Pericles Gasparini Alves and Daiana Belinda Cipollone
There are strong reasons to argue that the issues of illicit trafficking in small arms and sensitive technologies can be addressed as a single problem, even though, at first glance, both encompass a large scope of subjects with sharp differences. For example, while illegal trafficking in small arms covers mostly hand/shoulder-carried arms and a handful of other light weapons, illegal trafficking in sensitive technologies involves a quite different category of products such as nuclear material, chemical and biological substances, their related technologies and delivery vehicles.

Both of these illegal dealings, however, are often linked to drug smuggling, terrorist activity, guerrilla warfare, and organized crime, as well as other types of low intensity conflict. In some cases, illicit trafficking in drugs and small arms is a precursor to trafficking in sensitive technologies, creating a spiral of corruption and other felonies of national and international proportions.

Illicit trafficking therefore affects both the stability of States and the safety of their populations. There are no national or regional boundaries delimiting this type of traffic: the problem is truly global with multifaceted ramifications. Curbing its development and proliferation calls for a better assessment of the phenomenon and a new way of looking at problems and identifying solutions.

In a world of growing interdependence, the greatest challenge today seems to be that of making bold decisions establishing new priorities and being willing to start innovative co-operative ventures, while changing old ways of thinking and working.

This attitude constitutes a particular vision, which is an integral part of the quest for a new world order; seeking structural changes to the fabric of international security alone will not be enough to reach this goal; one must also dare to undertake profound transformations of fundamental values. Coping with the issue of illicit trafficking from a new perspective is therefore the sine qua non for success in this fight both on the national and international level.

Understanding the problem
There is a real need today to address the issue of illicit trafficking in small arms and sensitive technologies from a variety of angles, taking into consideration their interrelationship and implications for other areas of social and State security. It is important to venture to make assessments of the illicit trafficking problem in different regions of the world. This has been the challenge that the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) has faced over the last several years. In trying to clarify the illicit trafficking problem, it has organized different meetings and supported the publication of books describing, for example, what small arms are, what constitutes their illicit trafficking, and the kind of conflicts in which these weapons are being used.

In addition, though it is a fact that some manufacturers and dealers have been involved in illegal transactions, the role of manufacturers and dealers in illegal trafficking in small arms is rarely addressed. The debate promoted by UNIDIR helps to fill that gap.

There is also a need to understand illicit trafficking better because it is generally carried out in secret. What are the schemes used to transfer weapons, substances and technologies? What factors influence manufacturers and dealers to engage in illicit trafficking? What are the different interrelationships between arms manufacturers and traffickers? How and why is it so difficult to control illicit trafficking in a changing supply and demand environment?

Illegal trafficking in nuclear/radioactive substances has been a subject of growing concern since the late 1980s. Like other problems involving smuggling of illegal substances and material, curbing this type of trafficking is as much a problem of controlling national supplies of nuclear/radioactive material as it is a matter of co-ordination of knowledge and information on the international level.

While law enforcement, intelligence services and related institutions constitute the first counter-traffic obstacles within national boundaries, several organizations such as the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the World Customs Organization (WCO), and others are also sensitive to the issue.

As in the case of small arms and drugs, it is well known that there is an effort to understand the specific sources of supply and the flow of demand of material related to the production of weapons of mass destruction.

Efforts are also made in many countries to improve the physical safety of installations that contain or transport sensitive material and substances. Yet what other kinds of co-operative measures exist on the national and international levels? Are those co-operation efforts sufficient? Is there room for improving individual and/or collective actions?

The discussion promoted by UNIDIR also addresses the role of terrorism in illicit trafficking. How and when did drug cartels start supporting terrorist groups? Are present trends in such support the same today as in the 1970s and 1980s? Are there similarities in such trends from country to country or region to region? How can national means of counter-terrorist activity face increasingly rich and heavily armed groups? How can human and material resources be better managed to respond more appropriately to the mounting requirements of law enforcement and to strengthen information-gathering centres?

Looking ahead
The UNIDIR efforts also stimulates a reflection on how institutions and Governments can be better prepared to counter illicit trafficking. There is a quest to highlight perspectives for new and improved synergies and international co-operation. In the area of small arms, for example, intensive efforts are underway at the global and regional levels to reach agreement on curbing the illicit traffic in certain categories of small arms, ammunition and explosives.

