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Fatchett arrives
By Nalin de SilvaTamil racism baptised, and nurtured in the beginning by Britain and then by the west in general is very active again. The Tamil racists and their sponsors seem to be working according to a plan. The theme at the moment appears to be negotiations with the LTTE. There may be debates on whether the negotiations should be conditional or not and whether the UNP and the PA should agree on what they have to offer jointly to Tamil racism. However the UNP, the PA, the Marx brothers, the NGO’s and the non-national lobby all agree on some kind of negotiations with the LTTE.
The big business community as expected and predicted has finally settled down to the so-called ethnic problem. They started with ten points but it was very clear from the beginning that they were interested only in one question. Though they have not defined as yet what this ethnic question is they are willing to offer their expertise to the government as well as the opposition to solve this undefined problem.
In the meantime the LTTE handed over to the International Red Cross, some of the soldiers and a few others that they had ‘captured’. They were brought to Colombo and many wandered why they were released at this juncture. In fact at least one of those released has aired the view that the LTTE is ready for negotiations and that the release of the soldiers could be considered as a green light.
Mr. Fatchett, the under secretary in the British commonwealth and foreign office, arrives in Colombo next week amidst these events. The UNP and I suppose Mr. Kadirgamer, who has been identified with the Fox agreement between the leader of the opposition, would like to see Mr. Fatchett campaigning to implement his predecessor’s agreement. On the other hand Mr. Fatchett himself would most probably insist on strengthening the Fox agreement. The Tamil racists want negotiations to commence immediately but the government, especially the G. L. Peiris school of thought insist on some kind of agreement between the UNP and the PA before commencing negotiations. Dr. Peiris himself would insist that the UNP agree on the so-called political package as a pre condition for the negotiations.
Anyhow the general theme appears to be an agreement between the UNP and the PA and then negotiations with the LTTE. As far as the Tamil racists are concerned talks means getting one-step closer to Eelam. Their policy of "a little now and more later", as formulated by Mr. Chelvanayakam has helped them in their journey from the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam pact to the G. L.- Neelan package.
The all party conference convened by the big business community was nothing but a platform for the UNP and the PA to come together in preparation for the talks between the government and the LTTE. However it did not materialise that way but the big business community has not given up its task. Apparently they are thinking of convening another all party conference. I would not be surprised if they offer themselves as the facilitator, or even the mediator, for the talks first between the UNP and the PA and then between the government and the LTTE.
Before commencing these talks there is the task of fooling the Sinhala people. Already various groups are demanding that the UNP and the PA should get together to finish the Tamil racist problem. The Sinhala people also want these two parties to come to some kind of agreement. However their objective is something else. They want the UNP and the PA to get together, not as a precondition for talks between the government and the LTTE, but to annihilate the LTTE militarily. The NGO propaganda machinery knows this very well. They simply state that the two parties should join hands in order to put an end to the problem without saying what the problem is and what they mean by solving the problem. The Sinhala people are made to believe that the ‘problem’ will be solved if the UNP supports the government in its "war efforts".
Some Sinhala organisations have already swallowed the bait and they insist that the UNP and the PA should join hands to defeat the LTTE. They are either very na•ve politically or are being led by the NGOs. Those who think that the Foxes, Fatchetts and the Tathams would allow the UNP and the PA to come together to crush the LTTE, are sadly mistaken. If the UNP and the PA join hands it will be at the insistence of the western powers led by Britain and will pave the way for negotiations between the government and the LTTE.
I do not subscribe to the view that the LTTE is interested in talks only when they are weak. That hypothesis does not explain the behaviour of the LTTE. The LTTE wants negotiations when the Tamil racist movement can gain something out of the talks, or when they themselves are interested in some auxiliary conditions such as movement of various goods to Jaffna, the so-called fishing rights of the people which very often mean the freedom for the LTTE boats to operate without any interference by the navy etc or when they are under pressure from the sponsors of Tamil racism. When India opted to become a sponsor of Tamil racism in order to teach a lesson to the J. R. Jayewardene government LTTE had no choice but to agree to go to Thimpu for talks with the government. Now they may be willing to come to the negotiating table as Britain, the godfather of Tamil racism, which allows the LTTE to have an office in London, is determined to see that negotiations commence.
