Ponnuthurai Sivapalan, the recently appointed Tamil United Liberation Front Mayor of the Jaffna Municipality is the latest victim of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

The carnage at the Nallur Kalyana mandapam (Wedding Hall) now housing the Municipal Council also caused the deaths of Jaffna Brigade Commander Susantha Mendis posthumously promoted as Major - General, his principal Staff Officer Capt. Ramanayake, Senior Supt. of Police Chandra Perera, ASP Sarath Fernando, ASP Chandramohan, Headquarters Inspector Mohanadhas, Police Constable Gerard, Addl. Municipal Commissioner Pathmanathan, Municipal Engineer Eeswaran, Asst Municipal Engineer Pathmarajah, and a woman, Municipal architect, Mallika Rajaratnam. Another injured eight of whom three are in critical condition are hospitalised.

The instrument of death was in the form of a sophisticated Claymore device mine lodged between the roof and ceiling. The usually arc shaped Claymores are basically anti-personnel mines used to target foot and mobile patrols. A few have also been suspended on trees by the LTTE in the jungles. But placing one up above a room of seated occupants and heaping death downwards is another first for the LTTE in this dirty war.

Sivapalan ... the third mayor to be assassinated in Jaffna (Pic by Gamini Mendis)

The discovery of another bombing device that apparently did not explode provides knowledge of what the lethal weapon was likely to have been. Investigations are on to ascertain the exact nature of the death device.

It remains to be seen as to whether the bombs were placed several months ago when the building was being renovated and lying dormant until being activated last Friday. Another possibility is that the bombs were planted on the municipal premises only the previous night or a few days before. If this theory is correct then some 'inside connivance' has occurred.

The reported detention of two night watchers Mangaleswaran and Thevasingham suggest that suspicion centres around the fact that the bombs were very recently placed during nightfall. It is suspected that the bomb was activated by a powerful remote control mechanism from outside though some say an electronic timer also could have been used.

The topmost soldier in the North Major - General Lionel Balagalle has described the incident as a 'setback'. In one single incident the Mayor, Town Commandant and SSP have been eliminated. So too have a number of other top police and municipal officials. The meeting with the Army and Police was known to municipal officials only at 9.30 am in the morning. The earlier schedule was to hold the Municipal Council meeting at 11 am in the same room.

If that meeting had occurred as planned then the explosive attack would have caused the deaths of the Mayor and the Council in its entirety.

Although investigations are yet to be completed all preliminary indications are that the perpetrators who originally targeted the Municipal Council may have decided to go-ahead with their plan in spite of the changed agenda because the opportunity to kill the Brigadier, Senior police officials along with the Mayor too was an attractive target from the LTTE point of view.

The attack from a Tiger perspective has succeeded in exposing the fragile security situation in Jaffna. The killing of Municipal officials in particular is likely to send shivers down the spines of most public servants in Jaffna. The tenuous structures of civil administration struggling to assert themselves in Jaffna will now regress into oblivion. The security apparatus too will naturally adopt a more sterner hard-line approach and increase security measures. The slow process of transferring military control to civilian authorities will now be put on hold. More importantly the psyche of the Jaffna people would reluctantly reconcile itself to the harsh reality that there is no return to normalcy at least not now.

When local authority elections to Jaffna were held in January this year this column stated that it was the Jaffna municipal elections that was of paramount importance. For more reasons than one it was the metropolitan poll that proved to be the most fair and free of the seventeen local authority elections. It was also the most prestigious being the northern capital. Also the best possible chance to usher in a normal civilian administration albeit with some constraints was also possible only there.

All the Tamil parties contested Jaffna and nominated the best possible candidates for the Jaffna mayoral stakes. The EPDP had their Jaffna organizer Jegan and the EPRLF their Jaffna organizer Robert. The PLOTE had its deputy leader Manickathasan and the TELO the Secretary -General Sivajilingam. The TULF had a woman Sarojini Yogeswaran widow of popular Jaffna ex-Parliamentarian Yogeswaran as its candidate. The TULF got into the hustings late because of some legal difficulties. Its campaign was conspicuous by its low - profile, non - presence nature. Yet the TULF won Jaffna and Sarojini Yogeswaran created history as the first elected mayoress of Jaffna.

