The case of Manickavasagam Suresh one time LTTE chief in Canada is not an issue Sri Lankans are not totally unfamiliar with. Readers of this column in particular have been informed regularly of developments concerning Suresh in Canada. The Sri Lankan government too often refers to this directly and indirectly. There have been several instances where the matter has been referred to as an example of international opinion veering around to Sri Lanka's point of view and that Canada itself was penalising and banning the LTTE. These were erroneous statements made without understanding the complexities of the Canadian situation.

The watermark reached its highest when Canadian immigration minister Lucienne Robilliard ordered Suresh to be deported to Sri Lanka on the 19th of January this year. When Suresh's lawyers sought an injunction from the Canadian Federal Court against this ruling Mme. Justice Lamer-Tremblay upheld the deportation order and stated that Suresh could be deported to Sri Lanka. Since Suresh himself had gained refugee status in Canada on the grounds of fleeing persecution in Sri Lanka his case was now on the verge of setting controversial precedents.

Moreover it seemed that the image of Sri Lanka abroad had now improved. Most refugees from Sri Lanka find it easy to obtain political asylum because of the negative impression of Sri Lanka in the human rights sphere. Foreign minister Kadirgamar was obviously delighted at this turn of events and spoke quite frankly with the Canadian Daily "The Globe and Mail". Kadirgamar was quoted by the "Globe" of Jan. 17th as describing Suresh as a "big fish" which in turn helped Suresh in courts later.

What happened next was not to Sri Lanka's liking. Suresh's lawyer Barbara Jackma who enjoys reputation in legal circles as being a champion of the underdog went to the Ontario General Division Court and sought an injunction against the deportation order on the day of scheduled deportation. The motion sought a restraining order on the Immigration and Citizenship minister from deporting Suresh until his challenge to constitutionality of sections of Immigration Act under which he was ordered deported had been heard and determined. An interim stay order against deportation was obtained. The application against Suresh's deportation was heard by Justice Dennis Lane on Jan. 23rd. Barbara L. Jackman and Ronald P. Poulton appeared on behalf of Suresh while Cheryl D. E. Mitchell and Bridget A. O'Leary appeared on behalf of the Crown. Decision was reserved for Jan. 28th of 1998. Justice Lane ruled in favour of the applicant Suresh stating that court was satisfied that applicant would be at grave risk of torture and death if returned to Sri Lanka and granted motion.

The ruling and the reasons for it have been recorded fully in the latest Ontario Law Reports 38 O.R. (3d). It has been indexed as Suresh vs Regina. Relevant extracts from it are reproduced here so as to provide an insight into the ramifications of the Suresh vs Regina case in Canada particularly the reasons as to why he was not deported to Sri Lanka. The salient points in Justice Lane's ruling about the considerations taken into account when making his decision are as follows...

"Mr. Suresh (The "applicant") moves for an order restraining the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration from deporting the applicant or otherwise causing him to be removed from Canada until the determination of the issues raised in the main application herein. The applicant seeks to have our court declare that the sections of the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2 under which he is to be deported are unenforceable as they are inconsistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and to attack the acts of the Minister done under those sections in his case. He had concurrent proceedings presently before the Federal Court of Canada seeking leave to bring a proceeding there to judicially review the same acts of the Minister.

On Monday, January 19, '98 at the opening of the applicant's motion to enjoin his removal from Canada, I heard a motion by the Crown to stay this motion on the ground that the matter was before the Federal Court and that this court should, as a matter of discretion and comity, decline to intervene. For reasons which I endorsed on the record that day, I decided that it was necessary in the interest of justice to intervene to ensure that the applicant would not be deported without having his day in court on the issues raised in the Federal Court and here. I did so with some concern bearing in mind that the Federal Court itself had refused the very injunction now sought before me. However, no appeal could be brought in that court for procedural reason noted in my endorsement and it seemed to me, as I said:

Once removed to Sri Lanka, there seems to be a good possibility that the applicant will not be in a position to benefit from any potential success he may have in the application for leave in the Federal Court. In these very narrow and peculiar circumstances, and in light of the view I hold that to offer the applicant a forum to review his constitutional rights, and then to deport him before the constitutionality of his deportation is resolved, would be affront to Canadian ideas of justice...