The LTTE and the Tamil racist movement in general, in spite of the much-talked about Hindu culture, are closer to Christian Britain than to Hindu India. At least by now it should be clear that Britain and the other western powers are using Tamil racism against the Sinhala people and their culture. Tamil racism is only a weapon in the hands of western cultural imperialism.
Everybody including the Christian western powers, who said they are secular, know that the LTTE is interested only in Eelam. It is prepared to give up Eelam only for a confederation of what they call a Sinhala state and Eelam. On many occasions Prof. A. J. Wilson, the only son-in-law of Mr. S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, has also made pronouncements to the effect that the LTTE would be prepared to drop Eelam for a confederation. A confederation is a de facto separate Eelam and the LTTE and the other Tamil racists are only trying to hoodwink the others.
However the LTTE does not mind coming to the negotiation table in order to gain recognition by the government and the international community that they are the sole representative of the Tamils and also to legalise through accords, pacts etc., some of the intermediate ‘legal pre-requisites’ like self determination and Tamil homeland before they achieve their final goal of Eelam. The UNP, which clamour for unconditional talks, completely ignores the fact that as far as the Tamil racist parties are concerned, self determination, Tamil nation and Tamil homeland are non-negotiable. In other words the government has to agree to these pre-conditions of Tamil racism before they commence these so-called unconditional talks.
The LTTE is not interested in regional councils and political packages. Unlike the so-called Tamil moderates the LTTE does not want to achieve Eelam in two stages, first going through a federal state. That is why they have rejected the G.L. - Neelan political package. The LTTE would perhaps like to see the UNP and the PA agreeing on the confederation. Mr. Fatchett is interested in negotiations. Like so many others he may quote the Northern Ireland problem. Whether he does it or not he has to be reminded that the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka have been parts of an eksesath (unitary) Sri Lanka for more than two thousand years and that it was only in 1889, the present Northern and Eastern provinces were demarcated by the ancestors of Mr. Fatchett. In any case can Mr. Fatchett explain to the vast majority of the Sinhala people, other than the NGO people and the NGO like people, what this problem that Mr. Fatchett is interested in solving. Many people think that there is a problem but when they are asked to identify or define the problem they just do not respond. Mr. Fatchett has to be informed that the Sinhala people are not interested in solving undefined problems.
The problem is not only undefined but non-existing as well. As the Tamil leaders themselves have admitted the Tamils do not have any grievances. Why is Mr. Fatchett coming all the way from London to solve a problem that is non-existing? (Please do not say that he is in Sri Lanka only in connection with the fiftieth anniversary of ‘independence’.) If it was only a question of defining the problem the Sinhala people could have waited until a Professor of History, Political Science or Sociology from Britain defined it. The Professors, NGO people, NGO type people, the media pundits, the enlightened artists, literary critics, those parliamentarians who consider themselves as intellectuals and similar people in Sri Lanka are unable to define anything on their own. They respect the intellectuals in the country of Mr. Fatchett so much, that for a living, they are prepared only to echo what their masters in Britain have to say. As there is no problem that warrants packages political or otherwise, Mr. Fatchett is only going to waste his time in Sri Lanka. Perhaps he could visit Anuradhapura and see for himself some parts of the unique culture that the Sinhala people have built in this country and that the history of the country is Sinhala Buddhist to the dissatisfaction of the Tamil racists and the professors of history.
These professors tell us that the history as revealed in the Mahavansaya is biased and it is not the ‘proper history’ of the country. It is so unfortunate that the Tamils who are supposed to have lived in this country from the very beginning, I mean from Vijaya days, did not leave us a history at least relative to them, if not the true and proper history of the ‘objective realists’. They could have easily borrowed some ola leaves from Rev. Mahanama who authored Mahavansaya, or somebody else and at least following the example set by the Sinhala people, could have written their own history. If they had just done that Prof. Indrapalan, formerly of the University of Jaffna, would have been spared of the burden of coming to the conclusion that there were no permanent settlements in Sri Lanka before the tenth century.
I am bothered by the question, ‘where is the Mahavansaya of the Tamils’? Were they magnanimous enough not to write their own history? Even if there was no tradition of writing history among the Tamils they could have learnt a lesson from the Sinhala people. Were they so proud that they did not want to emulate the Sinhala people? By not writing their own history the Tamils have only created problems for our professors of history. Whenever they want to write something of the Tamils in Sri Lanka, as Prof. Siriweera has done, they have to read between the lines that Rev. Mahanama wrote!
