Constitutional Affairs Minister G. L. Peiris responses to the Tamil Nadu media in Chennai have strengthened speculation about an early Presidential Election early next year. The PA government feel that this is the only avenue to both retain power as well as push through the devolution package. An insight into the government line of thought was provided by President Kumaratunga herself in an interview last month:

Architects of the Devolution Package - President K and Prof. G. L.

Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga was interviewed by K. K. Katyal and V. S. Sambandan of the Indian English daily 'The Hindu' some weeks ago (Aug. 2, 98). She was asked about the stalemate regarding the constitution reform proposals encompassing the devolution package and its future. 'How do you see the way out' she was asked specifically. She replied as follows:

'There is a stalemate in one way, but we can find solutions to it. We have the solutions in hand. The UNP government brought in a new constitution several years ago and they amended their constitution 16 times - their own constitution - in order to stay in power as long as possible and in the process, it is the strangest constitution in the democratic world. I am not being emotional about it. It specifies that not a word of the constitution can be changed without a two-thirds majority but on the other hand they had brought in a very innovative to say the least, electoral system where even if a particular party gets all the votes, the way it is counted, it will not have two-thirds majority in Parliament.

We want to change the constitution and bring in this political package for the solution of the ethnic problem. We want to do away with the executive presidency and so many other things and they are not giving us that extra 15 or 16 votes which we need to have a two-thirds majority. We have found a slightly, may be slightly, strictly not constitutional, but democratic and not illegal procedure. It is a very complicated thing, because you have to circumvent this arrangement they have put. It is a very tedious way of doing it. The political situation has to be good.

The Hindu: You mean the referendum?

Kumaratunga: I cannot tell you what it is all the moment. We will have to have several elections before we do that. Several types of elections including the referendum and hope that the courts and the judges will not be as partial as they have been up to now. I am confident that before the term of this government is over in the next two years, we will be able to do that...

Observers of the Sri Lankan political scene would hardly be surprised at the very visible frustration evinced by Kumaratunga at the non-cooperation of the chief opposition United National Party. According to the constitution a two-thirds majority in Parliament and consequent ratification by a nation-wide referendum is necessary for her new proposals to become law. The Peoples Alliance along with allies can muster a little over 135 votes right now. But this is a shortfall of 15 votes at least below the 150 mark necessary for two-thirds in a house 225. The UNP after a great deal of filibustering has now made it quite clear that it will not vote for the devolution package.

In that context Chandrika Kumaratunga's obvious anger and disappointment over the UNP attitude is understandable. In recent times however she has been exploring various ways and means of getting over the primary hurdle namely, obtaining a two-thirds majority in Parliament. If that difficulty is overcome she feels that the secondary hurdle of ratification at a referendum too would be possible. Thereafter the tertiary hurdle of implementation can be tackled bodily. So getting a Parliamentary two-thirds majority is the formidable task at present.

Kumaratunga and her top advisers have been enduring over the problem and seem to have arrived at three possible solutions to overcome the current obstacle. The first is to dissolve Parliament before expiry of term and go to the polls. The PA will seek a mandate from the people to change the constitution. It will also state that in the event of a victory Parliament would convert itself into a Constituent Assembly. This is somewhat similar to the 1970-72 period where parliament transformed into a Constituent Assembly, exercised the principle of 'autochtomy' and passed with a two-thirds majority the republican constitution of Colvin R. de Silva that replaced the British imposed Soulbury Constitution. Only in this case the PA will go ahead and pass right away the new constitution if it obtains a two-thirds majority on its own or can muster one with the aid of minority party allies. If it does not have a two-thirds then it will convert Parliament into a Constituent Assembly and pass the new constitution with a simple majority. Although the 1972 and 1978 Constitutions were passed by Parliament with two-thirds majorities the PA feels that it would not be constitutionally invalid to promulgate a new constitution with a simple majority if Parliament 'becomes' a Constituent Assembly.

The second option is not to dissolve parliament right now but to go ahead and stage an islandwide consultative referendum. This would be of a non-binding nature. The people approve of it with a thumping majority then that could be projected as the peoples verdict even if not officially binding. In that situation the hope is that the UNP though unwilling will be constrained to respect the verdict of the people. So the UNP will have to vote for the new constitution in Parliament when submitted. The problem in this line of thought is three-fold.