I agreed to hear the motion for the injunction on its merits. That hearing took place on January 23 and I reserved my decision.

The heart of the applicant's factual case is that if he is returned to Sri Lanka he will be in grave danger of persecution, torture and death. He asserts no inalienable right to remain in Canada, but only that he ought not to be deported to a country where he will face such consequences. His presence in Canada has been founded to be a danger to this country and that finding was reviewed by the Federal Court under the Immigration Act and found to have a reasonable basis. He is, and has been found by the Federal Court to be, a member of LTTE, the Tamil organization which is conducted an insurgency against the mainly Sinhalese government of Sri Lanka. He concedes that he has been active in this country in raising funds for LTTE. There is considerable affidavit evidence suggesting that the applicant will be detained upon arrival in Sri Lanka and that persons with similar anti-government records as his have suffered both official and unofficial reprisals, not stopping short of torture and murder. There are reports of international agencies and national government agencies confirming that such occurrences are dismayingly frequent in Sri Lanka. There is evidence that numbers of prisoners have disappeared from the custody of the government security forces and that recent history shows that the government does not fully control its own forces in the field and in the prisons at the prisoners handling and protection level. There is evidence that the activities of the applicant make him typical of the kind of activities against whom these sorts of reprisals take place.

The position of the applicant is that he is personally at a special risk because of his known position in the LTTE. This is supported by the reported statements of the Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka (Toronto Globe and Mail, January 17, 1998, Record, p. 204) that the applicant is a "big fish" whose activities are seen as "lethal". While the Foreign Minister also said that the applicant would be safe, there is much evidence to the effect that no guarantee of safety would be effective in the conditions prevailing in Sri Lanka.

The Crown, with the resources of the Ministry behind it, did not provide any witness to deny that such outrageous as torture and extra-judicial "execution" of imprisoned opponents of the regime occur. Instead, the Crown submitted that the court should find that the applicant will be safe because diplomatic assurances to that effect have been received from officials of the government of Sri Lanka, both in that country and here. But no such diplomatic assurance is before me. There is an affidavit from the Immigration Department Lawyer, Toby Hoffman, stating that the deponent has read an e-mail transmission between two other Immigration Department lawyers advising that unnamed officials of Sri Lanka gave unnamed officials of Canada assurances that while the applicant may be detained, he will not be subjected to torture or degrading treatment, and that it is "presumed" that the Sri Lankan government will provide protection. This is a far cry from the sort of evidence that would provide a basis for reliance upon the diplomatic assurances of a foreign government. The assurance itself is not before the court, nor do we even know if it is in writing nor at what level it was given. There is no evidence from the appropriate Canadian authorities stating any confidence in these assurances and whether we have treaty relations with Sri Lanka that would ensure that there are in place mechanisms for monitoring compliance.

On the evidence, I am satisfied that the applicant has raised a strong prima facie case that if he is returned he will likely be the subject of serious reprisals for his anti-government activity. The evidence indicates that there is a serious risk that these reprisals will extend to torture and possibly death.

The parties are agreed that the test to be met by the applicant on this motion is three-fold:

- to show a serious issue to be tried;

- to show that without the restraining order the applicant will suffer irreparable harm;

- to show that the balance of convenience favours the applicant, essentially by assessing which of the parties would suffer the greater harm from the grant or refusal of the interim remedy.

Canada's international obligations must inform any debate on whether the deportation of the applicant to a country where he may well be illegally tortured and killed conforms to our concepts of fundamental justice, or may be justified under S. 1 of the Charter on the basis of a pressing and substantial objective justifying a restriction on Charter rights: Slaight Communications Inc v. Davidson (1989) 1 S.C.R. 1038 at p 1056, 59 D.L.R. (4th) 416. Canada has ratified the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment which contains as art 3, the following:

3. No State party shall expel, return (refouler) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.

The Crown submitted that Mr. Suresh had already been found to be a danger to Canada because of his involvement with LTTE, an organization involved in terrorist activities in Sri Lanka and which itself is allied to be hostile to human rights in territory under its control. In my view, these considerations as to the nature of LTTE cannot prevail today, even assuming that they might have some relevance in a proceeding where the ultimate merits are being decided. They may give grounds for a refusal to exercise discretion at the end of a full argument, but I am to make only a preliminary assessment of the merits. On that basis, I am of the opinion that the Charter considerations noted above are too fundamental to be overridden by such matters. Charter rights are the due, not only of the good, but also of the bad, the unworthy and the undeserving.