Coming to the other end of the spectrum what is the history of the Tamils in Sri Lanka after the fall of the kingdom of Jaffna in 1619? It is well known that the ‘leading’ Tamil families like Ramanathans and the Coomaraswamys are of very recent origin not going beyond the Dutch period. It is not only these families which arrived in Sri Lanka during or after the Dutch period. Most of the Tamils in Jaffna are of recent origin. In fact the Dutch had to codify the Thesavalamai Law with regard to inheritance of land, in order to prevent these people from going back to South India and to encourage them to settle down here. As Mr. Gamini Iriyagolla has pointed out on so many occasions Thesavalamai is not a Hindu Law.
As the Tamils have no continuous history in this country going back to few centuries and a culture built in this country and passed down continuously from one generation to the next, again over a few centuries, they want to deny the country and the Sinhala people the Sinhala Buddhist history and the Sinhala Buddhist culture that the latter built. Mr. Fachett’s ancestors have encouraged the ancestors of the present day Tamils to do so. The Tamil racists and the others who back them do not want to recognise that the Sinhala people are the majority in the country, that the history of the country is Sinhala Buddhist, and that the culture is essentially Sinhala Buddhist and hence the country is Sinhala Buddhist. People who are prepared to recognise that the country of Mr. Fatchett is Anglo Saxon Christian are not willing to accept that Sri Lanka is a Sinhala Buddhist country. This is the crux of the problem. The Sinhala people and the country are denied their history and culture. If it is not racism then what is meant by racism?
Mr. Fatchett, I am afraid has no role to play. We are having a Tamil racist problem, which was created by the British. It has evolved over the years to the extent that a section of the Tamil racists are now fighting for a separate state. The problem has been presented as that due to so-called Sinhala chauvinism trying to exert its hegemony over the Tamils. The so-called solutions offered to this new ‘problem’ constitute the problem itself. The G.L.- Neelan package is only a stepping stone to Eelam. Any discussion with the LTTE will only take the country further towards an Eelam. There is only one solution to the problem. That is to defeat the LTTE militarily and Tamil racism politically.
Ranil, Cooray, Premadasa and JR
A rejoinder to CA Chandraprema
By Tisaranee GunasekaraThe current plight of the once great UNP is worse than I previously thought. Not only does the UNP possess a leader who engages in Bacchanalian revels in far off Los Angeles while ordinary Party members are being bloodily assaulted by PA goons; the Leader’s trusted henchmen busy themselves adding insult to injury by acting as apologists for the attackers!
Listen to C.A. Chandraprema: "The fact is that when a party is in opposition, they have to expect harassment by the governing party. This is part of political life." (Emphasis mine - TG). In all of its four year in power, the PA didn’t succeed in coming up with a better or more nonchalant justification of its violent, anti-democratic and often murderous conduct vis-a-vis the democratic and unarmed opposition. So while the leader turns a Nelsonian eye on the plight of party members, his faithful henchmen provide the PA leaders with just the excuse they need to continue with their anti-democratic, anti-UNP violence i.e. that all this is nothing but "a part of political life". (Incidentally, would Chandraprema care to repeat this, in Sinhala, to the families of those UNPers who were killed by the PA in the last four years?). The bottom line seems to be that instead of complaining about PA violence or defending themselves, UNPers should develop an attitude of stoicism - they are only paying for their past karma. They should instead comfort themselves with the thought that they will get their opportunity to wreak vengeance on the PA, when they come into power, some day. A weird kind of ‘gentleman’s politics’ and ‘new political culture’, this!
