by 'Foxwatch'
How that the dust has settled after the flurry of April visits by sundry foreigners - Bill Richardson, US Ambassador to the UN; Karl Inderfurth, US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs; Chief Emeka Anyaoku, Secretary-General of the Commonwealth Secretariat; - some of them none too sure of their facts - it is time to reflect on the significance of their convergence on Colombo. Let us not forget, too, Jha"s carefully crafted signal of things to come, in the shape of India"s "friendly concern" and support for a permanent merger of the northern and eastern provinces. (With a friend like India, who needs enemies?).

The gist of the foreign views echo those propagated so assiduously by the devolution lobby - that a political solution is necessary to end the insurgency, that the devolution proposals constitute that solution and that devolution would bring peace. Much of the domestic audience - perhaps the majority - disillusioned by repeated futile efforts by governments to buy peace with concessions, are sceptical about appeasement and alarmed at the vast powers that would be vested in the insurgent region under the devolution proposals. Western nations, with their knee-jerk prescription of political solutions have been more receptive. They have, unnoticed, even gone further than the government by saying the devolution proposals are a good "basis" for a dialogue to end the war!

And in the background lurk the British, the Norwegians and others, willing and eager to mediate a settlement and have their hour of glory.

Another graduation
The shift from domestic debate to high-powered foreign pontificating (to which the higher echelons of power dutifully genuflect) is of the utmost significance. Seamlessly, the devolution campaign has shifted to a new rarefied level where the powerful arguments against (which have never been answered) are being deftly side-stepped with the pro-devolution lobby seeking and obtaining the assistance of known supporters of devolution among major countries. We have again a sleight-of-hand akin to the "graduation" from Tamil grievances (unspecified) to Tamil aspirations (unlimited).

While it may be gratifying to the instigatons of this strategy to neutralise the opponents of devolution, the mediation road is flraught with peril.

Outflanking parliament and people
But first, one must not miss the big issue. The increasingly frantic calls for mediation involved much more than mediation per se. To elaborate, what is at stake is a new Constitution (misleadingly and disarmingly termed "the devolution package", as if it were an item in an industrial dispute) which would replace the existing 1978 Constitution and irrevocably transform the structure of the state so drastically that, in the opinion of millions, it could destroy the sovereignty and integrity of Sri Lanka.

The law requires that the new Constitution has to be approved by a two-thirds majority of Parliament and a simple majority of the electorate of Sri Lanka. Until those momentous votes are taken, the devolution proposals remain proposals which can be approved or rejected and not the holy writ they are made out to be. To thrust mediators into the scene, before Parliament and the populace vote on this momentous issue, would therefore pre-empt the sovereign right of Parliament and people to decide on their own Constitution and instead confront them with a fait accomplit.

Foreign mediators, politicians prepared to bend over backwards to appease, NGOs and ruthless terrorists would take upon themselves a task which only Parliament and the people are empowered to decide.

Facts of international relations
Now to consider the facts of life of foreign intervention. Foreign intervention will not be undertaken out of the goodness of western hearts, or a desire for peace, or traditional ties of friendship with Sri Lanka, or even concern for the Tigers. It was the British statesman Palmerston who formulated one of the classic tenets of international relations: "We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow."

If any confirmation is needed of the continuing validity of this principle, it can be found in "Viceroy" Dixit"s recent book "Assignment Colombo"; referring to Mrs. Gandhi"s support for the LTTE, be writes: "The question whether (Mrs. Gandhi) was right or wrong is a different matter... inter-State relations... are usually determined by considerations of real politic (rather) than ethical norms. The Indian approach... was a reaffirmation of the unpalatable political reality that politics and diplomacy remain an amoral phenomenon."

So we can dismiss instantly the naive (emphasis added) notion that Britain, the most ardent in the queue of mediators, offered its services because "Britain is a close friend of Sri Lanka", to quote ex-junior Minister Fox; and Jha"s professions of "friendly concern" should forewarn us to prepare for affectionate arm-twisting.

Secret, deals, cultivating both sides, shifting alliances, dumping "friends", prevaricating, pandering to the strong, exploiting the weak, and cultivating undercover links with terrorists are the norm in international relations.

