True, the choice was obvious. Yes,, President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga had to accept that invitation to the two-day NAM summit. Not because she is quite a globe-trotter but because President Mandela would be the host. And Nelson Mandela is one of the towering figures of the 20th century.

'Ethnic Conflict' is now one of the main items on the post-cold war agenda, not to mention on the seminar circuit. In South Africa, the issue was black-and-white, manifestly so. Only a man of Nelson Mandela's stature could say, after victory:

'Whites are fellow South Africans and we want them to feel safe, and we appreciate the contribution they have made to the development of the country'. I take the 'quote' from Nelson Mandela's 'foreword' to Hari Sharan Chhabra's South Africa: One Year after Mandela's Release published in March 1991. (I was privileged to receive an autographed copy when I met the author at a NAM meeting in Tripoli in Sept. 1991.

President Kumaratunga has undertaken a 'Conflict Resolution' exercise no less intractable ' or so we are tempted to conclude ' from the post-Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact signed more than 40 years ago, and the lessons we have learnt or preferred to ignore.. Mandela had a tougher task but he certainly knew that he could not afford to open a 'window of opportunity' to any African 'tigers'.

Freedom Charter
After many hard years he persuaded 3,000 delegates of all ethnic groups ' Africans, Coloured, Indians and Whites ' to sign a 'Freedom Charter'. He spent eighteen months, and thousands of rallies were held in city, small town and village, before he convened a 'Congress of the People'. The Charter itself was translated to Zulu Xhosa, Sotho and Africaans. But by 1963, seven years later, Mandela and four prominent 'comrades' were charged for 'sabotage' and sentenced to life, for conspiracy 'the violent overthrow of the State: But he was not impressed; The struggle must go on', he said.

Such is the President, freedom fighter, intellectual and prince that Comrade President Chandrika, her Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar and senior advisors will meet. O lucky people...

Non-alignment
It takes two to tango. Likewise, the Non-aligned. Unfortunately comrade Boris Yeltsin's Russia has lost the title -Superpower. So what happens to a movement that Jawaharlal Nehru created... but was smart enough to persuade Tito to play host at the inaugural meeting in Belgrade. Yugoslavia was the front line, between the Soviet Empire (communist) and the West, the former colonial powers (capitalist).

The new Russian empire ' the Commissars rather than the Czars ' has withered away. With the Soviet implosion, Moscow lost its 'colonies' satellites in the Cold War idiom ' in Eastern Europe, just as the Western imperialists, Britain, France, chiefly in Asia and Africa.

And now Yugoslavia is splitting up. Kosovo appears every day in the foreign news page. What is to be done? An old question, right? Well, the South African Foreign Minister is right. 'NAM' needs to cast anew many of the assumptions made in the past about the rules of engagement. 'We must continue to be the champion of the voice of the weak and the powerless in defiance of the hegemony of the strong and the powerful' reported the Lake House correspondent.

Kautilya thinks that the new global power structure makes the World Bank and the IMF the superpowers. And these overlords are faceless. And they work as a team. So non-alignment is meaningless. So what do I recommend? I take comfort from P. A. theoretician and powerful thinker, Prof. Peiris. Saw the headline in the Sunday Island,: Legalising Homosexuality ' more pressing problems to resolve ' G. L.?

It so happens that there are no Bhagavad Geetas or Krishnas of Tamil Nation and Tamil 'Nationalism' but only Bibles, Godfathers and Moseses. The Arjunas of Tamil 'Nationalism' have to follow the Moseses and not the Krishnas. As I have mentioned on many occasions the Chelvanayakam aspiration of Tamil racism was Federalism followed by an Eelam. The ITAK, which was launched on the 18th of December 1949, significantly enough at a meeting held in the headquarters of the CP/LSSP controlled Government Clerical Service Union (GCSU) in Maradana, emphasised that 'Tamils and Sinhalese had coexisted in their separate areas but that the two communities also mingled in each other's areas, and that it was the British imperial power which had imposed a unified system of government on both these areas. Nonetheless, their separate existences now entitled the Tamil speaking peoples to an autonomous state comprising the two Tamil provinces' (Pg.70). In other words Mr. Chelvanayakam either depended on myths or created myths in order to campaign for an Eelam.