In a situation where the UNP will be opposing can the government win in a referendum of this type which may cut across party lines and arouse communal passions? Will PA parliamentarians pull their weight in this referendum as they do not risk their parliamentary positions in this? If the country votes negatively on the issue at the referendum then the PA too will be morally bound to abandon the constitution reform efforts.

Secondly, even if the referendum is won the PA it is important to have a large percentage polled in favour at least 60%. A lower margin on a controversial issue such as this would be subject to serious doubts whether a credible mandate has been sanctioned or not. Thirdly, given the UNP's inconsistencies there is no guarantee that it would play ball and endorse the proposals even if the non-binding consultative referendum is won by the PA. The UNP cannot be expected to take a principled position on this. It can always say that it has to respect the wishes of the people who voted against in the referendum and not oblige. Besides another cumbersome detail is that even if the UNP votes in favour a second 'binding' referendum is necessary for ratification. Thus the people may have to face two referenda on the same issue within a short period.

Then there is the third option that may very well be contentious. It is also the most likely one to be followed. This idea is for President Kumaratunga to face re-election two years ahead. The President can seek re-election after four years in office even if the full term is not over. Kumaratunga would have completed four years as President in November this year. When Kumaratunga seeks re-election she would campaign strongly on the platform of approval for the political package. More importantly her manifesto would also have an important rider seeking approval to convert the present parliament into a constituent assembly if elected. If she wins she will convert parliament into an assembly that will then pass the new constitution not with two-thirds but a simple majority. If Kumaratunga registers an overwhelming vote then she may even dissolve parliament. The hope is that the party riding the euphoric wave of her victory will then do very well in Parliamentary hustings too. In such a scenario the PA will also seek a mandate at the parliamentary elections to transform parliament in to a constituent assembly. Thus the government will have then a 'double' mandate for converting parliament into a constitutional assembly. If in the process a two-third majority is obtained it would be most welcome. But even if there is no two-third the hope is that it could be passed with a simple majority parliament in its capacity as a constituent assembly.Although Chandrika Kumaratunga and her think tank have forged a strategy that seems sound on paper there are two problems both of which have been hinted at by Kumaratunga herself in the interview to the 'Hindu'. The first is the legal aspect. She emphasises that the plan in hand is 'not illegal procedure'. She goes on to say however that her hope is that 'the courts and the judges will not be as partial as they have been up to now'. The executive president stating in an interview to an Indian journal that the 'judges have been partial' is in itself a statement that is liable to stir up a hornest's nest. Fortunately none of Kumaratunga's detractors have highlighted the issue so far. It is arguable as to whether Kumaratunga was correct or not in her candid comments about the judiciary but her trepidation about how the courts may consider her contemplated manoeuvres is certainly understandable. It was only some time ago that Kumaratunga was threatening to enact a 'constitutional revolution' to circumvent the UNP in pushing through the devolution package. This constitutional revolution was in essence the possible options available to her in this respect and have been referred to earlier. 'Constitutional revolution' opposition politicians warned that any such manoeuvre would be challenged in courts.

When J. R. Jayewardene formulated the thirteenth amendment and provincial councils in 1987 under Indian pressure the direction in which the courts was likely to proceed was a big question mark. In fact one reason trotted out by Jayewardene for the dilution of devolution in the scheme was that it was necessary to prevent an adverse courts ruling. When the supreme courts took up the issue it was a five against four verdict in favour. Interestingly three of the five judges ruling positively were from the Tamil, Burgher and Muslim communities. The other two were Sinhalese. All judges who rules negatively were Sinhala.

In this case too any constitutional change as proposed by Kumaratunga will definitely be challenged in courts. It is learnt that even some legal eagles who are quite progressive on the ethnic question have been pessimistic about Kumaratunga's proposed stratagems being okayed by courts. The entrenched clauses of Jayewardene's constitution continue to be a stumbling block as they stipulate very clearly the conditions under which the current constitution can be changed. Unless a very bold, imaginative and widely interpretative approach instead of a rigid one is adopted by the courts, proposed manoeuvred are very likely to fail. The proposal of seeking a mandate to convert parliament into a constituent assembly and to enact the new constitutional reforms especially is a highly controversial one. Even without ascribing hidden motives to the judges it is doubtful that changing the constitution through extraneous devices will be palatable to most. There is also the question of certain acts being 'ultra vires' the constitution.