Take Britain, the most importunate candidate for mediator. Third-rate power though it may be, it has managed, while professing friendship for Sri Lanka and massaging the egos of its spokespersons, to simultaneously stroke the heads of the LTTE, which seeks to dismember the island, and turned a benevolent blind eye on the terrorists' international headquarters in London. If it succeeds in worming its way into the fray as mediator, however, larger interests would take priority over those of both the government and the LTTE and its collaborators. Predominant would be the interests of Britain and its western allies. What might those interests conceivably be? One has to speculate.

Grand design
Could Britain be fronting a western project? Several western countries issued approving statements with remarkable alacrity after the Fox Accord, almost as if on cue. Western intelligence is unlikely to have illusions about the package producing peace, whatever the politicians say for public consumption. Does the west perhaps wish to promote devolution in the knowledge that it would bring about the dismemberment of Sri Lanka, the creation of Eelam, the union of Eelam and Tamil Nadu, and the break-up of the emerging and feared giant India - a grand design in which Sri Lanka would be dispensable?

The Chilling Question
Then the question of which horse to back. Could Britain have been impressed by the sheer tenacity and ingenuity of the LTTE, noted the weakness of successive governments, and concluded that the LTTE would eventually achieve Eelam and more? Britain might then, as facilitator/mediator in the process, and guardian angel of the LTTE in London, expect to be rewarded with a head start in influence, investment and aid in an expanding Eelam. Fundamentally, are Britain's or the west's interest better served by preserving Sri Lanka's integrity or by promoting Eelam? In the cold-blooded world of real politics, the chilling question has to be asked, and the answer cannot be taken for granted.

Standing up to the mediator
Any thoughts that, if necessary, Sri Lanka will be able to resist the machinations of the mediators themselves, have to be looked at in the light of its negotiating record and the dynamics of mediation. The net result of negotiations so far has been that successive governments have made concession after concession, almost to the point of conceding Eelam, while the LTTE has stuck immovably to its goal of Eelam. This is surely a negotiating disaster that will be featured in textbooks as a classic case of How Not to Negotiate. So there is only the slanderers of hopes that Sri Lanka will be able to stand up to pressure by mediators of the LTTE.

Governments' vulnerability
Even if skills that have been absent so far miraculously appear, the dynamics of negotiation weight heavily against governments. One of the established effects of foreign mediation is the tendency of mediators, under pressure to produce results within a time-frame, to take the path of least resistance and bulldoze the way to an agreement, however unstable it may be.

Since terrorist organisations typically stick to their guns, literally and metaphorically, the full burden of the mediator's arm-twisting tends to fall on the legitimate government. As New York Times' former Senior Editor Barbara Crossette wrote in an article quoted in the Sunday Island on January 2, 1994: "...recent history does not inspire confidence in the United States as an impartial arbiter in international ethnic disputes... we have collectively misjudged the many dimensions of political conflicts rooted in ethnic or cultural divisions. The results have been unfortunate. They include the application of almost intolerable international pressure on only one side of a multifaceted problem, the censure of beleaguered governments or the inexplicable exoneration of others far more guilty of abuses..." (emphasis. Her remarks apply equally to all western mediators.

Big brother
As for the friendly Indians, Ms. Crossette observed: "(The LTTE) were able to operate militarily and diplomatically from the safe haven of the South Indian state of Tamil Nadu... New Delhi for its part denied in world forums what everyone in South Asia knew: India was supporting a movement that was trying to dismember a small neighbouring nation..." (Emphasis added)

Mediating on what
Finally, take the question of what will be mediated upon. The LTTE demands Eelam. The main Tamil parties include the name Eelam in their designations (except for the TULF, which spawned the LTTE). At times the LTTE and the Tamil parties profess their willingness to accept a reasonable alternative to Eelam, which on examination - recognition of the Tamils as a nation, recognition of the North and East as the Tamil homeland, the right of self-determination, the right of citizenship - turns out to be virtual Eelam!

The government, while objecting to Eelam, drafts a new constitution which provides pre-conditions required to establish Eelam. The opposition sits valiantly on the fence. Thondaman wants Prabakaran to be allowed to rule the North and East for five years. The common factor is the inexorable progress towards Eelam. The large numbers-possibly the majority - opposing the new Constitution are dismissed as chauvinists and extremists, and are hardly likely to be included in mediation proceedings. Where then are the differing points of view which have to be reconciled?