'This party, became within seven years the leading instrument for the implementation of Chelvanayakam's solution for the Tamil people. But meanwhile he saw his task as building a NEW NATION (emphasis added), giving the Tamil people a sense of pride in their homeland. He was regarded by the public, Sinhala and Tamil alike, as the Moses who would lead his people to the promised land' (Pg. 8). In other words in order to implement the so-called Chelvanayakam solution, which is nothing but Federalism followed by Eelam, Mr. Chelvanayakam first had to build a new nation. He had to start building a new nation simply because there was no Tamil nation in 1949 as he himself had admitted on several occasions. At the first national convention of the ITAK held in 1951 in Trincomalee, seven resolutions were adopted. 'The first resolution claimed for the Tamil-speaking people an 'unchallengeable title to nationhood', Nationhood was derived from 'a separate historical past .at least as ancient and as glorious as that of the Sinhalese'' (Pg. 74).

Mr. Chelvanayakam and the ITAK claimed a separate existence for the Tamils going back to more than two thousand years because they wanted to establish that the Tamils were a nation. Unfortunately for the Tamil racists the ancient or the modern history of the country did not support them in their endeavour. Prof. Wilson says Mr. Chelvanayakam was regarded by the Sinhala public also as the Moses who would lead his people to the promised land. The Sinhala people never considered Mr. Chelvanayakam as a Moses. He has only led the Tamils to a blood bath after inciting the generation of Prabhakaran against the Sinhala people. He is responsible not only for the creation of the myth of the traditional homeland of the Tamils and the Chelvanayakam aspiration but also for the creation of Prabhakaran and his generation.

'In a public speech at Jaffna a few months after leaving the ACTC, (All Ceylon Tamil Congress) he spoke of HIS CONCEPT (emphasis added) of a single united Tamil nation with 'no division into Indian Tamils and Ceylon Tamils'. He added that 'all Tamils settled in Ceylon formed one nation'. (Pg. 19, quoted from Ceylon Daily News, 26 April 1949). The point that Prof. Wilson reminds us is that the Tamils in Sri Lanka not only did not constitute a nation but as late as 1949 even the Jaffna Tamils considered the Tamils in the estate areas as Indian Tamils.

Mr. Chelvanayakam, on the other hand, by then had realised the importance of this sector for his 'solution' and wanted them to be incorporated as members of his so-called Tamil nation. Even before the formation of the racist ITAK (If ITAK is not racist what is it? A party that wanted to create a separate state for a non existing nation and which under this so-called Moses had only hatred towards the Sinhala people was racist. The Tamil racists in this country with their propaganda machinery have pretended to be moderates, enlightened people, peace loving citizens etc., while calling those who have exposed these charlatans Sinhala chauvinists.). Mr. Chelvanayakam had spoken of secession.

Of course, Mr. Suntheralingam had earlier written of Eylom (He did not know then how to write Eelam in English. That itself gives an indication as to how these concepts evolved first among the English educated Tamils who lived in Colombo), but it was Mr. Chelvanayakam who formulated a plan to realise the Chelvanayakam aspiration of the Tamils. After the general elections in September 1947, to the first parliament of the country, Mr. Chelvanayakam at a reception for ACTC MP's in Trincomalee had said, 'the present situation was such that the Tamils would have to decide whether they should demand a federal government'(Pg.25). 'On 26 November 1947, he went a step further from his stance on federalism. In moving an amendment to the first address of Thanks of the first Parliament, he asked 'why the Tamils should not have the right to secede from the rest of the country if they desired to do so'. (Pg. 25, quoted from the Parliamentary debates 26 Nov. 1947).

What made Mr. Chelvanayakam to change his 'stance' between September and November 1947? Nothing. It was not a case of changing his 'stance' but a case of gradually revealing to the others what he had in mind. Even the qualifying phrase 'if they desired to do so' had no importance. Mr. Chelvanayakam was only playing with words. It is clear that by 1947 he had formulated the Chelvanayakam aspiration for the Tamils, namely Federalism first and then Eelam. It should be remembered that this happened long before the Sinhala only Act, the so-called standardisation of marks at the University entrance examination, the so-called black July etc. It was aspirations first and then looking for grievances, and not a question of graduating from grievances to aspirations.