Political credo
A coward in opposition; a bully in power. When in opposition allow the victorious enemy to attack and mutilate, even kill your party people with impunity; but the moment you get in to power unleash a reign of terror on all your opponents. This seems to be Chandraprema’s political credo. This is why he criticises President Premadasa for not launching a violent offensive against the JVP from the word go. The primary responsibility of the leader of an opposition party is to his own party members. However, the primary responsibility of the leader of a country is not towards the members of his own party but towards all the people. He has to promote the safety and well being of all citizens equally, irrespective of ethnic, religious, class, caste or party affiliations/differences. President Premadasa took this responsibility seriously - which was why he relentlessly endeavoured to depoliticise the administration and the development process (whether it was providing jobs, granting promotions, dealing with the judiciary or giving houses and Janasaviya) . That is why he went out of his way to try to settle the country’s two internal conflicts (in the South and in the North) peacefully, by means of negotiated settlements. When he removed the emergency, released JVP prisoners and invited the JVP to the negotiating table he was behaving as a responsible, mature, democratic leader. It was after all peaceful means failed and the JVP left him with no other choice- and the people perceived this- that he reluctantly assented to a military option. This, together with his stand on the IPKF, is how President Premadasa retrieved for the UNP and the democratic system, the moral high-ground. Such recapture of the moral highground was essential for the victory over the JVP.Surprising
The fact that to Chandraprema all this is incomprehensible is hardly surprising since his watch word is: when in opposition, duck; when in power, charge. One cannot but remember how when he was being confronted by irate supporters of Gamini Dissanayake at Sirikotha in 1994, Mr Ranil Wickramasinghe called PM Chandrika on his cell phone and begged for and received protection.Chandraprema says that President Premadasa was the "most hated ruler this country has ever seen after Sri Wickrama Rajasinghe". Of course Chandraprema’s abiding hatred of President Premadasa is hardly a secret. I remember the article he wrote in Crosspoints, the journal of the National Christian Council, heaping caste-is" invective on President Premadasa. But surely even a confirmed egomaniac should hesitate to equate himself with the whole country! Because, according to all available evidence, the majority of our electorate did not hate President Premadasa. On the contrary. Which is why the UNP won more than 50% of the vote at the 1991 local government election, under the leadership of President Premadasa -and with Sirisena Cooray as the General Secretary. Even political opponents such as Wickremabahu Karunaratne deemed this election free and fair. (I should also mention that at this election President Premadasa had to face a united and rejuvenated opposition replete with Mothers’ Fronts etc.).
Similarly what earthly proof can Chandraprema offer to substantiate the claim that "the entire country wants Mr Cooray to retire from politics" - except for his own desire for this outcome and the fact that his political boss regards Sirisena Cooray as the greatest political danger cum threat to himself?
"I have pointed out umpteen times how President Wijetunga got the highest number of votes in the UNP’s history in 1994, by marginalising the Premadasa influence in the Party", declares Chandraprema loudly. However, the fact is that the UNP got the highest number of votes in 1994 simply because of population growth and the consequent increase in the number of total registered and valid votes - which was higher than in 1982,1988 and l991! If one uses this peculiar logic so favoured by Chandraprema, the UNP was more popular in 1970 (1,892,525 votes) than it was in 1965 (1,590,929votes)! And the SLFP was more popular in 1977 (1,855,331 votes) than it was in 1970 (1,839,979)! This is why in understanding the voting pattern of a country or the electoral performance of a party over a period of time, the accepted method is to use the voting percentages. Either Chandraprema’s level of intelligence is insufficient to understand this simple fact; or he is deliberately lying in order to deceive the readers. The third possibility is that his hatred of Premadasa/Cooray is such that he does not care what he says when he throws a tantrum in print - such as his completely untenable statement that President Premadasa was the most hated leader in this country.
Unlike Chandraprema who goes into a frenzy at the mere mention of the name Premadasa, I choose not to underrate Ranil Wickramasinghe’s intelligence - particularly at those times when he is not carried away by his sudden and unexpected elevation to the top. Which is why, as Chandraprema correctly points out, Ranil Wickramasinghe did not make any anti-Premadasa remarks after the death of President Premadasa. In fact he went out of his way to identify himself as a Premadasist. After all it was none other than Ranil Wickramasinghe who used such appropriate and moving epitaphs for President Premadasa as "Philosopher - Politician" and "First Servant of the People". He also entered an alliance with Sirisena Cooray. This is because he understood that he needed the support of the Premadasa tendency/constituency in his power struggle with Gamini Dissanayake and to obtain more preference votes at the 1994 Parliamentary election than his rival.
However, relatively shortly after the assumption of the leadership of the UNP came The Leader mania - the obsession to "unite the party under one head". This one party, one leader concept is a Nazi invention - as Albert Camus said: "One leader, one people, signifies one master and millions of slaves". This means a policy of externalisation of those groups and personalities within the Party which/who do not bow to the dictates of the leader, however unconscionable or silly these may be. And as I pointed out previously, such a policy is bound to become suicidal in a context of a highly competitive multi party electoral democracy.