So for these reasons and more the judiciary undermining Kumaratunga's efforts cannot be ruled out. Still it is not necessary to pre-judge the issue now as Kumaratunga has to overcome other obstacles before confronting the legal tangle. This brings us to the second problem referred to in her 'Hindu' interview. When describing her plans vaguely the Sri Lankan president says: 'It is tedious way doing it. The political situation has to be good'. Now what could Kumaratunga mean when she says the political situation has to be good. It can mean that the political climate should be conducive for the PA to win well at the hustings. In short she wants to win polls to push through her package in addition to the natural desire of politicians to consolidate and retain power. All her calculations of gaining a mandate to convert parliament into a constituent assembly, etc. can come an obvious cropper if she fails in the initial test of winning relevant elections. It is this imperative balanced with present political reality that has impelled Kumaratunga to declare an islandwide emergency and postpone elections to the provincial councils. This action has tarnished her democratic image greatly but from Kumaratunga's perspective it is a 'necessary evil' to achieve her overall objective. In that sense her current conduct is more or less a manifestation of the launching of her new strategy to enact a constitutional revolution that ultimately will resolve ethnic crisis.

Chandrika Kumaratunga was elected on a mandate full of hope and promise. Sadly that promise is yet to be realised while most of her election promises have not been fulfilled. Almost four years have passed now. Positive achievements are not very visible.

Thus it is clear that the PA is not exactly riding the crest of a popular wave right now. As such its capacity to face hustings at this juncture and win well is highly suspect. Facing the average Sinhala voter at present with the further handicap of the political package may be a greater hassle. This situation therefore rules out for the moment two of the three options possible for Kumaratunga to enact her constitutional revolution. A non-binding referendum may go awry. Elections to parliament also may not yield positive results. The issue may not so much be Sinhala opposition to the devolution package but resentment over other issues such as rising prices, lack of suitable jobs, etc. The danger is that people may vote against government in the referendum or elections to register their protest over basic grievances and not because of communal reasons. The end result however will be a negative vote for devolution. The only option available then is for Kumaratunga to hold an early presidential election.

Kumaratunga remains the greatest asset of the Peoples Alliance. Some would say the solitary asset. Her charisma is tremendous and she is perhaps the single most popular mass figure in Sri Lankan politics right now. On a one to one political contest she is way ahead of her chief rival Ranil Wickremesinghe. In spite of all the problems it is felt that she still possesses the ability to edge out her rivals in presidential pools. So the government hopes to cash in on her popularity. Even if Kumaratunga can win the Presidency her margin of victory is likely to be low given the current situation. A further impetus to garner votes is needed. Sadly for a government that came to power pledging peace and an end to war the only available device to gain popularity in the Sinhala South is to utilise successes on the battlefield. The only possible glory that the PA can aspire for in the current is indirect glory. It can hope to bask in the reflected glory of the military if and when it performs spectacularly in the war front. Political mileage can be gained to some extent by succeeding military or so it seems. In that respect the PA government has placed all its bets on the Jayasikurui horse. The success of the Wanni operation or reopening the land route to the North is what it is hoping for. Since the imposition of emergency was very necessary for the government to postpone elections under it, the PA went ahead and did just that. In the process the PA in general and Kumaratunga in particular lost much prestige.

With the 'liability' of provincial council elections being out of the way temporarily the PA now eagerly awaits the outcome of the Wanni war. The strategy then is to call for an early presidential election first. But as the provincial councils were also postponed there is a legal hitch in having presidential polls before provincial polls. In that case elections for both will have to be announced jointly and held separately if the presidential poll is to be held first. Otherwise provincial elections can be held and then the presidential stakes. The government will capitalise to the maximum on the success gained on the military front and go in for presidential elections. If it does extremely well parliament is likely to be dissolved and fresh elections held. Thereafter parliament will become a constituent assembly and enact the new constitution.

As far as PA calculations are concerned the next scene is military victory before the end of the year over the LTTE. Thereafter it is going to be presidential elections where Kumaratunga hopes to ride the crest of a euphoric wave. The important question at present is whether the LTTE will allow her to implement her strategy according to the time tables envisaged or whether the Tigers have a totally different agenda.