'On 15 February 1949, Chelvanayakam made a speech in his Kankesanturai constituency clearly outlining his plan of action. He declared that 'Tamil Ceylon must govern itself,' and enunciated for the first time ' the elementary right of small nations to have self determination'.' (Pg. 29). By now Mr. Chelvanayakam had dropped the 'if they so desired' and was really 'outlining his plan of action'. Only a son-in-law who has maintained a Chelvanayakam file, as referred to in his book, could have enlightened us on these plans of the father-in -law. However, the problem was that the much-wanted Tamil nation had not come into existence, as shown later, even in February 1949. At that time Mr. Chelvanayakam was talking of an elementary right of a non-existing small nation. It was so small that there were no members belonging to it! It appears that Mr. Chelvanayakam had taken Sunya to be Sudra.

Even in 1949 the Jaffna Tamils did not consider the eastern province Tamils as their equals. This was not merely a caste difference within a race. The eastern province Tamils were a different group altogether as far as the Jaffna Tamils were concerned. It was left to Mr. Chelvanayakam to win the eastern province Tamils to the nation ha was going to create. ' Many in the Jaffna Tamil community were sceptical about the attitudes of the Eastern Province Tamils, in particular those of Batticaloa ('the trousered people of Batticaloa', as Chelvanayakam occasionally called them), but Chelvanayakam was not put off.' (Pg. 32).

'From the beginning Che-lvanayakam concentrated on (as he put it) 'indoctrinating' the Tamil-speaking people of the Eastern Province. He quickly realised that they constituted the front line. Chelvanayakam, unlike his Tamil adversaries in the UNP, believed in his cause that a united Tamil nation could be built from among the different Tamil -speaking groups in the island. At a meeting in Jaffna on 27 June 1949 he had said that there could be no division into Indian Tamils and Ceylon Tamils; all Tamils in Ceylon formed one nation.'( Pg. 33).It is clear that Mr. Chelvanayakam had to indoctrinate the Jaffna Tamils as well so that they would accept the other groups of Tamils living in the country into the nation that he was striving to create. However, even as late as 1952 this evasive nation had not been formed. 'On 24 August 1952, in a speech at Jaffna College, he (Mr. Chelvanayakam) said that when he first went to the south of Ceylon in 1915 as a student at St Thomas' College, the Sinhala people lived there as a 'race' (sic), where as 'today they have become a nation. We in North and East Ceylon should also develop into the most advanced stage of human society, that is, we should achieve national status.''(Pg. 44). Never mind what Mr. Chelvanayakam thought of the Sinhala people while he was at S. Thomas' College.

The Sinhala people, who have lived in this country for more than two thousand years as a nation, thus demolishing the theories and the concepts of the western political scientists and their stooges, were well aware of the fact that they were a nation long before S. Thomas' came into existence. However the fact remains that even in 1952, according to Mr. Chelvanayakam himself the Tamils were not a nation.

Only in the seventies Mr. Chelvanayakam stopped talking of building the Tamil nation. Within twenty years he had built this mythical Tamil nation in Sri Lanka and after the formation of the TULF and the adoption of the Vadukkodai resolution the Tamil racists have always referred to a non-existing Tamil nation, in their documents. The Tamil racists think that a mythical nation can be established within twenty to thirty years, that is within a generation. As a matter of fact what they have created is not a nation but a generation which believes in a mythical Tamil nation. After all nations cannot be created simply because there are Godfathers who are hell-bent on executing their satanic plans.

The UNP has called for an 'all party conference' to discuss the changes that need to be made to the constitution. This call evokes memories of the abortive 'all party conference' called for by the UNP when it held the reins of power under President J R Jayewardene. Eventually it became a farce when fringe groups and religious dignitaries were also brought into the APC.

This made any consensus impossible. The APC dragged on but could come to no conclusion. By its call for a new APC, the UNP seems to be seeking to block the government's devolution package but without genuinely proposing an alternative that could be taken on by the government and yet be acceptable to the Tamil parties. In effect, the drama being enacted in slow motion is reminiscent of all the previous efforts taken by governments to reach agreements with Tamil leaders, which were opposed by the opposition.

Today this opposition is not being expressed in the customary form of anti-government marches and riots, but by the more subtle and sophisticated manner of constitutional foot dragging. Ironically, all of this is happening at a time that the country is blessed with both a president and leader of the opposition who have never been identified with chauvinist positions, but are sincerely committed to a solution that is fair by the communities in the country.

