly seized on this proposal. It would provide Britain with facilities on the sea route to Australia as well as enable her to fill a void to the daunting prospect of the absence of any military facilities in the Indian ocean. The convincing assurances D.S. offered the British provided the latter with the satisfaction that their sea routes would be safe and that their commercial interests would be protected.

Both these offers - military bases and protection of commercial interests-were master strokes befitting a statesman. This a pity that G.G.P. and his supporters failed to realise that once D.S. had agreed to make these major concessions which were well within his power, the minorities did not have a hope in hell. Their best recourse would have been to come to terms with D.S. before it became too late.

It must be stated to the credit of Whitehall that even while they gladly accepted D.S.'s major concessions, they still needed firm, cast iron assurances that the rights of the minorities would be adequately safeguarded. Whitehall of course was bargaining on the protection that the minorities would enjoy under a reliable statesman such as D.S.

D.S.'s grandeur lay in the fact that he single-handedly achieved independence for Ceylon because of his sense of brilliant timing and his far superior negotiating capabilities. He had successfully, no doubt, made the path clear for himself by throwing out Baron Jayatilaka from the ministerial raft and keeping S.W.R.D. chained to his anchor.

Thus Governor Caldecott wrote in his Sixth Periodical Report to the Colonial Office (18 February 1940). "Things Ceyonese" (p. 43)

that nothing would give Senanayake greater satisfaction than to help push Jayatilaka off the ministerial raft with one hand and to throw dung at Banks (the Inspector General of Police) with the other... I am bound to say that I agree with his (Senanayake's view that Sir Baron is now too senile, too casual, too lazy and too flabby to lead the council or even his Executive Committee.

And yet this is the tragedy, he (Baron Jayatilake) is the nearest, if rather remote, approximation to a statesman that Ceylon has yet produced.

Old and sick
But by the time independence came, D.S. had grown too old and sick and was past his prime. No wonder he reminisced with Sir George Gater on facets of his early life. He had just cause to be proud of for he in the end had won, unaided, independence for his country despite initial rebuffs from the various secretaries of state. Sir G. Gater in reproducing the gist of a conversation he had with Senanayake on 13 September 1945 noted (p. 83)

nearly the whole of the rest of the conversation which lasted half an hour was spent in Senanayake giving me once more an account of his past life from the days when he left school at the age of 17. He stressed the fact that throughout his political life he had never been opposed in his constituency and that he had been elected leader, without opposition. He was hoping to crown his career by achieving a settlement of Ceylon's constitutional problems.

Continuing Gater wrote a less than charitable note when he described these words of Senanayake as being a confession of faith, the conclusion being an attempt at trivializing the deeds of a man who could well afford to rest on his laurels after scaling the heights. It is clear that Senanayake deserved the congratulations of all and sundry.

K.M. de Silva has produced an admirable work of scholarship. He has taken the reader into the dark recesses of the Whitehall documents. In so doing we are given delectable pen portraits of the main players especially Senanayake, Bandaranaike and G.G. Ponnambalam.

K.M. de Silva is fair in the selection of the relevant papers. He has avoided the temptation of tilting towards one side or the other. All that one can exhort the reader is to read on and read on. This is a rich harvest, and the documents keep the attention riveted. All praises therefore to de Silva.

Precarious situation prevails in Jaffna

by K. Godage
It was said that Nero fiddled while Rome was burning. The story that unfolds may not be exactly the same, but the preoccupation of our politicians, wholly engrossed in the power game, and demanding that elections be held at the earliest, so that their dreams. (Pipe dreams for most no doubt), can come true, could in a sense be compared to Nero's performance.

To be charitable by them, perhaps their demand comes from a lack of understanding of the actual situation in the north. The government has not, with good reason no doubt, shared with the people information on the situation in the north. The people in the south have deduced, from the recent assassinations of Gen. Lucky Wijeratne the assassination of the Mayor Sarojini Yogeswaran and the other assassination of prominent citizens of Jaffna, that our armed forces are not in total control of the situation. There are other reports too emanating from the peninsula which indicate that all is not well out there.

Frightened
Many Tamil friends speaking freely have expressed their disappointment and disillusionment. They claim that though much was promised very little has actually been delivered over the past two years. They are today a frightened community. They feel that the armed forces cannot assure them of security from the LTTE. This they she was their principal expectation.

They have other complaints too. For example they state that the Jaffna farmer has been let down. I am informed that no arrangements were made to purchase their produce at fair prices. They say that if winning their hearts and minds was important, a serious effort should have been made to improve their economic circumstances.

They recall for instance, the 'Good Old Days', when their onion crop was purchased under the guaranteed price scheme within days of harvest before 'Dryage' set in, and they lost income, They recall that their potatoes were purchased before they began to rot. Last but not least, they say that they have lost their dignity.

They understand that the attempted assassination of Minister Nimal Siripala Silva and the killing of Gen Hamangoda virtually ended hopes for a major reconstruction and rehabilitation effort. To the people of Jaffna that incident represented the return of the LTTE. The message they say was loud and clear. They nevertheless lived in hope and supported the government's efforts to restore normalcy.