In a different manner, but also similar, was the performance by Minister G.L. Peiris and Dr Neelan Tiruchelvam when they analysed the Northern Ireland peace agreement and its applicability to the Sri Lankan situation. Anyone who attended the seminar on the Northern Ireland experience held last Sunday at Wadduwa would have wondered why the war was dragging on.

The skills to resolve it politically through negotiations are so obviously present within the country.

Those present at the seminar included two of Northern Ireland's leading peace workers, Prof. Thomas Fraser and Ms Ann Campbell, as well as foreign ambassadors, Sri Lankan parliamentarians and members of the intelligentsia.After a period of quiesence, Prof Peiris has once again emerged as a leading proponent of a political solution obtained through negotiations. Perhaps the great difficulties experienced by the military over the past two years has given him the space to be be more assertive about a renewed peace process.

In stating in an interview with the Indian media that the government was not only willing, but 'eager' to talk to the LTTE, Prof. Peiris has given notice of a shift in governmental thinking on how best to end the war.

At the Wadduwa seminar, Prof. Peiris was appreciative of features in the Northern Ireland agreement which were different from the devolution package that he has been hitherto labouring over. In particular, he voiced his appreciation of the 'change with continuity' model inherent in the Northern Ireland agreement.

For instance, there is continuity in that the new 108 seat Northern Ireland Assembly is elected from existing Westminster constituencies (Strand one, No 2). There is also, of course, substantial change in that the key decisons are taken 'on a cross©community basis; (i) either parallel consent, ie a majority of those members present and voting, including a majority of unionist and nationalist designations present and voting; (ii) or a weighted majority (60%) of members present and voting, including at least 40% of each of the the nationalist and unionist designations present and voting.'

'Key decisions requiring cross©community support will bedesignated in advance, including election of the Chair of the Assembly, the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, standing orders and budget allocations.

In other cases such decisions culd be triggered off by a petition of concern brought by a significant minority (30 out of 108) of Assembly members' (Strand one, No 5d). The open minded manner in which Prof Peiris approached his subject, sketching out 15 points worthy of significant consideration in the Northern Ireland agreement, was an indication that to him the government's devolution package was not one cast in stone

It can and will be changed, either in the search for a bipartisan consensus with the UNP or/and in negotiation with the LTTE.

Instead of having become more rigid with the passage of time, Prof Peiris's attitude seems to be one of increased flexibility and openness to accepting lessons from other parts of the world. This is why the opposition UNP's proposed 'All Party Conference' seems to be not very much on the mark at this time.

Certainly, having an independent election commission, police commission and public service commission advocated by the APC are all important for good governance in the country. Neither Prof. Peiris nor the PA government is unlikely to have any serious problems with them either as institutions for the future. And indeed, the arrangements set out in the draft constitution are not far from what the UNP desires

But a thousand times more important in the context of the ethnic conflict that overshadows everything in Sri Lanka is a constitutional structure that will address the ethnic conflict. Strangely enough the UNP's proposed All Party Conference does not include anything on the ethnic conflict.

This is a major defect which the UNP should rectify if it wants the APC to to be a serious contribution to the conflict resolution process.

Or else it will be seen as a mere political ploy to put in place those institutions that will enable it to fare better at the forthcoming elections, while delaying a possible peace settlement until after those elections.At present it seems unilikely that the proposed APC will be much of a success in political terms.

It does not appear that either the PA or the Tamil parties will be sending their representatives to attend the APC. However, a strong contingent of civil society organisations are likely to attend, if not for anything else out of courtesy to the largest opposition party.

This would be one silver lining in the APC, that the UNP under the leadership of Ranil Wickremesinghe, is learning to overcome its past suspicion of civil society and human rights organisations, and is now seeing them as partners in the good governance of the country.

We publish excerpts of 'Sri Lanka's Ethnic Crisis and National Security' by Rohan Gunaratne which sheds fresh light on LTTE domestic and international organisation. Stating that that the LTTE rate of recruitment is higher than the fatalities the author argues that the government can win against the LTTE only by adopting unconventional military concepts and restructuring its current political postures towards the Tamils. The book's forward is by General Richard Clutterbuck, Britain's foremost authority on counter-insurgency. The 428 page illustrated book is available in Colombo.

(Continued from last week)

By building effective counter-intelligence structures, the state will be able to limit both penetration and operation. Although arrests have been made, compartmentalized operation prevented government operatives in Colombo from comprehending the order of battle of the LTTE organization, structured to destabilize Colombo from 1995 to early 1998.