It appears that the political system, and the competitive rivalry inherent in it, is stronger than their individual wills. For the past three years, the two major parties have been at loggerheads on the government's devolution package and how it can be finalised. They have been unable to proceed forward because of the unavailability of a de-politicised mechanism for obtaining a consensual solution. As a result, the major tasks undertaken by the Parliamentary Select Committee on Constitutional Reforms have not yielded their potential benefit to the country.

The devolution package put forward by the government, and debated and discussed at great length, represents a genuine movement forward in the thinking with regard to fundamental constitutional change. While today the main opposition party, the UNP, has its still half-baked alternative which has stressed power sharing at the centre, the Tamil parties have expressed reservations about the government's package, and the LTTE has completely rejected it.

The question that arises is, on what clear lines is a change of thinking required? Given the fact that nearly half the Tamil population and two thirds of the Muslim population live outside of the north-east, any power sharing agreement between the ethnic communities needs to incorporate a substantial measure of power-sharing at the centre. The absence of an upper house in the government's envisaged constitutional reforms constitutes a glaring omission. Sri Lanka would be a unique example of a country with a high level of devolution of powers that is not counter-balanced by an equivalent power-sharing by the regions at the centre.

In the face of the steady continuation of the war, the suffering it entails and the economic hardships of the people, the difficulty that the political establishment seems to be having to create new options has been a very tragic feature. Surely, when the current strategies are not working out as they should something new and innovative should be tried out. One such strategy should be to find a mechanism by which party political rivalries can be overcome, the search for a solution is freed from the imperatives of petty party politics, and a devolution package can be finalised with bipartisan consensus.

A number of civic organisations, including the Inter Religious Peace Foundation, the Centre for Society and Religion, the Federation of Tamil Societies and the Dharmavedi Institute, recently put out a statement calling on the government and opposition to come to an agreement on sharing responsibility and credit for resolving the ethnic conflict, to take the process out of the arena of party electoral politics, and to place before the country their joint minimum consensus.

PEACE TASK FORCE When exhaustion sets in, an unwillinngess to change can result. But making a change, and breaking out of inertia is vitally necessary at this time. In August 1994, when the People's Alliance coalition took over the reins of government, it launched a new peace initiative that completely changed the old equilibrium that had developed between the old exhausted UNP-led government and the LTTE. The new government gained ground with its new initiatives, so much so that 'Chandrika souvenirs' were being sold on the streets of Jaffna, and the international prestige of the government soared. Likewise, a new initiative is needed today. But the signs are not good for a new initiative of the conventional kind.

The country presently appears to be heading towards a long period of elections. The line up includes the provincial council, presidential and general elections. A snap presidential election, with the devolution package as the main issue, seems to be on the cards. Under normal circumstances, elections would be the signposts of a healthy and vibrant democracy. But the bitter experience of Sri Lanka is that national issues give way to partisan politics during election time, to discredit the rival political parties and not to solve the problems.

What is needed, then, is an unconventional mechanism that would enable the political parties to disengage themselves from all these unproductive phenomena, at least as regards a solution to the ethnic crisis. We need a system that would enable the government and opposition to work together regardless of which party wins and which loses. It would be a terrible shame that a devolution package that is not, by any means an ideal one, should be the main issue at an election.

There is a means of securing a bipartisan consensus on the necessary constitutional reforms, but without the delays inherent in the Parliamentary Select Committee procedure. It is for the establishment of a specially mandated body consisting of an equal number of eminent persons appointed by the government and the UNP, who can agree on the basic principles of power sharing and devolution which can guide the future constitution. The larger the number of parties involved in hammering out an agreement, the more difficult it becomes to get a consensus, and conversely, the smaller the number of parties, the less difficult it becomes to obtain a consensus.

The basic idea would be for the leader of the government and the leader of the opposition to appoint an equal number to form a 'National Peace Task Force.' This body would be empowered to find the core principles on which a political solution to the ethnic conflict could be negotiated, ultimately with the LTTE. The task force would be required to do their work quietly and outside the glare of publicity. Most important of all, they would continue with their work, whatever the changes in the political arena.