The Crown submitted that the court should refuse relief to the applicant as he had filed no affidavit in this matter. The facts as to his activities were already canvassed before Tetelbaum J. in the Federal Court on the issue of the reasonableness of the detrmination that the applicant was a danger to Canada. That being so, the major utility of such an affidavit in the present proceedings would be to say that he feared for his safety if returned to Sri Lanka. The Crown did not cross-examine the deponents who expressed this fear on the applicant's behalf and I can see no ground for holding that his failure to make an affidavit should be fatal to his exercise of a right to challenge the constitutionality of the law under which he is to be deported. As his counsel pointed out, he has not been in Sri Lanka since the early 1990s and other are better witnesses as to what may await him there than he could be.

What counsel for the Crown described as her main submission was that there was no factual underpinning to the suggestion that the applicant was personally in any danger, because of the assurances of his safety given by the Government of Sri Lanka. For the reasons already noted, I do not accept this submission.

She also submitted that it did not raise a serious issue to say that the applicant, an alien with no absolute right to remain in Canada, could not be deported because of a fear of torture in the receiving country.

The prospect of torture does not become less outrageous because it will be inflicted illegally.

In my view the applicant has shown a serious issue to be tried, both factually and legally, in the proceedings before me.

If the applicant is deported to Sri Lanka, the evidence shows that he will almost certainly be detained and questioned and exposed to risks of torture and extra-judicial execution described above. In such circumstances, there is a strong probability that it will be impossible for the Canadian courts to influence the situation at all. His application will become moot, for any relief he might obtain would be unenforceable de facto, refusal of the injunctive relief decides the whole case against him. This is certainly damage which cannot be quantified or compensated in monetary terms, or at all by our courts. The applicant has demonstrated irreparable harm.

Counsel for the Crown contended that even if there is a serious issue to be tried and irreparable harm to the applicant, nevertheless the balance of convenience favours Canada. This country is not to be allowed to become a haven for terrorists and their supporters, any more that for murders (Bembenek, supra); sympathy should not be wasted on the applicant who chose the life of a terrorist and brought this situation on himself. It is true that the Federal Court has confirmed that the governmental decision to regard the applicant as a danger to Canada was not unreasonable. On the other hand, as noted in ex. A to the affidavit of Donald Gauthier at p. 6 the applicant is not known to have personally committed any acts of violence either in Canada or in Sri Lanka. His activity in this country, for which he is to be deported, was heading an organization which raised significant funds for the LTTE which are said to have prolonged the civil war. A continuation of these activities was judged to be unacceptable as counter to our international commitment to the fight against terrorism.

I accept that it is for the executive to make these sorts of judgements, but my duty is to weight the balance of convenience among the public interest generally, the interest of the Crown as litigant and the interest of the applicant: see the discussion in RJR-MacDonald, supra, pp 42-47.

The harm to the applicant if the order is refused is self-evident and has already been described; deportation will de facto finally decide the case against him, since he will be unable to benefit from any relief obtained on his behalf.

The harm to the Crown as litigant if the order is made is that the removal of the applicant is, at best, delayed, and may be frustrated altogether in the end. It will cost money to keep him here, in custody, and to fight the litigation, and the possible loss of the litigation may frustrate the Government's interest in the swift removal of terrorists generally. There was no submission that he is now, or will in the future, be able to continue from custody the objection able activities for which he is to be deported, is the immediate harm of those activities is no longer a factor. It seems to be unlikely that the spectacle of the applicant in custody fighting to avoid deportation will make Canada any more attractive to other terrorists, apart from the fact that he is being allowed the rights which the law gives him. If that makes us a more attractive place to be, then we shall all have to face it with such equanimity as we can muster, for the alternative, to deny people fundamental human rights, such as access to courts, is unacceptable.