The LTTE too attempted a direct disruption of polls only in Jaffna city. In the early hours of the morning on election day the LTTE launched a mini offensive on Gunagar in Jaffna municipality. It also indulged in some mortar shelling. This resulted in the voting times in Jaffna city being delayed by several hours. A feeling of panic too set in. The voter turn out in Jaffna town was nearly half of the actual number of voters present.

In another remarkable exhibition of courage the people of Jaffna had literally voted with their feet. In the process they dispelled the sustained propaganda barrage by the Colombo Tamil media that the elections would turn out to be a fiasco. The people in their own way demonstrated that they wanted to take the first small step in the gigantic journey back to proper representative democracy and civilian rule.

The PA and President Kumaratunga made maximum use of this performance to blare forth that it was a great victory for the government. The PA government sought to convert a creditable assertion by the people into a partisan political triumph over the LTTE. Again the prize showcase of this victory was Jaffna City. All the world especially the western media loves a spirited underdog particularly a woman in the patriarch dominated context of South Asia. So Sarojini Yogeswaran was lionized to a very great extent. Even the visiting US representative to the UN Richardson wanted a photo opportunity meeting with Yogeswaran who could not oblige him because she had injured herself at that time in a fall.

The Kumaratunga administration after seeking maximum propaganda mileage out of the Jaffna local authority situation did not take any meaningful steps to constructively promote the situation. At a time when the northern local authorities in general and Jaffna municipality in particular should have been given 'privileged' treatment to function efficiently and creditably all sorts of bureaucratic constraints were placed. All those 'bleeding hearts' from the South who went to Jaffna at election time to ensure and observe that their northern brethren were returning to the folds of democracy just lost interest after that. No pressure was exerted on the government to take extra measures and galvanise the northern bodies into action.

Sarojini Yogeswaran met President Kumaratunga herself but there was no immediate follow up action. Shortly before her death Yogeswaran in an interview to a Tamil newspaper sounded bitter and disappointed. There was an acute sense of feeling betrayed in that interview. More importantly the people of Jaffna too were sharing these feelings. They had taken a bold brave step in defying the LTTE diktat in opting to live in Army controlled Jaffna earlier. They had also boldly defied the Tigers in voting in comparatively large numbers at the local authority polls. But now there was no meaningfully reciprocal activity by the government. There was neither transition to civilian rule nor concrete development efforts. The government seemed concerned only in scoring narrow propaganda points and not evincing any real care or concern about their plight.

The local authorities won by the EPDP, PLOTE and TELO too were not functioning. Trotting out various reasons, some of them valid, these parties did not constructively engage in running the Councils. Some never convened while others had only a few taking oaths. But the TULF took that leap of faith and trusting the Kumaratunga government attempted to work the two authorities under their control, the Jaffna MC and the Valigamam North Pradeshiya Sabha in spite of the constraints. It was a very commendable and courageous step for the TULF as it lacked the fire-power and financial power of the other Tamil parties. The TULF was extremely vulnerable. Sarojini Yogeswaran in particular refused armed bodyguards on a matter of principle.

The TULF once again became politically targeted. Its close association with Kumaratunga's efforts to usher in a devolution package was a plus point in its favour once. But with the Constitutional reform process reaching an impasse and the consequences of the war troubling the Tamils on a widespred scale the TULF was the subject of criticism. The 'moderate' and 'democratic' nature of the party made itself very vulnerable. Tamil elements who would not dare criticise Tamil groups or the tigers publicly pulled no punches when it came to the TULF. Tamil political parties too kept on criticising the TULF. In a bid to demonstrate that it was not TULF support that helped the government to prolong the emergency the party started voting against emergency extension in Parliament. Thus it proved that it was not responsible for the sustained emergency. Still the criticism continues.

There is a Tamil proverb that only fruit bearing trees are stoned. Likewise there is the English saying that on one kicks a dead dog. The TULF may be down but it certainly is not out. The 1994 Parliamentary elections as well as the two local authority results of 1998 have demonstrated that if free and fair elections are held the Tamil electorate will vote for the TULF in a big way. Of course it is difficult to predict a situation where the LTTE enters the democratic mainstream but even then the TULF is likely to do reasonably well.