The mechanism of such an essentially bi-partisan peace task force could provide an institutional framework outside of the petty party political rivalries that continue to stand in the way of a solution to the conflict in the country, and could be a mechanism for achieving a just and sustainable peace. In this Sri Lanka can follow the core of the strategies used with considerable success in Northern Ireland and the Philippines. It could also build upon the concept developed in South Africa of a 'sufficient consensus'. Recognising the impossibility of obtaining a consensus between all the different parties, the South African peace negotiators informally agreed that agreement between the two main parties would constitute a 'sufficient consensus' for purposes of going ahead.

The mechanism of a de-politicised peace task force could provide an institutional framework outside of the petty party political rivalries that continue to stand in the way of a solution to the conflict in the country, and could be a mechanism for achieving a just and sustainable peace. As in the case of the three member National Unification Commission in the Philippines, the proposed (Sri Lankan) Peace Task Force could be provided with Cabinet status and specifically empowered with the task of formulating consensual principles on which a political solution may be found. The Peace Task Force could also be the agent of mediation with the LTTE at least in the initial stages.

We publish excerpts of 'Sri Lanka's Ethnic Crisis and National Security' by Rohan Gunaratna, which sheds fresh light on the LTTE domestic and international organisation. Stating that the LTTE rate of recruitment is higher than its fatalities, the author argues that the government can win against the LTTE only by adopting unconventional military concepts and restructuring its current political posture towards the Tamils. The book's foreword is by General Richard Clutterbuck, Britain's foremost authority on counter-insurgency. The 428-paged illustrated book is available in Colombo.

On June 21, 1991, at 9.55 a.m. an Elf 350 lorry destroyed the Headquarters of the Joint Operations Command (JOC), the nerve centre of the Sri Lankan security force. The LTTE had planned to destroy the JOC when the service chiefs were in session, but on that day there was no conference. Under the direction of Nadaraja Varatharajah alias Muthukumaraswamy Sridharan alias Varathan, two LTTE cadres Panchalingam Surendram alias Suresh alias Saheer and Thavagapal Thirumahan alias Chandran were tasked to drive in a vehicle laden with explosives into the JOC compound. As Varadan failed to arrange for a pass for the vehicle to enter the compound, he instructed Surendran to park the vehicle near the entrance to the JOC, arm the explosive device and withdraw.

When Surendran realized that the circuit had no timer and the vehicle would explode instantly killing the driver, he backed out. Thereafter Varadan used Surendran's backup Chandran, who was killed in the explosion. After the explosion, Varadan did not travel to the north fearing that the LTTE leader would reprimand him for not conducting the operation according to the designated plan. Therefore, he withdrew to Kotmale, where he committed suicide by consuming Potassium Cyanide when a police team closed in on him. Eleven service personnel and ten civilians died and 114 were injured in the blast. The explosion also damaged about 200 houses, 56 motor vehicles and a number of push cycles.

The LTTE gradually perfected the art of striking secure security, political and economic targets in Colombo. Within two months of the Wijeratna assassination the LTTE assassinated Rajiv Gandhi, but this time used a suicide body suit. Thereafter, the LTTE perfected their art of long range operations to strike human targets. Similarly, after the JOC bombing the LTTE developed their expertise in bombing buildings. The Sri Lankan security agencies were developing their counter intelligence capability reactively to distruct preparations by the LTTE to conduct operations in Colombo.

* On November 16, 1992, an LTTE suicide bomber Subramanium Loja Mohan alias Mohan, riding motorcycle No 126-5062 crashed onto the official vehicle of the Navy Chief Clancy Fernando. The vehicle was travelling slowly towards Navy headquarters. Admiral Fernando, his flag lieutenant Sandun Gunasekera and the driver were killed. Admiral Fernando, escorted by a navy guard, followed almost the same routine every day. For over a month, an LTTE team had mounted surveillance on Admiral Fernando's movements. Admiral Fernando, who was responsible for several naval initiatives to dent LTTE's domination of the Kilali lagoon, separating the peninsula from the mainland, was a prime target of the LTTE. His death not only demoralized the navy but also impeded plans to develop a brown-water navy to fight the LTTE Sea Tigers.

Following the assassination of the Navy Chief, the police and the army supported by the intelligence agencies began to conduct operations to identify LTTE operatives in the city. Mohan was a member of a nine member LTTE hit team operating in Colombo under the directive of Kanagaratnam Sivakumaran alias Kannan. When a police team moved in on Kannan on November 24, 1992, he committed suicide by exploding a grenade. Kannan had taken precautions to evade suspicion by establishing residence in a plush area in the city. The security forces arrested another team member who provided information that revealed future LTTE targets in the city.