What is the general public interest in this situation? The Crown calls up on the public interest in our keeping our international commitments in the fight against terrorism: the applicant points to the general public interest in our keeping the international commitments we undertook when we ratified the Convention against torture. There is an undoubted public interest maintaining our commitment through the Charter and the common law to the rule of law. There is a public interest in maintaining the integrity of, and public confidence in, the courts, both of which will be undermined by the perception that resort to the courts may be frustrated by executive action. In my view, on balance the harm to the public interest occasioned by deporting this man, without allowing his challenge to the lawfulness of his deportation to be heard, greatly outweigh the contrary interests. Such an act would offend our national sense of justice and fairness. To that must be added the probability that he will be subjected to detention and worse in the hands of the security forces whose record is as described in the evidence. Our deporting him to face this fate is problematic indeed for a signatory to the convention against Torture. I have no doubt that the general public interest requires that the deportation order by stayed until his Charter rights have been determined.

Overall therefore, the balance of convenience favours the applicant. The applicant has therefore met all of the tests for injunctive relief.

An order will go restraining the respondents from causing the deportation or other removal of the applicant from Canada until ten days after the Federal Court of Canada has heard and determined the applicant's application, now pending in that court as no. IMM-117-98, for leave to commence a judicial review of the decision of the Minister under s.53(1) of the Immigration Act and other relief. If there is any difficulty in settling the exact form of the order, an appointment may be arranged through my assistant, Mrs. Diamante. Costs were not addressed in the argument and may also be spoken to by appointment.

Motion granted.

Excerpts of White House Press briefing, August 3.
PRESS BRIEFING BY BARRY TOIV

Q: Can you tell us any more about whether the President is going to stay to his story, the one he's told that he said was the truth, that he had no sexual relationship with Monica Lewinsky?

Mr. TOIV: The President told you that he is going to testify truthfully, and so that is -- he's already spoken to that.

Q: But is that the truth? Or is there some other truth to which he will now testify?

Mr. TOIV: I have absolutely no reason to believe otherwise.

Q: Did he do any preparation today for his testimony? Has he gotten into any kind of -- not rehearsal, but discussions with lawyers about how to handle this?

Mr. TOIV: I don't know if he has spoken with his lawyers today or not. I'm sure that he will spend a fair amount of time talking to his lawyers between now and the 17th. But whether he has spoken to them today, or how he is preparing, I don't have any information for you on that.

Q: Well, that's actually what I'm asking, is how is he preparing?

Mr. TOIV: I'm sure he will spend time talking to his lawyers and doing whatever he thinks is necessary and that they think is necessary to prepare. But I don't have any detail for you on exactly how he is going to prepare.

Q: Has the President taken note of this outpouring of advice publicly to him to come -- if, in fact, he lied earlier -- to come and recant?

Mr. TOIV: Let me come back to that. If this is of any help, the President's Counsel believes this to be an extremely important issue for the institution of the presidency. And you have his statement as to the exact reasons that he has appealed -- that the White House is going to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court. But he does view this as a very important issue for the institution of the presidency.

Q: Has the President noted all that?

Mr. TOIV: I believe he's aware of some of it. And as I said this morning, we'll have -- he'll receive all kinds of advice from people inside, from people outside, from outsiders who were insiders, insiders who were outsiders. We'll hear it all and take note of it.

Q: For a brief time Mr. Clinton was a law professor. Does he think it, from a legal standpoint, a wise course to confess to committing a felony?

Mr. TOIV: I don't know why that question comes up.

Q: Well, if he changed his testimony I take it he would be admitting he lied under oath in the Paula Jones deposition and he was talking under penalty of perjury there.

Mr. TOIV: I don't think I have anything that could go beyond what I've already said.

Q: Barry, does he see it as legitimate advice, or is it just politics?

Mr. TOIV: Well, it probably depends on the individual who is giving it, but I don't think I'm going to get into who is giving which.

Q: Oh, come on.