Hence their support for the holding of elections and the vote, however small, for the anti- LTTE parties. This they claim was a message to the government that they had faith in the government's efforts. Whilst they do not blame the government entirely, they feel helpless and do not know what to do.

They claim that the LTTE's game plan is succeeding and that the government is incapable of taking preventive action.

The game plan of the LTTE according to my friends from the north is this. They claim that the LTTE has been able to successfully infiltrate the peninsula (in any case they were not completely removed from the preninsula and are said to remain in many areas including Pooneryn, Kilali and the Islands). They appear to have first bided their time and then began to pick on the forces through sniping and mining of roads. At the same time they have been sabotaging the government's efforts to bring back peace and normalcy to the areas under government control. The next phase has been the insidious campaign to instil fear of them once again in the community. Those who openly support the government have been singled out and brutally murdered. This is said to be continuing.

Already most of those who were elected at the recent elections, are said to have resigned their seats out of sheer fear. The result of course is that the people have begun to put distance between themselves and the armed forces. It is said that the armed forces would themselves have noticed the change of attitude of the people towards them.

As to whether this has been reported to Colombo, is not known. The LTTE is said to be slowly gaining the upper hand by terrorising the people. To say that they live in fear of the return of the LTTE is an understatement.

According to my 'informants', the next phase of the LTTE's game plan in the undermining of the civilian administration. The GA is said to be a non person. He has neither power nor influence, and is said to be a frightened man.

The LTTE is said to have instructed all public servants functioning in the peninsula as to how they should act. It is even being said that the LTTE has an office in the 'Islands,' to which they summon all public servants for instructions. The LTTE's goal is to cripple the administration, they are said to have already ensured that it is ineffective. I am informed that even the judges have been intimidated and that the courts have ceased to function.

The situation is being compared to that which existed in the south in 1988 and '89 when the JVP paralysed this country and brought it to a complete standstill by mere word of mouth. It does seem that the LTTE has indeed achieved two of their objectives.

The assassination of Major Gen Lucky Wijeratne has been particularly significant, for here was a Sinhalese who had endeared himself to the Tamil people and given them back confidence and dignity. He had been the embodiment of the hearts and mind approach. Why did the LTTE assassinate him when he was on his way out?

The answer is not difficult to find. The LTTE was sending a message to the army, that the same fate awaits anyone who seeks to befriend the Tamil people. The LTTE will not permit any liaison to be established with the people. It is a part of the LTTE's plan to alienate the armed forces.

Alienation
The alienation of the armed forces is the third objective of the LTTE. Once this is achieved, they would begin to pick on the police posts and stations, which are in any case said to be a mere presence today. They, it is said do not function in any effective manner.

In this regard an observation made to me bears recall. I am informed that the policemen sent to the north do not measure up for the tasks they need to perform and are unsuitable to face the situation they confront. In the first instance they do not speak the language.

A policeman, by the very nature of his work, must have rapport with the community and this is impossible without language. My friends presume that they have also not been given any special training. A further point made to me was that having the army do police work did not help either.

The thinking is that after the LTTE success in alienating the people from the military, they would commence their 'clearing operations'. As stated earlier, The belief is that the LTTE would commence attacking the police posts and stations and make them undefendable and force their closure.

Thereafter it is felt that the LTTE would seek to have the army itself withdrawn from their smaller camps to more defendable positions, leaving the LTTE once again in control of the areas vacated by the army, which would be almost the whole peninsula!

This situation appears to have arisen on account of the fact that we do not have adequate troops, even now on the ground in the peninsula to establish effective control. In the circumstances any reduction to troop or police strength to hold elections in the south, would mean that we would be wishing the north goodbye.

The choice is plain for all to see. As for the provincial council elections, as Sunday Paper correspondent has pointed out, that exercise is only for one set of scoundrels to replace another. Let us hope that these politicians will realise what is at stake and let their ambitions take a back seat for once.

Meanwhile I do hope that the powers that be, would resist the recent tendency to shoot the postman, for having brought bad news. In any event, the subject matter of this article and the analysis should not be 'news' for the government. The National Security Council should itself be aware of the actual situation on the ground, whatever may be the sunshine stories they feed us on.

But I am beginning to have doubts about this. From the statements we hear that "The war would end soon". I am beginning to wonder as to whether our leaders have also been fed 'sunshine stories'- Stories they like to hear? As for us, have we not heard this boast from President Jayewardene, Ranjan Wijeratne, and all those who have been in charge of our security in the past? Have we not been waiting for god.

It appears to me that their is a dangerous complacency pervading the establishment, with each 'player' singing the praises of the other, and of how well they have done in this war, quite oblivious to the fact that they are sitting on a volcano.

Let us hope that the authorities have done their thinking and are taking preventive action to ensure that LTTE does not succeed and that our youth have not sacrificed their lives in vain.

At the risk of seeming to be facetious, may I conclude with the words, "Sinhala papers please copy'. For, it is most important that those wanting military solutions, understand the real situation.

The writer is a retired foreign service officer who served as ambassador to Belgium and the E.U. He retired as Additional Secretary to the Foreign Ministry.