* On March 23, 1993, a LTTE cadre Kandiah Ragunathan, operating under the alias of Appiah Balakrishnan, opened fire killing Lalith Athulathmudali, the former Minister of National Security and the leader of the Democratic United National Party. Athulathmudali was addressing an election meeting in Kirulapona when the assassin approached him with 9 mm CZ pistol, a favourite weapon of the LTTE. After he opened fire, Athulathmudali's bodyguard returned fire wounding the assassin. Exploiting the pandemonium that followed, the assassin escaped. Due to extensive bleeding, Kandiah could not proceed to his safe house. Having managed to walk down the nearby Mugalan road, he rested under the cover of darkness. Due to extensive bleeding and pain, he consumed a phial of Potassium Cyanide and committed suicide.

The then opposition tried to exploit the animosity between President Ranasinghe Premadasa and Lalith Athulathmudali by accusing the President of ordering the assassination. Subsequent investigations produced substantial evidence to indicate that the LTTE had masterminded the assassination of Athulathmudali, a leader who was bent on destroying the LTTE. To create dissension within the mainstream parties, the LTTE issued a statement denying its role but admitted that Athulathmudali was an-enemy of the Tamil people.

On May 1, 1993, the LTTE suicide bomber Kulaweerasingham Verrakumar alias Babu assassinated President Ranasinghe Premadasa on his way to address the May Day meeting. As Babu approached the president and his entourage on a push cycle at 10.45 a.m., bodyguards attempted to prevent him from reaching the president. Babu activated the suicide body suit worn beneath his clothes, killing the president and 23 others. Premadasa's body was perforated by hundreds of small steel balls. Babu, was originally dispatched by LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, to collect intelligence on the intentions of Premadasa during the peace talks. During that period, Premadasa's inner thinking that he shared with his staff was communicated to the LTTE leader by Babu.

Babu defied the regular security screening conducted by the National Intelligence Bureau at the recommendation of the Presidential Security Division (PSD) by winning over the confidence of the powerful presidential aides. Babu even flew in the presidential chaser helicopter and spent time in the presidential bungalows throughout Sri Lanka. Through his friendship with the presidential aides, Babu had effectively penetrated the president's inner circle. Even the 6,000 strong PSD failed to protect the president from Babu, who has systematically and effectively won the trust and the confidence of the presidential aides. Deception was integral in LTTE war strategy. Premadasa was among the many who had failed to understand the LTTE psyche.

Prabhakaran, who was in the peninsula, ordered the public announcement of his opponent's death at the LTTE organized May Day rally in Jaffna. A cadre walked on to the platform announced that 'President Premadasa of Sri Lankan was killed by a suicide bomber this morning'. The announcement shocked the crowd. A momentary deafening silence was broken by cheering LTTE supporters. In keeping with the LTTE strict code of not acknowledging civilian killings, the LTTE denied its responsibility in the killing of a ruling world leader.

* On the night of April 8, 1994, there were four explosions. The first meant for the Mount Lavinia Hotel exploded prematurely killing Alphones Anthony Aruldas, a member of the LTTE in Canada who had joined the LTTE in Sri Lanka. His accomplice, Madimaran Mahendran, who was injured was taken into custody. The other explosions were at Hotel Sapphire, Taj Samudra and Marriot.9 The next morning there was another explosion in the National Zoological Gardens at Dehiwela. The police recovered another explosive device from the boarding place of Aruldas. A tribute to Aruldas by another LTTE activist in Canada was published in the Canadian press.

* On October 24, 1994, an LTTE female suicide bomber assassinated Gamini Dissanayake, the presidential candidate of the United National Party, while he was addressing an election meeting in Grandpass, Colombo. As Dissanayake, who was planning to leave the platform at 1.15 a.m., stood up and greeted the audience good morning, the bomber who was seated on the third row stood up, and while biting a Potassium Cyanide phial detonated herself. The bombers head blew off skywards and landed on a concrete roof of a nearby building and her scalp was entangled in a power line just below the roof. Among 54 civilians killed and 72 injured were prominent members of the ruling party and other political leaders. Their bodies were perforated by two different types of steel balls from the suicide jacket worn by the assassin. Based on hard intelligence, Dissanayake was repeatedly warned of an impending threat to his life but did not heed the warnings.