The LTTE had conducted reconnaissance of military-security, political and economic targets in the south. At least over a period of ten years, the LTTE had conducted reconnaissance on almost all the key political leaders and service chiefs. The LTTE conducted reconnaissance even of the schools attended by the children of the VIPs. With intensification in security and stepped up alertness, the LTTE has also changed its operational methods and practices. The LTTE has increasingly recruited 'Tamil youth living in Colombo for a considerable length of time to conduct their operations. This is contrary to the earlier practice of sending complete assassination squads from the north'. On occasions, the LTTE had hired Sinhalese to conduct reconnaissance. The only effective method of securing the South, primarily the capital and national leaders, is not to adhere to reactive, but to proactive concepts. A reactive concept is to increase check points or intensify security around targets. A proactive concept is to conduct counter-intelligence operations, swooping on LTTE operational cells, based on intelligence developed from interrogations. In the Kelanitissa Power Station attack, the conclusion of the police report reflected the reactive mindset - 'excellent post-disaster' response - ineffective when confronted against a proactive group like the LTTE.

From early 1995 to early 1998, the police and the military were unable to neutralize more than two dozen cells. With the notable dearth of counter-intelligence operations aimed at disrupting plans of the LTTE intelligence wing in Colombo, the LTTE built operational, backup and sleeper cells during this critical period. While operational cells arranged for accommodation, transport and reconnaissance, LTTE hit teams continued to penetrate, strike and withdraw, after killing VIPs and destroying the heart of the economy in Colombo. The government failed to develop a police on regulated covert operations. Such a mandate, critical when fighting terror to the scale perpetrated by the LTTE, remained unrecognized. The literature on the merits of covert operations was not reviewed by the defence bureaucrats concerned with the security of Colombo.

If Sri Lanka has a policy, covert operations would have been in the hands of professionals. The unwillingness to sanction covert operations conducted by professionally-trained operatives, forced non-professionals with weapons, vehicles and finances to operate, precipitating a spate of unfortunate incidents. In the absence of such a policy, dead bodies to LTTE cadres and supporters in Colombo, began to appear in Diyawanna Oya (lake). It is a similar situation that was replicated in Jaffna in 1996 and also 1997. Yet, political coverage, vital for covert action, aimed at interlocking and neutralizing terror squads operating on the borders of legality and illegality, was not forthcoming.

Covert operations, which yielded tremendous successes - more than overt operations - failed comprehension. In a counter-insurgency context, particularly with ethnic overtones, conducting mass-scale cordon and search operations, was detrimental to the long term interests of the state. For instance, the large scale sweep conducted in Colombo in late October 1997 proved counter productive. Although the police and the army exercised restraint and discipline and was closely supervised by the Deputy Defence Minister Anuruddha Ratwatte, the outcome was neither cost-effective nor productive. The detention of 1000 men and women on suspicion generated sympathy for the LTTE and hatred towards the state.

In addition to strengthening the capability to conduct counter-intelligence as well as covert operations, the Sri Lankan security-military bureaucracy failed to develop a rapid response capability in Colombo. The time taken of the military or the police to respond to an LTTE strike has been unusually lengthy. Considering the capability of other foreign specialized military organizations engaged in counter-terrorism, the Sri Lankan military is yet to develop or re-orient the appropriate force structures of effectively respond to a crisis in the capital. Other foreign counter-terrorist organizations that have proved to be effective are:

Indian Theater:
LTTE's international theater of operations can be divided into India and the rest. India remained LTTE's principal external support base, both political and military until October 1987. Even thereafter, until about 1991, the LTTE operated in Tamil Nadu covertly. The 14 LTTE divisions in India were:

(1) Intelligence
(2) Communication
(3) Shipping
(4) Narcotics
(5) Arms Production
(6) Purchase of Explosives
(7) Propaganda
(8) Political Work
(9) Food and Essential Supplies
(10) Medicines
(11) Fuel Supply
(12) Clothing
(13) Transport
(14) Finance and currency conversion

The LTTE frequently conducted political activity and military operations in Tamil Nadu with the support of DK, AIADMK, DMK and other parties until the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. Many Indian Tamil nationalist politicians made use of the precarious situation in Sri Lanka to build their domestic political power. Some gave their lands to set up arms factories and training facilities, which others provided large financial contributions to the LTTE.