Q: Why is he fielding all this advise? Why is he spending so much time -- you said this morning that you expect him to spend a fair amount of time with Mr. Kendall and he's going to be doing daily sessions. Why does he need to do all that preparation if he's simply going to stick to his original story?

Mr. TOIV: I don't recall saying he's going to do daily sessions.

Q: No, but that was suggested.

Mr. TOIV: I said that he would probably spend some time with his attorneys.

Q: But why all the preparation if he's just sticking to his story? How complicated can it be?

Mr. TOIV: I think that anybody who is going to testify before a grand jury spends some time talking to attorneys. They're not very wise otherwise.

Q: Barry, do you think that since the President is testifying voluntarily and the subpoena has been withdrawn that Mr. Kendall has an obligation to share any results on this dress that may be made available August 17th?

Mr. TOIV: I think that I'll leave that to Mr. Kendall.

Q: I mean Mr. Starr.

Mr. TOIV: Oh, I'm sorry. Say again.

Q: Do you think Mr. Starr has an obligation to share the results of the FBI tests on the dress with the President, assuming that the test results are known before August 17th?

Mr. TOIV: Different question, same answer. I think I'll leave that to Mr. Kendall.

Q: Barry, is it a problem with all this sort of TV chatter, especially from people like Jack Quinn and others who are essentially administration proxies, sort of saying two things -- one, at the worst case scenario, it's only sex; and two, he's sort of hinting that there might be some sort of further explanation? I mean, implicit in all this sort of talk is that they don't believe the President, and these are people who are ostensibly on his side. I mean, what to make of that?

Mr. TOIV: You would need to ask them. They're making those statements and you just need to ask them what's the basis of those statements.

Q: But the President doesn't mind all these people talking with the sort of implicit assumption that somehow he didn't tell the truth?

Mr. TOIV: I don't think the President pays a lot of attention to what goes on on the Sunday morning shows.

Q: Any plans for the President to address the American people on this in conjunction, perhaps with this testimony -

Mr. TOIV: Now, the Sunday afternoon shows, maybe that's a little different.

Q: Any plans for the President to make an address to the American people on this in conjunction with his testimony, either before or after -

Mr. TOIV: No plans that I'm aware of. As for before, I mean, the President has already spoken to that. As for after, no plans that I'm aware of.

Q: So you've absolutely ruled out a -

Mr. TOIV: Well, the President said -- on Friday I believe the President said that, you can understand why I will not be commenting in the interim.

Q: Right. But he said other things like, I want to -- you know, sooner rather than later, more rather than less. What I'm asking, are you ruling out an address to the nation before the 17th?

Mr. TOIV: I'm only telling you what the President said. And I have no reason to expect that he will change his mind about that.

Q: Do you have any guidance on this or are you just -

Mr. TOIV: I have no reason to believe he will change his mind about that.

Q: Does the White House think that David Kendall misled the press when he announced that the President would give testimony on the 17th, but failed to tell us that the grand jury would see a live television feed of it?

Mr. TOIV: Well, it appears to me that Mr. Kendall and Mr. Starr reached an agreement, apparently a very complicated agreement, about how the testimony would take place and about how the testimony would be spoken about by Mr. Kendall. And Mr. Kendall has now issued two statements. I don't think that I'm in a position to go beyond that. First of all, I don't know the nature of the agreement between the two of them, but Mr. Kendall was fairly clear about giving his reason for issuing a slightly different statement on Saturday than he had previously. And I'm going to leave it at that. I'm not going to go beyond that and I'm not in a position to know what the agreement was.

Q: Do you know if the President or anyone else as the White House agreed with Kendall's decision initially not to reveal that part of the agreement on grand jury testimony?

Mr. TOIV: I don't know.

Q: Could you please clarify, will the President be able to answer direct questions from members of the grand jury?

Mr. TOIV: I don't know the answer to that. You would have to ask Mr. Kendall that question.

Q: To follow up Mara's question, will the President give a national address after his deposition?

Mr. TOIV: I'm not aware of any plans at this time.

Q: Is that something you might want to take into consideration and suggest to the President?

Mr. TOIV: Me, personally?