The assassination was carried out during the peace talks conducted by the LTTE and Chandrika Kumaratunga, the newly appointed prime minister. The LTTE denied its role in the assassination. To win the favour of the new president, a few public officials tried to exonerate the LTTE. The LTTE feared Dissanayake because he called for the implementation of the Indo-Lanka Accord. He also called for the return of the Indian Peace Keeping Force, under the LTTE had suffered badly.

* On October 20, 1995, the LTTE attacked the oil storage complexes at Kolonnawa and Orugodawatte in the outskirts of the capital. Twelve LTTE cadres, dressed in Sri Lanka military uniforms, travelled in a van and in a lorry containing soap, milk powder and food to the target area at 1.30 a.m. The cadres operating in two teams struck the security personnel and the oil tanks using RPGs, LAWs, grenades and small arms fire. They also used improVised explosive devices especially designed to blast the storage tanks. At least three cadres. Warting suicide jackets, fought their way into the tanks and blew themselves up destroying he tanks. Ten of the 21 tanks at Klonnawa and three of the four tanks at Orugodawatte were destroyed. After three hours the security forces responded. When they approached the scene, and LTTE suicide bomber leaped towards them detonating himself while other cadres opened fire. The LTTE lost four cadres, killed 22 services personnel and desroyed diesel, kerosene, aviation fuel and crude oil valued over US$ 10 million. The damage to infrastructure was estimated at $15 million.103

It was later revealed the LTTE had staged the operation to destroy the oil tanks after conducting extensive reconnaissance, building models and rehearsing the strike. The specialized team of Black Tigers, inducted of a safe house in Colombo, also conducted reconnaissance just before launching the operation. The LTTE staged his operation to cripple the military offensive aimed at depriving them of the Jaffna peninsula. The LTTE assessed hat without fuel, the army, navy and the air force would not be able to sustain an operation in a distant theatre. Sufficient reserves to support ongoing operations for a calendar month thwarted the LTTE design.

The LTTE had carefully worked out the withdrawal plan, depriving the security forces the opportunity to capture the LTTE operations commander. Covert units of the Special Task Force and the Directorate of Military Intelligence had been swooping on LTTE cells in Colombo since 1990, but were reluctant to operate without the right degree of political patronage. Hitherto, at least 60 cells, continuously formed by the LTTE in Colombo had been neutralized. But, the pace of operations had dwindled after early 1995 and increasingly towards late 1995 as the government displayed a reluctance to support semilegitimate covert operations. 104

The increasing ability of the LTTE to operate in Colombo was attributed to the inability of the military-security bureaucracy to comprehend the importance of counter-intelligence operations. When the Criminal Investigations Department detained key operatives engaged in anti-LTTE operations, such covert operations had almost come to standstill. 105 The reaction led other covert approves to take a back seat. The recurrence for successive strikes by the LTTE only confirmed that the high-risk high-yielding counter-intelligence operatives in Colombo were playing by the rules. This mean declaring all arrests. Legal assistance, visits by ICRC and other human righs NGOS, and prohibition of using physical force during interrogations. The consequences were devastating.

* On January 31, 1996, the LTTE struck the heart of the financial disttict of Colombo destroying the Central Bank building and damaging a series of other srucures housing American Express ABN Bank, Ceylinco and Air Lanka. An LTTE suicide bomber rammed an explosive laden lorry (42-6452) into the building at 10.45 a.m. After passing through two police checkpoints. The lorry was followed by a three wheeler, carrying two LTTE cadres armed with an auotmaic rifle and an RPG while the bomber Raju died, the back up team Subramanium Vigneswaran alias Kittu and Sivasamy Dharmendran alias Raju were apprehended by the public. The blast killed 86 and injured 1338 men, women and children. At least 100 people lost their eye sight.

The operation was planned and executed by the YEL group of the LTTE Black Tiger wing. Over a few months, the LTTE studied the structure of the building and built-in a bomb into lorry. To make the blast effect larger, the LTTE designers even changed the tire size of the lorry enabling into climb the steps of the Central Bank.