Incorrect understanding
This policy is also based on an incorrect understanding of the history of the UNP, as the following statement by Chandraprema clearly indicates: "JR Jayewardene kicked out the vastly popular Senanayake faction from the UNP and won resoundingly in 1977". JRJ was able to lead the UNP to victory in 1977 because he turned the UNP into an anti-elitist, populist party. According to JRJ’s authoritative and distinguished biographers, Prof KM de Silva and Prof. Howard Wriggins: "With JR the UNP ceased to be the goyigama party it was under his predecessors in the leadershipÉBy making it a party more representative of the caste profile of the country JR ensured its recovery from its long electoral slump and its eventual domination of national politics for more than a decade after the mid 1 970s" (JR Jayewardene of Sri Lanka - Volume II. Emphasis mine - TG). The promotion of Ranasinghe Premadasa was the main symbol of this sea change. JRJ moved against Rukman Senanayake only in the context of an electoral victory - the by election of Ja-ela in 1976 and the move against Rukman Senanayaka was depicted and celebrated as a yet another milestone in the transformation of the UNP into an anti-elitist, populist party. "JR’s decision to expel a scion of the UNP’s founding family was a carefully calculated move to focus public attention on what he regarded as the bane of Sri Lankan politics, the domination of two ‘family compacts’, the Senanayakes and Bandaranaikes This became the third facet of a political campaign which he hoped would sweep him into power.. " (Ibid.). JRJ de-inducted the few to rally around and unite the many. Ranil Wickramasinghe is de-inducting the many to make the few feel safe and happy again! The electoral consequences of such a strategy should be obvious.Seeing everything in its obverse seems to be one of Chandraprema’s particular gifts. For instance, take his statement that "Ranil was one of those who gave Premadasa a chance". On the contrary. President Premadasa was the one (apart from JRJayewardene) who gave Ranil Wickramasinghe a chance - by appointing him as the leader of the House in 1989 and later, Cabinet spokesman (despite his mediocre performance in a number of Ministries) when he had nothing very much to recommend him other than his relative youth. Under the able leadership of Ranasinghe Premadasa, Ranil Wickramasinghe’s performance improved significantly. But this changed with the death of President Premadasa and Ranil Wickramasinghe’s sudden elevation to the post of Prime Minister. The efficient Minister became a lacklustre Prime Minister who did nothing remarkable or memorable during his one year tenure. As for his performance during the last four years as The Leader, well to say that it was the worst in the 50 year history of the UNP would be to err on the side of generosity .
Ill fits
Obviously the mantle of the top leadership ill fits Ranil Wickramasinghe. But I must hasten to add that I am not one of those who think that he is a mere weakling without any talents or capabilities whatsoever. I believe that under the right conditions, and when he is released from the burden of leadership, he is quite capable of performing extremely well, as he demonstrated in the 1989-1993 period. After all, it is a well known fact that there are players who perform very well until they are elevated to a leadership position. Once the burden of leadership is removed from their shoulders, they again begin to perform well. Ranil Wickramasinghe is such a person. I firmly believe that he has the potential to make a contribution to the country as a future Minister - under the right kind of leader - as he did under President Premadasa. And it is my earnest wish that the next leader of the UNP will give Ranil Wickramasinghe this opportunity to prove himself and to make a contribution to the party and the country.
In Mannar's 'cleared' and 'uncleared' areas: A multi-layered reality
Jehan PereraMannar town, and the island on which it is located in the north-west corner of the country may presently be out of the limelight of the war. But together with the rest of the Mannar district on the mainland, they are still very much a part of the bitterly contested Wanni region. Mannar hit the headlines for a brief moment in late August with the story that the LTTE had stopped civilians coming into the "cleared areas." If true, this would have caused considerable hardship to an already beleaguered population living in the "uncleared" or LTTE-controlled areas who come to Mannar town to conduct business with the state, purchase supplies and obtain medical assistance..
But if there was any crisis over the permission to people to move relatively freely, it soon blew over. The Bishop of Mannar, Dr Rayappu Joseph, denied that any Catholic pilgrims journeying to and from the sacred Catholic shrine of Madhu were detained or denied permission to move. Instead life in the area was disrupted by another type of event that received less media publicity. This was the killing of seven persons by the army, presumably on suspicion that they were members or supporters of the LTTE. Reports coming in from Mannar indicated that the people there were feeling a sense of fear and shock, believing that a harsher army policy was imminent.