Q: Barry, in the two weeks before the testimony that the President will be giving, does he feel there has been a chilling effect already by these court decisions on attorney-client privilege and executive privilege in terms of restricting his ability to consult with some of his closest advisors and aides here at the White House?

Mr. TOIV: Well, the President has really relied very heavily on his Counsel to work through the decision-making process on this issue and whether to appeal it. And his Counsel, Mr. Ruff, believes very strongly that this is a critical issue not only for the White House, but for the entire government. And that is why the issue is being appealed.

But as far as -- I don't think I can -- I have not asked the President himself whether he feels that there is this kind of effect right at this moment.

Q: So you can't tell us if it's already had a chilling effect on the President as he reached this major decision?

Mr. TOIV: No, I cannot answer that question.

Q: But it's true there are some things he doesn't discuss with aides because they are subject to subpoena -- I mean, that's true, isn't it?

Mr. TOIV: Well, that's always been true. In this case, that's been true.

Q: Kashmir, what about that?

COLONEL CROWLEY: There is no question that the fighting -- I understand the fighting has tapered off somewhat today, but the fighting over the weekend underscores the tensions that we have seen for sometime in Kashmir. The nuclear tests that both countries made earlier this year raises the stakes in terms of Kashmir being a flashpoint, which is why, over the last few weeks, we have continued to press the Indians and the Pakistanis to meet, to talk, and through that dialogue to try to resolve their differences.

We're encouraged by the fact that they have, at both the prime ministerial level last week, foreign ministerial level last week, conducted some negotiations. And we hope that they can use this dialogue to help defuse tensions in the subcontinent.

Q: And is the President still leaving open some time in November, after Malaysia or before Malaysia, to visit India and Pakistan, if it would be helpful?

COLONEL CROWLEY: All decisions on the trip to Malaysia and other destinations are -- well, the APEC, we'll do APEC in November. Will the President visit any other countries? Those are decisions which are yet to be made.

EXCERPTS OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT NOON BRIEFING, AUGUST 3

State Department Spokesman James Rubin briefed.

Q: Is the State Department keeping track of the violence that is going on between India and Pakistan? And does the United States play any role in trying to mediate an end to that?

RUBIN: From Thursday through Saturday, artillery and small arms exchanges across the line of control separating Kashmir intensified, reportedly killing dozens of people -- many of them civilians. Sunday and today, however, the fighting tapered off significantly. There are firing incidents along the line of control almost daily during the summer, but the recent exchanges were particularly intense. Adding to the tensions are continued killings of civilians inside Kashmir and now in the Indian state of Himachal Pradesh. We condemn these acts of terrorism. The volatility of Kashmir is a stark reminder of the pressing need for India and Pakistan to resolve their differences. This is particularly true now, following the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in which have significantly raised the stakes in their disputes. We have made clear to both sides in the past that they should refrain from provocative actions as well as provocative rhetoric. I would expect those messages to be sent -- most recently in response to those fightings very shortly.

We urge the two countries to resume the senior-level dialogue as soon as possible, and to approach these talks imaginatively and constructively. We are willing to assist the parties in this process at the request of both parties; we don't offer to mediate unless requested by both sides.

Q: You said messages have been sent someone is on his way or --

RUBIN: I expect it to be done shortly. If it hasn't occurred already.

Q: Well if you don't want to announce --

RUBIN: I just don't know, Barry.

Q: But you mean physically will be delivered.

RUBIN: No, no, I'm talking about a diplomatic message from our government to the Indian and Pakistani Governments, not a new trip or a new envoy or anything.

Q: Not the Secretary of State or anything?

RUBIN: No. I'm talking about a message government-to-government message which either has occurred or will occur shortly.

