By Nayana
"I could not dig; I dared not rob;
Therefore I lied to please the mob.
Now all my lies are proved untrue
And I must face the men I slew:
What tale shall serve me here among
Mine angry and defrauded young?"

This was Rudyard Kipling's imaginary "Epitaph for a Politician" following the carnage of the 1914-18 War. We leave it to readers to decide whether there are Sri Lankan politicians who might deserve a similar "epitaph" one day.

It is clear that while censorship may hide the truth, it cannot hide the fact that lies are being told. That was amply demonstrated last week when casualty figures rose daily from 9 to 43 to 150 to 400 arising from what was initially described as a six hour battle that began and ended last Sunday morning.

While military censorship in wartime was generally accepted in the pre-Internet age, at least one Government Minister has acknowledged that its value is doubtful in today's world of instant global communication. In this instance the loss of Kilinochchi base was admitted by the authorities 24 hours after the Leader of the Opposition had already referred to it in a statement issued from the United States.

Certainly if credibility is to be maintained (and it is very important for a Government to have credibility if it is to enjoy both public confidence and moral superiority over its enemies in the eyes of the international community) then the censor should know how to distinguish actual military secrets and news that is merely embarrassing to the authorities.

In any event censorship on war news in democratic countries does not mean an end to the other checks and balances that are supposed to operate on those who wield power such as parliamentary scrutiny, financial accountability and the convention that those who preside over debacles must resign. If elections have to be postponed, a national government is formed.

In Sri Lanka the war is fast becoming the excuse to do away with every form of governmental accountability. The State of Emergency that has been in force for most of the last seventeen years has not only permitted press censorship and conferred on the security authorities vastly enhanced powers of arrest and detention without trial, but has also been sued by successive governments as means to legislate without parliamentary scrutiny in areas that have nothing to do with national security or public order such as environment, the financial system and the takeover of commercial establishments.

Policing which in democratic countries is considered a community function coming under the purview of the Home Ministry, is in this country classed as part of the defence services because it has units that perform a fighting role. The type of mindset this generates was illustrated by a recent incident involving a survey conducted by a well known NGO on the functioning of the "women and children's desks" which were said to have been established at a number of police stations. Although these desks had been promoted by the Police force itself as a people-friendly exercise designed to make it easier for victims of abuse to make complaints, senior officers took objection that the surveyors had discussed the working of the scheme with junior personnel manning the desks, on the grounds that it breached the tenets of a "security-oriented" service.

However it is in the sphere of public finance that cavalier attitudes seem to be most prevalent, and nothing in our history has eaten up public money like the war. Indeed the Government itself, in the days when it was strongly pushing its "peace package", was heard to bemoan the financial cost of the war even more than its human cost.

There can be few countries which have carried on such a long war on such an intensive scale without any significant armaments industry of its own. With all major purchases being made from foreign sellers, the scope for kickbacks and commissions is enormous. The international arms trade is well known both for the size of the commissions involved and the number of intermediaries who stand to benefit from a deal. Anyone who doubts this as a general proposition should read a book called Thatcher's Gold, in which two British journalists (not subject to censorship, of course) have detailed the arms dealing that made former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's son a multi-millionaire during his mother's tenure of office.

Of course it may be said that our fighting forces deserve the best that the country can afford, and if some persons are benefited by the custom of the trade, that is not something to carp about. To the question: "How do we know they are getting the best?' the standard answer would be: "Tender procedure" - the process of evaluating competing offers both in terms of price and quality.

However, this answer no longer holds good due to that useful device called the 'crisis purchase'. In a widespread guerrilla war where triumphs and setbacks can alternate rapidly, it is not difficult to make out an almost continuous case for crisis purchases.

We shall not embark on a case study, which can be better done by defence correspondents as and when the censor allows them. Instead this column will pose its readers a hypothetical problem: Take a country at war - any country. Its forces suffer a sudden setback when a major base is overrun by the enemy resulting in the loss of much valuable weaponry. Crisis purchases are hurriedly made to replace the loss. Some people worry that the lost equipment which is now in enemy hands could be used to mount an even bigger attack against some other base. On the other hand, local commission agents and others who benefit from the crisis purchases are not worried, knowing that such a scenario will necessitate yet more purchases.