This is fully realised by other Tamil parties and hence their vicious tirades against the TULF. The LTTE also knows that the intra-Tamil political threat to it is from the TULF and not the other Tamil parties. In addition there is the 'defencelessness' of the TULF in terms of armed protection. This makes the TULF doubly vulnerable to the LTTE. At the same time the divisions within the TULF also must be taken into account. There is one faction that co-operates closely in the government's Constitutional reform exercise. Another powerful faction is closely aligned to the LTTE way of thinking. While a third grouping is somewhere in between these positions.

The TULF component that is seen as being sympathetic to the LTTE has been against TULF participation in the Jaffna local authority polls. In fact when a foreign journalist informed an important member of this faction that Sarojini Yogeswaran had been killed that 'worthy' broke out into a smile. The opinion expressed was that he was against the participation of elections and that his position was now justified. In this scenario it is clear that continuous participation by the TULF in the so called local authority process in Jaffna can only bring about more and more violent repercussions.

Sarojini Yogeswaran thought that the 'boys' would not harm her as she was alone and unprotected. She also wistfully referred to Velupillai Prabakharan alias 'Thamby' who was befriended by her husband Yogeswaran and had enjoyed her hospitality in her home in the bygone days. This association however did not prevent the LTTE killing her husband along with Amirthalingam in 1989. That too after entering the home on the pretext of negotiations and after eating her biscuits and drinking her tea. Her unarmed helplessness also did not stand in the way of the LTTE gunning down her mercilessly.

Sarojini Yogeswaran after becoming mayoress was very careful in not giving cause for offence to the LTTE. She always emphasised the necessity for negotiations with the LTTE. Likewise her successor Sivapalan also was arguing publicly in favour of recommencing talks with the boys. Still that did not insulate them or insure them from LTTE retribution. Most members of the TULF have taken extra care not to antagonize the LTTE publicly. Even when their colleagues are killed by the LTTE they only express 'anguish and outrage' but never condemn the LTTE directly. The TULF also keeps on calling for negotiations with the LTTE. TULF president Sivasithamparam even stated that the LTTE could become the sole representatives of the Tamils if the Tigers opted for negotiations.

Even now TULF personalities are stating publicly that nothing can destroy the TULF and that they would continue to run the municipal council, senior vice-president Anandasangari has even said that if a suitable candidate cannot be found he himself would become mayor. While these assertions which are clearly in defiance of the LTTE are being articulated on the one hand the TULF also displays a marked reluctance to condemn the LTTE directly or challenge it for the killing of Sivapalan. The curious dichotomy in the TULF is that it seeks to appease and mollify the LTTE by refusing to condemn the Tigers while arousing their wrath by indulging in defiant exercises such as trying to run the municipal council.

But what the TULF and for that matter a considerable section of Tamil opinion fails to realise is that the LTTE is not playing a game of ludo. It is bent on a deadly serious campaign to achieve a separate State for the Tamils. It will regard all Tamils who do not subscribe to its agenda as being against it. Of these anyone displaying a contrary assertion are termed traitors to be destroyed at suitable times. In that process it will think nothing of killing TULF personalities although it was that party which fostered Tamil nationalism to the point of obtaining an electoral mandate for Tamil Eelam. It is not only a case of being like 'revolutionary France' during the reign of terror when Pierre Vergniaud remarked at his trial that the revolution like Saturn might devour each of her children one by one. In the TULF case it is more like Parashuram killing his mother at the behest of his father.

The LTTE in spite of all its boasts has only a destructive capacity. All constructive aspects of its structure are also geared towards destruction, death and despair. The continuous LTTE leadership of the Tamils can only lead the community towards a dismal future. The need of the hour is for a meaningful and credible alternative to emerge. It is clear that at the present time it is the TULF despite its handicaps and shortcomings that can provide such leadership. The party's worthwhile participation in the devolution exercise shows that it is mindful of its responsibilities.

Therefore it is for the TULF to decide what exactly it wants to do at this juncture. If it wants to defy the LTTE then it must get its act together and do so openly, unanimously and unambiguously. The silent majority within the Tamil community will slowly begin to back the TULF after awhile. But it will take some time. But if the TULF continues to send out mixed signals and hesitate to even challenge the LTTE for killing its members then it cannot expect people to repose confidence in it.