Q: Jamie, the situation appears to be deteriorating with the bad meeting in Colombo between the two leaders; now the fighting intensifying in Kashmir. And as you said, given the background of all of this, isn't your concern raised even higher than it was after the tests now? Do you see things deteriorating as they appear to be or is not --

RUBIN: I don't know that I would agree with the characterization of an across-the- board deterioration. Clearly, the meetings were not fully successful and at the in Sri Lanka, I guess they were; but, we have been in touch with both the Indians and the Pakistanis in a very intense discussion in recent weeks. Secretary Albright had some opportunity to do that on her trip, and obviously Deputy Secretary Talbott has gone through extensive discussions with the two sides. He's going to continue to do that, and there are additional meetings planned in the coming weeks. So that is the diplomatic effort that we're doing, and we believe there is enough reason for optimism to continue working on it. That doesn't mean that we're likely to see a breakthrough by any stretch of the imagination, but we're working the problem.

With respect to the fighting, I think what I the information I've received is that it tends to go up and down at this time of year. This was a particularly intense outburst of fighting with a particularly tragic loss of life, but it has calmed down today and yesterday.

Q: Do you see one side or the other being more inflexible than the other? I mean, it seems like --

RUBIN: At this point, I haven't gotten the kind of report from Deputy Secretary Talbott that would encourage me to make that kind of a judgment.

-Wireless File- USIA

That the Buddha smiled is by now a familiar expression with respect to Indian nuclear testing. Recently during the time of the SAARC summit the Prime Minister of the land where the Buddha lived smiled in the land which has become the home of the Buddha Dhamma for the last two thousand three hundred years. The smile of the Indian Prime Minister Shri Atal Behari Vajpaee had nothing to do with nuclear power. According to a Sunday newspaper he had smiled after listening to the TULF delegation.

The delegation of the Tamil United Left Front, which was headed by Mr. M. Sivasithamparam included the TULF parliamentarians Messrs. R. Sampanthan, Joseph Pararajasingham and Neelan Thiruchelvam. According to the Sunday newspaper the delegation "highlighting the plight of the Tamils" had cited the arbitrary arrests of the Tamils. They have also told the Indian Prime Minister that travel to Jaffna was limited It is learnt that Shri Vajpaee had very attentively listened to them and smiled.

I am not sure as to whether the TULF delegation told the Indian Prime Minister that travel to Jaffna is limited because of the LTTE activities and that the trains cannot run beyond Vavuniya as the railway tracks had been removed by the LTTE, and that with or without trains they would not go to Jaffna as the LTTE is waiting to give them a grand welcome and that being humble servants of the Tamil people they are not interested in such welcomes. They would not have told the Indian Premier that the LTTE recently attacked the Dalada Maligawa nor that only the Tamils are arrested on suspicion as LTTE members not because they are Tamils but due to the fact almost all members of the LTTE happen to be Tamils. The TULF would not have mentioned that the former mayoress of Jaffna was killed by the LTTE.

My fundamental question is not on what the TULF leaders did not tell Shri Vajpayee. They had no business to tell the Prime Minister of a foreign country, however friendly it may be to interfere in the internal affairs of the country. The Indian Prime Minister did not respond to what the TULF leaders had to tell him and he only politely smiled with them. As the President Ms. Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunge has said the Indians know that the problem in the North and the East is an internal problem of Sri Lanka. The Indian leaders would like to forget the past, especially what took place during the Jayawardane era.

The unfortunate and infamous Indo - Sri Lanka agreement was a result of the western oriented foreign policy of the J. R. Jayawardane government. The Indira Gandhi government as well as the Rajiv Gandhi government overreacted to the JRJ foreign policy and made a blunder in nurturing the LTTE as well as the other armed Tamil racist groups. People like Dixit, who acted as if he was the viceroy, contributed much to the suffering.

One is bound to ask the question what would be the position of India if a political party or parties which claim to represent the Muslims in India were to meet with the Prime Minister of Pakistan to air their "grievances". The TULF leaders, Mr. Ashraff and the representatives of a Hindu Association in Jaffna have also met the Indian Prime Minister over tea. There is no harm in having tea with a foreign dignitary. But to talk internal politics with him and, as some have done, to request him to intervene in our internal affairs is not something that should be overlooked by a sovereign country. To globalise the incident in the context of the "global village", which has the American President as the village headman, would America allow the Spanish speaking people in the U. S. A. to discuss matters arising out of making English the official language in that country with the head of state or government in a Spanish speaking country in the Americas.