The Indian troops fighting the LTTE did not prevent the Indian Tamil nationalists from assisting the LTTE. After the IPKF withdrew, the LTTE continued to maintain a network in India. The failure of the state agencies to disrupt the network led to the assassination of the EPRLF leadership headed by K. Padmanabha. The DMK, shielded the network, enabling further subversion of the political, and the criminal-justice system of the Indian state. The LTTE used the same underground network with additional resources, to kill Rajiv Gandhi, the first of two world leaders to be assassinated by the LTTE.

The best known international operation of the LTTE was the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, a former prime minister of India. Hitherto, the LTTE had conducted assassination operations in India. For instance, the EPRLF leader K. Padmanabha and 14 others were killed by LTTE cadres during a meeting of their central committee in a flat at Kodambakkam, in Chennai on June 19, 1990. The LTTE developed the operation to eliminate the EPRLF leadership Jaffna under the directive of the LTTE Chief of Intelligence Pottu Amman and the LTTE leader Prabhakaran in February 1990.

On his instructions, Chinna Santhan came to Chennai and joined an engineering technology institute, which was near the flat where the EPRLF leaders lived. A hit squad consisting of Sivarasan, David, Dileepan, Daniel and Ravi arrived in Tamil Nadu on June 10, 1990 and that on being informed by Chinna Santhan that Padmanabha and other EPRLF leaders were holding a meeting in the flat, they reached the target in a vehicle armed with AK-47 rifles and hand grenades. After eliminating the EPRLF leadership, the squad withdrew in a Maruti car, driven to Pillaiyar Thidal village in Thanjavur district the next day, and escaped in a boat to Jaffna. Seven years after, the Indian court acquitted 15 of the 17 accused including former Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) Minister Subbulakshmi Jagadeesan, her husband Jagadesan, former State Home Secretary R. Nagarajan, Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK) leader V. Gopalsamy's brother V. Ravichandran and advocate D. Veerasekaran. Only Chinna Santhan and Anandaraj, two LTTE activists were sentenced. While Chinna Shanthan developed the reconnaissance for the operation, Anandaraj had harboured Gundu Shanthan, the LTTE leader for Trichi.

The one eyed LTTE leader who headed the assassination squad to eliminate the EPRLF leadership was Sivarasan - he was also the choice of the LTTE leadership to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi. In October 1990, six months after the Indian troops withdrew, the LTTE leadership assessed that Rajiv Gandhi would be elected as premier in the next election and the reintroduction of the IPKF to Sri Lanka would become a reality. The LTTE had suffered under the IPKF period.

(To be continued)

'Beitish Envoy draws parallel between Ireland, Lanka and suggests that Sri Lanka engage Tigers in talks' was the heading of the Reuters report from Colombo as it appeared in 'The Island' of 5th September. Just above this report were the photographs of Arjuna, Murali, Sanath and Aravinda with the heading Arjuna and the Triumphant Band Return. Who dictates terms to wh'British Envoy draws parallel between Irom?

It is said that the English (not the British) gave the world and us the parliamentary system and cricket. They have given us much more than that. Tamil racism in Sri Lanka is their creation. They baptised and nurtured Tamil racism until recently when the western countries in general decided to take care of the fiend.

The Sri Lankan cricketers have beaten the English. I do not think that the Sri Lankan cricketers played the English game. The two teams played two different games albeit with the same umpires. The Sri Lankans play their own game of attacking cricket, which the English will never play. They play only attacking politics and that too, since the so-called second world war, giving us the impression that they are not attacking.

I will give an example from politics in cricket. After Sri Lanka won the world cup the English cricket establishment always maintained that if the matches were played on their pitches Sri Lanka would not have won. They said that Sri Lanka won simply because the matches were played in the sub continent with slow pitches. Now there was an underline assumption and a subtle attack which many people did not realise. That is that the true pitches are the English (the Australian, and the South African) and in order to determine worthy champions cricket has to be played and won in England.

The Sri Lankans also took this as some gospel truth and were determined to win a trophy and a test match in England. It is good to see that the Sri Lankan cricketers have achieved their ambition. But what they should have done was to challenge the English to win matches in the sub continent. Sri Lankans could have easily said 'look our pitches are the true cricket pitches and not yours. If you want to be worthy champions win matches on our pitches. The genuine champions can be found only if the matches are played in the sub continent'. It is not a case of coming down to the level of the English but only a matter of attacking politics being met with similar politics.