Yet, given the nature and status of the problem today, any such agreement would not have great practical effect if counter-traffic authorities do not receive adequate means to enforce the law, not only at the national level, but also at the regional level as regards strategies of surveillance, tracking and intervention.

Moreover, it is not easy to organize multilateral action; the reasons and manner in which co-operation could be fostered vary from the issue of small arms to drugs to sensitive technologies. An additional obstacle is that, at the national level, few countries have a comprehensive legal regime that can provide for preventive deterrent initiatives, law enforcement and punitive actions in all areas of illegal trafficking.

At the international level, the development of ad hoc arrangements and regimes prevails today over global agreements controlling the transfer of certain sensitive technologies and goods.

It is true, though in spite of the absence of a solid legal regime, that there are some joint actions by members of those arrangements to co-ordinate national policies and to promote transparency in transfers of technologies and goods.

However, none of these arrangements or regimes have multilateral verification systems. Nor do they provide for national control schemes.

Controls are expected to be carried out by regular national entities that are in charge of implementing national legislation. In some countries, these national entities have traditionally worked separately and do not necessarily share their work in great detail, eg., police forces and intelligence services.

In some instances, this state of affairs can create a gap in the relationship of institutions and in the final analysis it benefits those conducting illegal trafficking. Therefore, the international community must agree on a new agenda to fight illicit trafficking.

Having acknowledged this basic premise, one should question how the strengthening of international co-operation can contribute to the creation of a new agenda to fight illicit trafficking. Should there be a call for new tactical and strategic approaches? Is there a need to have more encompassing multilateral actions? The answer to both of these questions is "yes".

What is needed today is to increase the level of co-operation between and among those institutions and communities that could together, more effectively than alone, take action to combat illicit trafficking, be it in small arms, substances related to the production of weapons of mass destruction or terrorism.

Recommendations
In conclusion, there is a real need to put together those institutions that have practical experience in dealing with legal and illicit traffic in weapons, substances and technologies, to conceive a plan of action and a forward-looking agenda for co-operation. The following recommendations provide what could be considered as the first step towards achieving that goal.

Some short-term action
* Raise the awareness of decision makers to the growing importance of intelligence gathering in the prevention and struggle against the illicit traffic in substances, technologies, materials and equipment, and the need to provide relevant agencies with human and technical resources.

* Increase investigations of centres of arms concentration, aiming at reducing their importance as a fuelling factor of armed violence at the domestic, regional and international levels.

* Create or improve control of small arms related systems in the possession of civil society.

* Improve control mechanisms at airports, airstrips, harbours, terminals, borders, stations, land, air and sea routes, and any other place that could be used for illicit trafficking.

* Install adequate mechanism to co-ordinate the efforts of different agencies responsible for this issue.

* Implement training courses for those directly enforcing national laws in the field, as well as for those at the senior levels of law enforcement.

At regional and global levels
* Conducting a detailed survey of all industries relevant to the question, regardless of volume of sales, which might eventually be subject to control mechanisms.

* Increasing co-operation in intelligence activities to enhance the detection and monitoring of the supply and demand of arms and sensitive substances.

* Conducting joint investigations of border areas and encouraging the exchange of information on criminal elements and traffickers involved in the illegal trade of arms and other substances.

* Enhancing monitoring measures for legitimate international commerce in order to detect unusual flows of goods or funds that might be related to illicit trafficking.

* Fostering permanent collaboration among countries in order to implement national control measures for the export of dual-use materials, equipment and technologies.

* Encouraging information flow among the national agencies specializing in the field at regional and global levels to improve policies and legislation concerning the investigation of illicit trafficking of materials and technologies subject to control.

* Promoting the dissemination of information on different types of proliferation of small arms and sensitive technologies at the political, university and business levels in order to assist the implementation and further development of control measures in each country.

There is a growing willingness on the part of organizations working to curb illicit trafficking to co-operate both nationally and internationally. The development and implementation of these proposed actions should be supported by others more longer-term and sustainable efforts. This book addresses ways and means to pursue this goal.