By Nayana
The Northern Ireland Agreement - recently commended to this country by the British High Commissioner as proof that there is light at the end of the tunnel - is deserving of critical study if only for the fact that it appears to be working; and working with the consent and will of the people.

However, if it is to be of value as an example of what can be done, it must be analysed carefully and objectively. Self-serving interpretations by different parties will not bring us any nearer to solving our own problem.

At the outset it must be emphasised that the significance of the Northern Ireland Agreement for Sri Lanka does not lie in any similarities of historical situation which, as Dr Nalin De Silva pointed out in the daily Island recently, is quite different.

The lessons to be drawn from the Northern Ireland peace process are to be found in the manner in which the negotiations were conducted and the constitutional devices employed in bringing about a settlement of a long-running communal / sectarian conflict in a way that has the support of the majority and minority communities.

It is probably with this in mind that the British authorities assisted in bringing down two Northern Ireland scholars who had been involved in the peace process to share their experiences with Sri Lankans. The Justice Ministry, together with the International Centre for Ethnic Studies must be commended for promoting the event, although it remains to be seen to what extent the lessons from the Northern Ireland experience will be taken on board by a political and intellectual establishment that has for the last four years largely stuck to its own ideas about the "package".

Although the British Government is more fortunate than its Sri Lankan counterpart in being able to change major aspects of its constitution without the need for a two-thirds majority in Parliament, there has nevertheless been a tradition of consensus between the major parties in their approach to the Northern Ireland problem.

Indeed, in 1993 it was a Conservative Government, together with the Government of the Irish Republic, that issued the "Downing Street Declaration" embodying the basic principle on which the present Agreement rests. Hence there was no need for protracted discussions between the parties of mainland Britain before commencing talks with the parties of Northern Ireland.

In Northern Ireland (as in Scotland and Wales where different types of devolution measures were enacted in 1997) the Agreement was put to a referendum even though there was no law requiring it. Its endorsement by a clear majority of voters gives it legitimacy and puts pressure on those fringe groups who have so far refused to accept it.

Proof of the assimilation of the Agreement into the process of democratic government in Northern Ireland came when even certain Protestant parties opposed to its terms contested and won seats in the Assembly set up under the Agreement, thereby implicitly accepting that this Assembly was now the only proper forum for canvassing ideas about the future of the Province.

In Sri Lanka, where changes to the Constitution of the magnitude contemplated would most probably require a referendum as a matter of law, ground conditions may not permit one to be held in the areas for which the "package" is chiefly intended. A referendum which is anything less than free, fair and substantially representative of the pre-displacement population figures for the relevant areas would de-legitimize any settlement and give space for groups who seek to oppose it outside the democratic process.

Thus any talks agenda in Sri Lanka would presumably have to include modalities for enabling such a poll to be held.

Turning now to the substance of the Agreement: Its most significant feature, in this columnist’s view, is that it seeks to reconcile majority and minority interests by a system of power sharing and not by territorial fragmentation.

Majoritarian democracy is tempered by a requirement for cross-community consensus on key decisions including budget allocations and the elections of the First Minister, Deputy First Minister and Speaker of the Assembly.

Executive functions will be carried out by a committee system allowing for pro-rata representation of all parties in the Assembly, similar to the system under Donoughmore Constitution which, by common consent, is likely to be revived under any settlement in this country.

The European Convention on Human Rights or an equivalent Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland will bind all public bodies, while an Equality Commission will handle individual complaints and monitor the promotion of equality and parity of esteem.

While our fundamental rights chapter and the various mechanisms for its enforcement ranging from Supreme Court to the Ombudsman can be treated as equivalent to most of the above, an interesting concept is "parity of esteem".

This phrase is repeated at several places and embodies a central concept in the Agreement, namely that everyone’s community loyalties and aspirations are accepted as legitimate, even while all signatories pledge to pursue their goals only by peaceful means.

Thus the twin strands of the problem, namely the wish of the Catholic community for re-unification with the rest of Ireland and the desire of the Protestant community to remain part of the United Kingdom, are dealt with by recognizing the "legitimate" wish of a substantial section of the people of Northern Ireland to unite with the Irish Republic while also recognizing that "it would be wrong to make any change in the status of Northern Ireland save with the consent of a majority of its people".

Put simply, this means that it is permissible for the Catholics to peacefully pursue their aspiration of a united Ireland but such a re-unification cannot take place without the consent of the Protestant majority in the North.

This acceptance of the legitimacy of the aspirations on all sides while committing all parties to "exclusively democratic and peaceful means of resolving differences" is one of the hallmarks of the Agreement and probably the key that made it possible.

History has shown that no group comes willingly to the negotiating table if it is made to look like a defeated party. Thus Republican pride is saved even while they have for all practical purposes given up their claim of forcing the re-unification of Ireland.

One might say that the "Good Friday" Agreement is a typically British triumph of pragmatism over theory, characteristic of its basically unwritten constitution, and contrasts sharply with the sterile debates over the meaning of words like "unitary" and "united" brought about by our excessively rhetorical constitutions of 1972 and 1978.

However these problems can be overcome if one can forge a constitutional arrangement that wins the support of the majority of the people and creates conditions where that support can be manifested through a free and fair referendum.

Hence we return to the importance of an effective negotiating process employed in Northern Ireland which was designed to involve, if not all groups, at least a sufficient number of groups from all communities so that their opinion will carry weight with any extremists who remain outside. In this connection it is relevant to mention that the British government did not produce a complete constitution which it expected others to accept, but began the formal talks only with a "Framework Document" setting out some basic principles.

While a ceasefire and an eventual "decommissioning" of arms are integral to the settlement, the time frame for both was kept flexible while the talking went on. The political will of the participants has now succeeded in enforcing a ceasefire on all extremist groups.

Those involved in the peace process also testify to the fact that for many years prior to the commencement of formal talks, much informal discussion had gone on, often initiated by persons of accepted integrity in civil society who had contact with militant elements on one side or the other. The lesson to be drawn from this is, on the one hand, that the government of the day does not have a monopoly on the peace process, and on the other hand, that civil society has a duty to exercise its own initiative.

With two successive governments in this country having involved themselves in peace talks that failed disastrously, a view has gained ground that Sri Lanka does not at the present moment have persons sufficiently skilled in the art of negotiation to conduct such talks successfully, and hence the call for international facilitators and /or mediators.

Whether there is an actual lack of suitable personnel or whether suitable persons were simply not called upon is a debateable question. However, some misconceptions about the negotiating process are certainly evident, one of which is the significance of "unconditional" talks.

Only the politically naive would imagine that unconditional talks means going into the conference room with a blank agenda. In all professionally conducted negotiations, the parties carefully work out their goals and options in advance and, as the Northern Ireland representatives mentioned, skilled negotiators often have two or three alternative positions to fall back on so as to keep the talks going. "Unconditional" talks only mean that parties are not asked to publicly commit themselves to a position before the discussions start.