The TULF will be fully justified if it asks the LTTE openly as to why Sarojini Yogeswaran and Ponnuthurai Sivapalan were killed. It can legitimately question the Tigers as to what right that outfit has to kill two mayors who were trying to serve the people in a limited way under difficult circumstances. If the TULF embarks upon this course it can hope to win a mass following in due course that would act fearlessly. But if it just continues in the present manner not only will it never become truly significant but stand discredited and lose its present position too. Also mollycoddling the Tigers does not guarantee immunity from the LTTE not even for the Batticaloa contingent.

If it is the TULF position that LTTE is the sole representative of the Tamil people and that its heinous crimes should not be challenged then it has no business to continue in politics. Clinging on to elected office in such a situation can only be construed as crass opportunism. This column is not unmindful of the past tribulations suffered by the TULF and is sympathetic to its enviable predicament. But it is the responsibility of the TULF that encouraged a generation of Tamil youths to fight for the Eelam cause to help resolve the crisis created. In today's context only the TULF can do something meaningful however weak it may be.

At the same time the current political conditions too have to be taken cognizance of. The conduct of the government as well as the security situation in Jaffna indicates clearly that local government there can only be a facade. If the government had deployed substantial numbers of soldiers in Jaffna and pumped in a lot of money with the aim of making a showcase of Jaffna there may be some justification in the TULF tagging along. As it is the government has even pulled out soldiers to man the Wanni front. The LTTE level of infiltration suggests that the security forces may not be able to afford the luxury of civil administration in Jaffna for some time.

As such there is no need for the TULF to continue with the optic illusion of running a municipal administration. It is futile for the TULF to indulge in rhetoric and appoint a new mayor. Unless current conditions improve that person too is going to be another human sacrifice. Such a sacrifice is particularly meaningless in a situation where the mayor or the municipality will not be able to do anything meaningful or solid. Instead the Jaffna municipality would do well to emulate its counterpart the Valigamam North Pradeshiya Council and suspend its functions indefinitely with the proviso that the situation would be reconsidered after an overall political settlement.

Following such a course need not be termed cowardice but merely a page out of the LTTE book of tactics. After all no Tamils called the Tigers cowards when they engineered the mass exodus from Jaffna. Vadamaratchy and Thenmaratchy were cede to the army without a fight on the basis that it was a 'strategic withdrawal'. The TULF too would do well to abandon its suicidal attempt to keep running the Jaffna municipal council as a cosmetic exercise sans any real power.

This also does not mean that the TULF should abdicate its political role. It should once again take the initiative to pressurise the PA and UNP to arrive at an understanding and promulgate the proposed Constitutional changes. The development that would cause a sea change in Tamil opinion is a bipartisan consensus between the major Sinhala parties on maximum devolution. It is that development that would truly isolate the LTTE politically and begin a reappraisal of Tamil political thought. Going ahead with feeble attempts to keep the meaningless municipal council of Jaffna running can only be another sop to Cerberus.

The UNP and the TULF have said that the bomb attack at Nallur, Jaffna last week was a clear signal to the government that it should resume unconditional negotiations with the LTTE. According to the UNP MP Mr. Tyronne Fernando 'the government must listen to reason before more people die in violence'. Mr. Joseph Pararajasingham, the TULF MP has said 'They (LTTE) are the key players and must be part to whatever proposed settlement'. (The Island Sunday Edition 13th September 1998).

It appears that the UNP has two 'types of reason'. Neither Mr. Tyronne Fernando nor the UNP advocated any talks during the period 1987-90 with the JVP. I cannot remember the British High Commissioner, the American ambassador or the Norwegian ambassador attending any workshops in Wadduwa or anywhere else on the JVP crisis and assisting the government and/or any non governmental organisation to import so called experts on conflict resolution and drafting agreements. There were neither the media pundits who called the JVP insurrection a JVP war 1 or a JVP war 2.