They resemble Don John Dharmapala and have been brainwashed by their western education and by the so-called westminister and whitehall traditions. The real westminster and whitehall traditions are nothing but attacking as exemplified by the Foxes and the Tathams.

What right the British High Commissioner in Sri Lanka has got to interfere with our affairs? As reported in 'The Island' he has suggested that Sri Lanka engage the LTTE in talks. He has drawn a parallel between 'TERRORISM in Northern Ireland and the ETHNIC WAR in talks.' (my emphasis) He has also said . What worries us in the Northern Ireland, as it worries you in Sri Lanka, is that we had , we have democratic states based on universal suffrage and yet groups felt so alienated that they turned to violence to try to impose their will on the majority of their fellow citizens'.

It is very clear that the western powers are trying very hard to get the government involved in talks with the LTTE. Mr. Ranil Wickremesinghe has recently said that there should be unconditional talks with the LTTE. It was only last year that as a result of a visit by the then British foreign under secretary Dr. Fox letters were exchanged between the Leader of the opposition and the President on procedural matters in connection with talks between the government and the LTTE. Mr. Wickremesinghe's complain has been that the government has not honoured the 'agreement'.

Last week we had Prof. Thomas Fraser and Ms. Annie Fraser from Northern Ireland . They were in Sri Lanka to present their views at a workshop organised by the Ministry of Justice and the International Centre for Ethnic Studies headed by the TULF MP Dr. Neelan Thiruchelvam. Dr. G. L. Peiris was billed to deliver the keynote address at this workshop, which the High Commissioner for Britain Mr. Tatham was expected to attend. The Frasers, we are told were engaged in drafting the political agreement reached between the governments of the United Kingdom and the Northern Ireland. All these people seem to believe that there is a parallel between the Irish questio

Nothing can be further from the truth. They are neither parallel nor intersecting. They are skew and are not on the same plane. The only similarity between them is that both were created by the British. However that does not give a licence to Foxes, Tathams and Frasers to interfere with our sovereignty. The President should tell the British government in no uncertain terms that Britain should keep away from our internal affairs and that she should remind the British High Commissioner that now we do not have British Governors in the country. It appears that the Tamil racists, their Godfathers, and the sponsors are now rallying round Mr. Wickremesinghe and Dr. G. L. Peiris whom they want to form the next government. I would not be surprised if Dr. Peiris becomes the Minister of Constitutional Affairs in a UNP government as well.

The present government under the leadership of Ms. Kumaratunga was brought to power by the non-national forces only for one specific reason. (It is true that it was the people who voted for the PA. But Ms. Kumaratunga became the leader of the PA, hijacked the SLFP and then enforced SLMP policies on the PA under the auspicious of the non-national forces.) They wanted this government to implement the G.L.- Neelan political package. However the non-national forces misread the SLFP psyche, and underestimated the strength of the Sinhala nationalist movement and they were not able to achieve their objective. It is not only the Russian rouble, which is responsible for the fall in the various indices of the stock exchange. If not for the executive presidency all these non-national forces would have by now brought this government down.

The British High Commissioner refers to terrorism in Northern Ireland but to an ethnic war in Sri Lanka. Why is that Britain is so reluctant to call the LTTE a terrorist organisation? The term ethnic war gives respectability not only to the terrorist LTTE but also to the other Tamil racist parties as well. Then Mr. Tatham goes on to say that groups feeling alienated have turned to violence to try to impose their will on the majority. Now the question has to be asked as to whether these groups have been made to feel alienated by the majorities and also who are the majorities in the respective countries.