Let us remember that the Indo - Sri Lanka, or the JR- Rajiv agreement was not only a blunder but something which is defunct now. It is an irony of history that the agreement was not implemented after the so-called Indian Peace Keeping Force left the country. The IPKF discredited in the eyes of the Sri Lankans went back without fulfilling the conditions in the agreement. The moment the so - called IPKF left the country the Indo - Sri Lanka agreement was made defunct.

The LTTE was not disarmed and the Sri Lankan army was again entrusted with that task. The Sri Lankan army could have done that already, if not for the political interference and pressure brought by the so-called moderate Tamil Parties, the NGO's and the non national lobby in general The week kneed governments by giving into these pressures have only managed to betray the country.

The so-called moderate Tamil parties do need the LTTE for their political survival. Knowing very well that individually they are under death threat they have to make sure that the LTTE is not defeated militarily. Their strategy of Federalism first and then a separate state can succeed only if the LTTE keeps on fighting for an Eelam in one step. The TULF is then in a position to pose as a moderate party and achieve Eelam after going through an intermediate Federal constitution, say for example, in the form of G. L. - Neelan regional councils. Only with the presence of the LTTE, they can pretend to be moderates and come out with their harmful "alternatives" like provincial councils and regional councils, which will eventually lead to a Federal state.

The "moderates" want the LTTE in order to establish the regional councils or the Federal constitution, come to power in the East and the North and then defeat the LTTE politically. But as long as Prabhakaran is alive these "moderates" can "rule" Jaffna peninsula only from Colombo, with the help of the Sri Lankan army. If not for the army they cannot even think of having mayors in Jaffna.

The TULF and the others cannot ask the Indian Prime Minister to intervene in our internal affairs for the simple reason that Sri Lanka is a sovereign country. The Indo -Sri Lanka agreement was a blunder and it is defunct now. People should not be allowed to make capital on blunders and defunct agreements. The only remnant of the disgraceful Indo- Sri Lanka agreement is the contemptuous provincial councils. It was under the Indo - Sri Lanka agreement that the thirteenth amendment was drafted which paved way to the provincial councils. However these were established as a solution to the "grievances" of the Tamils and were based on concepts such as Tamil Homeland, Tamil nation and self determination. All these myths have been now exploded.

Tamil leaders themselves now admit that the homeland theory was a hoax. They now claim to have graduated from "grievances" to aspirations. They assert that the provincial councils do not satisfy their aspirations and now demand regional councils keeping to their policy of "little now and more later".

It is useless to discuss the homeland hoax. However I must say a few more words about "grievances" and aspirations. The strategy of "little now and more later" suggests that it is not "grievances" but aspirations that have motivated the Tamil racists to continue with their hostilities. The "grievances" and mythical histories were created in order to justify the aspirations. It is not a matter of graduating from "grievances" to aspirations but a case of Tamil leaders advancing from Ponnambalam aspirations to Prabhakaran aspirations through Chelvanayakam aspirations.

I have described these aspirations earlier but we can conceptualise them better under the headings given above. The architects behind the Ponnambalam aspirations were the three Ponnambalams, namely Messrs. Ponnambalam Ramanathan, Ponnambalam Arunachalam and G. G. Ponnambalam. Ponnambalam aspiration was to see that the Sinhala people did not have a majority at the centre, that is the Legislative Assembly and the State Council. Chelvanayakam aspiration was Federalism first and then Eelam while Prabhakaran aspiration is Eelam and nothing but Eelam.

The Bandaranaike - Chelvanayakam pact, the Dudley - Chelvanayakam pact, The District Development Councils, the Provincial Councils and the Regional Councils are all steps taken to fulfil the Chelvanayakam aspiration with the strategy of "little now and more later". The memorandum sent by the TULF to Shri Rajiv Gandhi falls within this scheme. The governments of the Gandhis depended on the myths created by the Chelvanayakam aspiration to teach a lesson to the JRJ government.

The Indian government now understands the folly of their past policy on Sri Lanka and appears to be determined to stay away from the internal affairs of the country. It is in the interests of both India and Sri Lanka that Shri Vajpaee should continue to smile whenever he meets the Tamil leaders over tea.

MORE