The difference between the two situations is that the JVP took up arms to capture state power while the LTTE wants to set up a separate state in the Eastern and the Northern provinces carved out by the British. It appears that a war situation results when an armed organisation demands state power in part of the country but not when an organisation claims state power over the entire country. According to these 'enlightened' people the government should have talks only in the former case. Also the foreign diplomats tell us that only in the latter case the members of the organisation become terrorists. Perhaps if the JVP claimed state power only for the Southern province carved out by the British they would have been treated with more respect by the diplomats, the media pundits and the 'main' political parties. Even then they should have been very careful not demand state power for the Ruhuna as (i) it was not a creation of the British and (ii) Ruhuna extends up to Trincomalee.

The UNP claims that the government has already written to the LTTE on talks and that they (UNP) would like to see that talks are unconditional. The President has stated that there would not be any unconditional talks with the LTTE. I am not sure whether Ms. Kumaratunga is 'political na•ve and imagined that unconditional talks means going into the conference room with a blank agenda' as mentioned by the Sunday Island columnist Nayana (in general and not particularly in the case of Ms. K) but the President has decided that it is not good to have unconditional talks with the LTTE.

In any case the majority of the Sinhala people are against having talks with the LTTE unconditionally or conditionally. It has to be emphasised that the Sinhala opinion is not represented by the NGO members and other such creatures who begin with 'enlightened' statements like 'I am a Sinhala Buddhist but you know I am of the view.' These 'Sinhala Buddhist but' (SBB) people thought and claimed that they represented the Sinhala opinion on the G. L. - Neelan political package but by now even the western diplomats should know what the Sinhala people thought about the package.

Anybody who knows anything about negotiations and discussions know that people do not go into discussions with blank agenda. Any leader of a student union will tell you about the fall back positions and other intricacies associated with talks. More important than these is the most fundamental question that comes up in negotiations. What are you going to discuss? What is the problem that you are going to discuss? One does not go into negotiations even without knowing what one is going to discuss. I am not having in my mind the question of defining very clearly the nature of the problem. Once the problem is known, the other details such as modalities and fall back positions can be worked out, provided that there is some problem to be discussed.

The problem in Sri Lanka is different from that in Northern Ireland not only historically. However history is important as the present problems are creations of the past. Whatever the Post Modernists have to say there is nopresent moment without a past and a future. It is with respect to history that this type of problems are defined finally. The manner in which the negotiations are conducted and the constitutional devices employed are secondary however important they may be.

When the British, who cheated the Sinhala people in 1815 by signing the Kandyan or the Udarata Convention with no intention of honouring it, are eager to assist us with bringing down 'experts' from Northern Ireland to help' us with so-called constitutional devices, in solving a problem they have created, the Sinhala people are worried, to say the least. When the so called Good Friday agreement turns out to be something that has effectively retained Northern Ireland within the English empire all that the Sinhala people can tell the High Commissioner politely is 'no thank you'.

Northern Ireland
In Northern Ireland the problem is one of giving independence to that part of Ireland, which the English (British) have been ruling after manoeuvring with their 'unwritten constitution'. The problem is well defined and the English (British) are trying hard to cling to Northern Ireland with their proven 'diplomatic' skills.

What is the problem in Sri Lanka? The Tamil racist parties themselves admit that there are no masters and servants and that there are no grievances. According to them the Tamils have only aspirations. The present aspiration of Tamil racism is an Eelam. The LTTE wants to achieve this in one step while the successors to the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi (Lanka Tamil State Party) or the so-called Federal Party likes to realise it in two steps, going through a Federal state first. These parties from Thimpu days have insisted on certain non-negotiable conditions, which amount to accepting Eelam. The non-negotiable conditions do not constitute the fall back position of the Tamil racist parties but their launching pad. Perhaps the NGO's and the western sponsors of Tamil racism have a knowledge of the fall back position of the LTTE.

As far as the Sinhala people are concerned there are neither launching pads nor fall back positions in respect of talks with the LTTE. One simply does not negotiate on the aspirations of the Tamil racists.

In order to justify their aspirations the Tamil racists have created a mythical history, which cannot be substantiated with any historical or archaeological evidence. The question is whether the Sinhala people should agree with a government or an opposition that wants to negotiate with the LTTE on the constitutional devices that should be adopted in order to help the Tamil racists to achieve their aspirations. Any negotiations with or without the help of the British or some other party, and with or without conditions amount to this. The Sinhala people, not the SBB variety, will never agree to such negotiations. As far as the majority of the Sinhala people are concerned, there is no problem to discuss. If the Arabs, Indians, Pakistanis or any other community living in London come out with some political aspirations will the English (British) agree to have negotiations with them?