This scenario repeats itself from time to time, with those who control the war effort apparently making no changes to their strategy with a view to reducing the losses. To take a hypothetical example, let us say that large and well-equipped bases continue to be cited at vulnerable places where they can be attacked from three sides at once. More losses result; more crisis purchases are made.

Alternative 1: The government sets up an inquiry, accepts its findings and, proceeds to take action against all elements found to have acted corruptly or negligently. Alternative 2: The Government appoints a commission of inquiry but its report is suppressed. Alternative 3: The Government does not bother to set up any inquiry. Question: What would each alternative response indicate about the government?

Now let us return to Sri Lanka. Apart from the apparent carte blanche that has been granted for military procurements, the Government's handling of public sector financial matters, and particularly its privatizations of core areas of the economy have been shrouded in secrecy and surrounded by controversy. Under particular attack at the moment is the principle of parliamentary scrutiny of public finance.

Although the Constitution states that "Parliament shall have full control over public finance", this has always been a somewhat inaccurate statement since a Government with a parliamentary majority can always get its financial bills passed. However while the minority cannot block a bill from becoming law, the idea of the parliamentary system is to permit members from both government and opposition ranks to scrutinize and keep the public informed about the financial activities of government and public sector institutions.

The Constitution itself provides for the auditing of public accounts and the presentation of reports to Parliament. These provisions are supplemented by Part II of the Finance Act No.38 of 1971 titled "Financial Control of Public Corporations". The Auditor-General or any auditor authorized by him can call for any information or summon any person "as he deems necessary" for this purpose. There are prescribed time limits within which reports should be forwarded.

Separately, Parliament through its Standing Orders has given itself power to examine the finances and management of government departments and local authorities through its Public Accounts Committee; and "the finances, financial procedures, performance and management generally" of any public corporation or other undertaking vested in the Government and "any matter arising therefrom" through its Committee on Public Enterprises (COPE).

In order to supervise effectively, any such auditor or committee must be provided with accurate information. Following marked hostility reportedly shown by officials of the Board of Investment when questioned by COPE over the Airlanka controversy, and the reported refusal by the Government to divulge to the Committee the agreement on the Colombo Port, further anxiety has now been caused by a move to reorganize the Finance Ministry in a manner that will do away with the Public Enterprise Department staffed by professional accountants that used to be responsible for furnishing reports to COPE on the performance of public enterprises.

Against the general background of secrecy adopted by the executive arm of government in its dealings with the country's economic assets, this recent move has predictably aroused suspicions of mala fides. However in law the right of both Parliament and the Auditor-General to examine such accounts is absolute, and information requested by them must be furnished irrespective of whether or not there is a special department to facilitate the process. While the PED as such is only an administrative department whose functions could be performed under another name, the supervision of the accounts, financial procedures and management of public corporations is a legal requirement.

The question facing Parliament is how to enforce that legal requirement in the face of non-cooperation from the Executive. The position is not helped by the fact that in this country, contrary to the custom in Britain from where our Parliamentary Committee system originated, it is a government MP who invariably chairs any such Committee.

Even questions from the House are stalled by Ministers asking for up to six weeks time to answer questions, although Standing Order No.27(1) clearly envisages immediate answers to oral questions. Here again we have the problem that, contrary to tradition, the Speaker and Deputy Speaker are elected by a partisan vote which invariably results in governing party members holding those posts.

Meanwhile the possibility of backbench revolt within a ruling party has been greatly reduced with the introduction in 1978 of the proportional representation system which has meant that an MP is ultimately answerable to his party leadership rather than to his electorate.

Thus under our system of Government the value of Parliament as a check on the Executive has proved to be severely limited. The Supreme Court remains the final interpreter of the Constitution, and there seems no reason why any refusal by the executive arm of government to furnish information that it is legally required to do cannot be made the subject of a judicial determination. A government official, for instance, cannot plead Ministerial or even Presidential orders as an excuse for concealing information that he is legally required to divulge.

The idea of legally enforcing government accountability, very commonly resorted to in neighbouring India, is yet to find expression in Sri Lanka. However, no other method seems to be working.