Prabhakaran and Mahattaya before they fell out

* On July 26, 1996, the LTTE exploded the Aluthgama bound passenger train at Dehiwela, after a bulk of the Tamil commuters had alighed in Wellawatte, a predominantly Tamil area. At 6.05 p.m., two bombs in briefcases, placed in the passenger compartment of a train by an LTTE cadre and his new found girlfriend exploded killing 63 commuters and injuring 476. A few days later, the bomber, arrested on suspicion, and later his girlfriend, confessed. The LTTE cadre provided information that led to the destruction of several LTTE cells.

* On October 15, 1997, an Indian-built Tata 1210 truck laden with explosives and driven by an LTTE suicide bomber rammed the World Trade Center (WTC), Sri Lanka's tallest building inaugurated by the Sri Lankan president only three days before. Although the destruction of the structurally-proteced WTC by the 400 kg bomb was no severe, the adjacent buildings, particularly Hotel Galadari Meridien was considerably damaged. Of the six LTTE cadres who took part in the attack, he driver died in the explosion.

The others wearing sucicide jackets underneath their military clothing, engaged the Sri Lankan troops for over ten and a half hours. They withdrew to the Lake House, a newspaper publishing house, situated between the Air Force headquarters and the Navy headquarters, and challenged the military. The attack killed 18 and injured over 100, including 30 foreigners from Japan, U.K. France, Singapore, Jordan, Australia, Canada, Cuba, Lebanon, Egypt, Malaysia. Pakistan, India, US, Sweden, Holland, Saudi Arabia, and Korea _ many countries where the LTTE have a presence. The LTTE had struck the WTC within a week of the US declaring the LTTE a terrorist group. Although the LTTE leaders in the US had decided to file a legal suit stating the LTTE was a 'liberation' organization, the bombing sent a powerful signal to Washington DC. In keeping with the LTTE code, LTTE UK spokesperson Vallipuram Ramachandran alias Anton Rajah alias Ramasar 'Categorically denied' LTTE's role in the blast.

* On November 14, 1997, at 4.30 a.m., two LTTE helpers entered the Kelanitissa Power Station at Orugodawatte and using improvised magnetic explosive devices, they destroyed two tanks and withdrew before the security personnel in the station responded. Although some fifty service personnel were on duty, the two tall sentry towers overlooking the tanks were unmanned during the attack. The Colombo Fire Brigade and the Air Force extinguished the fire within an hour, but the attackers escaped from the security zone.

Two helpers had entered the security zone of the power house from the railway line side, by cutting the barbed wire and thick iron mesh, security fences separated by eight meters. The first opening was one and half feet in height and one foot in width. The second opening was two feet in height and one and quarter feet in width. Unobtrusively wading through 150 yards of two and half feet tall weeds, the LTTE helpers reached the target. Having gained entrance to the power house premises, the helpers fixed 10 magnetic explosive devices onto the four diesel tanks. Each tank contained 13 million litres of oil. But, the explosives on two tanks went off causing little more than a minor oil leak. Only 500 liters had drained off from the tanks.

An intact explosive device was later discovered by the bomb squad on another furnace oil tank near the affected diesel tanks. A travelling bag concealed by the side of a tree contained a letter written in Tamil to 'Ureshan' the principal helper, providing instructions on the use of the nine explosive devices. While one device would trigger off after 15 minutes, the other eight would trigger off after 20 minutes. A razor knife, a plier, and a Potassium Cyandide phial in a rigiform container was in the bag.

The attack reflected that the LTTE would change its style of operation from time to time. Helpers-tested sympathizers - were hardest to apprehend as often there are no photographs of them training or with fellow cadres. Further, there are no records of them having joined or served with the LTTE. Only the LTTE leader who tasked them, would be aware of the identity. They were, as far as the law enforcement agencies were concerned, faceless, nameless and the aucost dangerous. The Kelanitissa Power Plant attack demonstrated the recurring vulnerability of Colombo to LTTE infiltration and influence. It also demonstrated the lack of appreciation of the LTTE capabilities and capacity by the military-security bureaucracy.

There are significant lessons that can be drawn from LTTE covert operations in the glaringly vulnerable city of Colombo. It would be nearly impossible to prevent LTTE infiltration of the capital as it has become a crucial feature of their strategy.

LTTE International Network - Offices and cells 1997/98

(To be continued)