However the British have taken a keen interest in discussions with the LTTE. Last year Dr. Liam Fox was in Sri Lanka and he got the President and the Leader of the Opposition to exchange letters on some procedural matters in connection with negotiations with the LTTE. Mr. Ranil Wickremesinghe is very keen to see that the government adheres to this 'agreement'.

Bombs are no invitations: scene of a bomb blast in Colombo

In a few days Mr. Wickremesinghe will be leaving for the USA ostensibly to raise funds for the UNP. There he is expected to meet members of the New York Tamil Sangham, regarded as a front organisation of the LTTE. He has also given an interview to 'Sanjeevi' a magazine section of the 'Udayan' newspaper published in Jaffna, where he has said that while in the opposition he would talk to the LTTE to bring about a ceasefire. However this is in contradiction to an earlier report according to which the UNP is of the view that the previous talks with the LTTE failed because of the ceasefires. These contradictory positions indicate that the UNP has no grasp of the situation and is only acting according to the whims and fancies of Tamil racists and their sponsors.

The UNP, it appears, is now very keen to end the 'war'. Unfortunately for the UNP there is no 'war' to end. What they say is that they are really interested in stopping the military operations against the LTTE, which has taken up arms against the state so as to establish a separate state and fulfil their aspirations. In other words the UNP is interested in having unconditional talks with the LTTE in order to give more and more powers to the provincial council in the Eastern and the Northern provinces, thus paving way for an Eelam. The so-called war can be stopped only in one way. That is by defeating the LTTE militarily.

The UNP and the TULF leaderships state that the last week bomb explosion was a clear signal to the government to start unconditional negotiations with the LTTE. But Mr. Anandasangari, the vice president of the LTTE speaking to the Rupavahini said that he did not know who was responsible for the bomb attack. Without 'knowing' the organisation responsible for the bomb attack the TULF talks of signals. The TULF, which is responsible for the creation of the LTTE, is now being attacked by their adored 'boys'. However they are not in a position even to say that their members are being killed by the LTTE. Together with the UNP all that they can do is to look for 'signals' which they think will at least guarantee the survival of their leaders living in Colombo.

The bombs, if at all, send signals to the TULF. It is the TULF, which should talk to the LTTE. Those English educated Tamils who misled the generation of Prabhakaran, with their mythical histories, homeland concepts, Tamil nation concepts and rights of self determination should have the courage to tell their 'boys' that the agony was started by the British and that they themselves were used by the British against the Sinhala people, first by inducing them to ask for equal representation in the Legislative Assembly. They should tell their 'boys' to lay down arms and to learn to live with the Sinhala people, retaining their identity as Tamils. Would the SBB people in the NGO's arrange some workshops, preferably with the participation of the three diplomats who went to Wadduwa, to give courage to the TULF leadership?

The frightening efficiency and infinite patience of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam were demonstrated with ruthlessness and brutality yet again, to the whole world, with the calculated killing of Jaffna Mayor Ponnudurai Sivapalan last Friday. Experts from the Government Analyst's Department are still poring over the scene of devastation in Nallur, together with army personnel, and have confirmed that the blast was caused by a modified Claymore mine which had been hidden on top of the asbestos ceiling of the mayor’s office in the Jaffna Municipal building. Since the building is always guarded, it is believed that the only way that the Tigers could have placed the bomb was during renovations to the building which were done in June, shortly after the new mayor took office.

The investigation is now focussing on the method by which the mine was triggered off. Claymore mines are extremely powerful weapons, since their blast is directional, blowing up everything in one direction, unlike a conventional bomb, which explodes in all directions, and is thus less specialized. Claymorescan be modified to be triggered by a variety of methods. The main possibility is that some type of timer was used. It is impossible to set a timer three months in advance, since there is no way that a bomber could no that far in advance when the mayor would be sitting in his office. So this possibility is already discounted. This means that the timer was set a few hours or days before the meeting. Iwould have been impossible for an LTTE cadre to set the timer while the meeting was in progress in the office.