Prof. Fraser in an article published in 'The Island' of 4th and 5th of September talks of three related problems in Northern Ireland. As far as I can see there is only one problem in Ireland. The country has not been given full independence by England (Britain). Wales, Scotland and Ireland were the first colonies of England. They were the first to become members of the English empire later to be renamed as the British empire. Though England (Britain) gave some kind of political independence to the other countries after the war known as the second world war, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland remained within the empire.

n the case of Ireland the whole problem began in the sixteenth century. The Stuarts as well as Oliver Cromwell were responsible for colonisation and various other actions that the English took against the Irish. (If Messrs. Tatham, Fraser and Co., are interested in comparisons they can compare the land policies of Oliver Cromwell, which deprived the Irish Catholics of their land, with the land policies of the British in Sri Lanka starting with the waste land ordinance.) As Prof. Fraser himself mentions in the early 17th century large parts of Ulster were settled with Protestants. Prof. Fraser states that events such as the Battle of Boyne (1690) 'confirmed a Protestant Ascendancy in Ireland for the next hundred years and are still vital to understanding the current situation'. But he does not mention that the siege of Londonderry in 1688-89 and the Battle of Boyne did not take place as organic developments in the history of Ireland. If not for the English there would not have been so many Protestants in Ulster.

Finally in 1801 Ireland was annexed under the pretext of forming the United Kingdom of Britain and Ireland. (Britain had been formed by annexing Wales and Scotland.) The Irish nationalists waged a war of independence and independence was given to 28 counties in 1922, which formed the present Republic of Ireland. A parliament was set up in Dublin for these counties but the remaining six counties remained part of the so-called United Kingdom and they formed the Northern Ireland. In effect they remained a colony of England (Britain).

The present Northern Ireland problem started with that 'independence.' The Republic of Ireland has claimed jurisdiction over the whole Island. If the English (British) had given independence to the whole Island including the six counties, which they retained, there would not have been a Northern Ireland problem. The Protestants and the Catholics would have had some difficulties in the beginning but if there was no interference from Britain they would have sorted them among themselves. In any case there would not have been so many Protestants in Ireland if not for the Stuarts and Cromwells.

Now what has happened with the agreement that the Frasers have helped to draft? The agreement declared that 'Northern Ireland in its entirety remain part of the United Kingdom and shall not cease to be so without the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland voting in a poll'. On the other hand the Republic of Ireland has agreed to repeal articles 2 and 3 of its 1937 constitution which claimed jurisdiction over the whole island. The English diplomacy has saved the Northern Ireland for the United Kingdom! Beware of Frasers and others who are working for the English.

Mr. Tatham talks of minorities who feel that they have been alienated. In the case of Ireland who are the majority and who are the minority? Mr. Tatham must have had the IRA in mind when he talked of a minority. The Catholics are a minority only if Northern Ireland is considered . Even there in certain counties the Catholics are in the majority. If the whole Island is considered the Catholics form the majority. It is clear that it is the majority which feel they are alienated due to the policies of the Protestant England (Britain). A minority of Protestants is imposing its will on the majority with the help of the English (British).

In Sri Lanka it is again the majority Sinhala people who have been discriminated as a result of the policies of the British. However the majority has not taken up arms as in the case of Ireland. Here it is the Tamils, who are not prepared to accept that the Sinhala people are the majority, and who have taken up arms. Prabhakaran was created by the Anglican Chelvanayakam who in turn was created by the Anglican British. The British created the English educated Tamils and gave them privileges and undue prominence in the professions and equated them historically and culturally (in the sense of the culture of the country) with the Sinhala and finally by appointing equal number of members to the Legislature instilled in their heads a hatred against the Sinhala majority.

Sri Lanka has been an Eksesath (Unitary) state for more than two thousand years. We became an Eksesath state long before the westerners and their political scientists thought of the concept of a unitary state. The so-called Jaffna kingdom, which in any case did not extend up to the present Eastern Province carved out by the British, was not a sovereign state.

It is not a question of Sinhala people grabbing the Eastern and the Northern Provinces, as the English (British) did in the case of Ireland but a problem of Tamils demanding a separate state as a result of Tamil racism created by the British, and taking up arms to achieve their aspiration. (I have traced the origin and the evolution of Tamil racism in Sri Lanka elsewhere.) There is no need for any talks, conditional or unconditional, with the LTTE which together with the other Tamil racist parties impose conditions on the government. These conditions including acceptance of Tamils as a separate nation, the right of self determination of the Tamils, and the traditional homeland concept, which according to them are non-negotiable, amount to giving an Eelam in principle.

If Mr. Tatham and the rest are interested in the welfare of the Sri Lankan people there is one thing that they can do. Pay compensation for violating the 1815 Kandyan or Udarata convention and all the other acts against the Sinhala people, especially the Buddhists, and keep away from our affairs even though it was the British who created the problems.