The search has been narrowed to all those who knew in advance that there would be a top level meeting, attended by the mayor, Jaffna Brigade Commander Brigadier Susantha Mendis, and Jaffna SSP Chandra Perera. It is unlikely that the news leaked from the brigadier’s staff, or the police, so the hunt is now on for an infiltrator among the municipal workers and officials, including those who were wounded. Since this was a meeting to discuss traffic arrangements in the city, the majority of those in the room were police officers, namely ASP Sarath Fernando and HQI Mohan Das.

A constable named Gerard was present to assist the SSP.A member of the brigadier’s staff, Captain Prasanna Ramanayake, was present totake notes and assist Brig. Mendis. The civilians in the room, apart from the mayor, were Additional Municipal Commissioner Pathmanathan and Municipal Engineer Eswaran. A typist, Mallika Rajaratnam, who knew shorthand and sometimes did secretarial work for the mayor, was taking notes for records purposes. Another method the blast could have been triggered off is by remote control, from anywhere within a few hundred yards. Experts are poring over the scene piece by piece to see if there are any fragments of the bomb left which will indicate this.

In any event, police are searching for the contractors who did the renovation to the municipal office, since the person who actually planted the mine in the ceiling is likely to have been one of the workmen. The hunt is on for the LTTE cadre who has clearly infiltrated the staff of the Municipal Office, to prepare the bomb. Detectives are going through the histories of all the workers and their families, to find out who it was. Meanwhile, the government is considering issuing a warning to its top-level officials in the northeast and Colombo, to report if they have had any renovations done to their offices during the last few months, in case this method of attack is repeated.

These include Cabinet Ministers, and Provincial Council VIP’s. However, incredibly, this has not yet been done, since top officials in the Ministry of Defence feel that this would be an admission that no-one is secure,even in their own offices. Meanwhile, the TULF has begun considering who should replace Sivapalan as mayor.

Time stood still in Jaffna on Friday

The party is determined to fill the spot, despite the fact that the next mayorwill be the most likely person to be assassinated anywhere in this country. The TULF, which considers its handsome win of the Jaffna MC in January elections, to be a clear sign of confidence in the party from the northern people, is determined not to be driven out of the crucial post. It is only one of two councils in the north, which the TULF contested, since a court order,allowing the party to contest came only a few days before the poll. The party won both councils.

The TULF’s Vice President, V. Anandasangari, has already sworn that the post will be filled, despite what happened to the 46-year-old Sivapalan. The LTTE has clearly shown that it will not allow any civil administration in,Jaffna, after it was thrown out bodily from the city by the armed forces on December 5, 1995. It will especially not allow any Tamil party to rule there and win the hearts of the Tamil people; something the government desperately wants. Sivapalan knew the risk he was taking when he took the job. His predecessor,Mrs. Sarojini Yogeswaran, had shunned security, saying that she must live among the people, despite her husband having been killed by the Tigers a decade ago. She was gunned down in her home on May 17.

Sivapalan insisted on the most stringent of security measures, never travelling without a strong escort of army personnel. Yet, the LTTE’s was cunning enough, and patient enough, to get him. It may seem remarkable that the LTTE would plant a bomb and wait three months for its chance to detonate it. But one must remember that this is the organization which managed to get one of its people into the household of President Ranasinghe Premadasa, and wait for years before he struck on May 1, 1993. Babu, the president’s killer, befriended not only the president’s staff, but the president himself, for years, before he calmly wheeled a bicycle laden with explosives to Armour Street and blew up everyone in the vicinity, including the president, and himself.

If the TULF fills the mayor’s seat once again, it is only a matter of time before the LTTE tries to kill the next mayor. Although the army and police can do their best to foil such attempts, it can be expected that the Tigers will keep trying until the war is over. And the way things are going on the battlefield, it doesn’t look like it will end in this century. This definitely makes the mayor’s job a candidate for the dubious title of being the most dangerous job on earth.

Although President Chandrika Kumaratunga, Deputy Defence Minister Anuruddha Ratwatte, and a few other top officials in the government and armed forces are higher on the Tigers’ hit list than the mayor of Jaffna, none of the others has to live in Jaffna, the lion’s den itself.