However, Mannar town has remained relatively tranquil with the government forces in comfortable control. This is a change from last year, when LTTE "pistol groups" conducted their deadly operations frequently, shooting soldiers and members of the legally armed Tamil political parties. The Muslims of Mannar are also trickling back. Prior to their cruel expulsion in 1990, Mannar had a large Muslim population of about 30,000. Even though they enjoyed good relations with their Tamil neigbours who pleaded on their behalf, the Muslims were given less than 24 hours to quit their homes and properties by the LTTE. After the recapture of Mannar island by the security forces, about five percent of the Muslim population has come back, while the rest await a guarantee of safety from the LTTE which has so far not been forthcoming.
The soldiers at the checkpoints, the police at the pass offices, and indeed the LTTE, are courteous, more so to members of the Catholic clergy. Mannar is the only predominantly Catholic district in the country, which provides the Catholic Church with a leading role as a civil society actor. Inevitably, the Church's role crosses over into being an intermediary between the government agencies and the LTTE. Even the security forces use the Catholic clergy as a sounding board for many of their decisions, believing that the clergy are close to the people, as indeed they are.
But the change in attitude of the security forces towards the Catholic clergy, as compared to a few years ago, may also be reflective of the attempted "hearts and minds" approach of the government to win over the loyalties of the Tamil people. At the ubiquitous checkpoints, and pass offices, the security forces often go out of their way to expedite the time consuming process for the Catholic clergy. The largely Buddhist security personnel even offer the Catholic clergy their chairs and a cup of tea, purchased at their own expense from a nearby kiosk.
BRITTLE NORMALCY Checkpoints and pass offices loom large in the lives of the people of Mannar. The movement of people and goods is heavily regulated by the security forces on the grounds of enabling a check on the LTTE. They have the effect of investing authority in the security forces, and authority is seldom not abused for personal gain. There is no denying the fact that this system, which is intended to protect the security interests of the government, puts an enormous burden on the poverty-stricken people who reside in the district. Both people coming into Mannar and those travelling out of Mannar are required to obtain passes.
A few miles before the causeway that links Mannar island to the mainland there is a checkpoint and pass office to which people who come from the "uncleared" areas have to stop at in order to get their passes. Even those who are sick and need to go to the hospital in Mannar town have to join the long queue in the hot sun. A social worker said, "By the time they get to hospital, they are half dead."
Inevitably, complaints of bribery and corruption in the issuance of passes are there to be heard, with Rs 25,000 being the price of a pass for a person who urgently needs to go to Colombo to get a foreign visa. After complaints made by the Church authorities at the highest level, several high ranking security forces personnel were moved out of the district, and the situation improved. The reputed clout of the Church with those in high places in the government may be another reason for the respect shown to the Catholic clergy by the security forces in Mannar.
However, keeping the LTTE out from Mannar island, let alone the district, has proven to be a more or less impossible task, whatever the merits of the pass system. Although Mannar island is supposed to be a "cleared" area, large parts of it are bereft of a regular detachment of security personnel. As a result, it can be believed, as indeed the people resident on the island do, that the LTTE is having a free run in those thickly forested areas, which are sparsely populated. In fact, the security forces do not permit vehicles beyond a certain point on the island, as they are likely to be hijacked by the LTTE and whisked off by boat to the "uncleared" areas on the mainland.
The brittle nature of the "normalcy" in the Mannar district can also be seen on the highway from Medawachchiya to Mannar. This road was captured during Operation Edibala early last year. Some sections of the road pass through thick jungles which come almost to the very edge of the road. The security forces who traverse this road do so at considerable risk to themselves, for there is little that they can do to prevent LTTE infiltration into those jungles, in which ambush parties can lie in wait.
In fact some weeks ago, a claymore mine, which is detonated by remote control, exploded killing a large number of soldiers. The events that unfolded provide an indication of the tension under which both the security forces and ordinary civilian population lives. One of the soldiers, who was in civilian attire at that time, ran into a nearby Catholic convent for safety in the immediate aftermath of the explosion. But other soldiers believed that the LTTE attackers themselves had fled into the convent premises, and after the dust had settled entered the convent.
Unfortunately, a religious ceremony for seven year old children was taking place at that time inside the convent. In addition, reconstruction work on the convent was taking place, and several workmen were also present at the time of the bomb attack. The sound of shooting in all directions followed by the entry of the agitated soldiers into the convent had caused panic all round, with the children wailing loudly, and the workmen believing that their last moments on earth had come.
On the other hand, it speaks for the discipline of the soldiers, and the change that has taken place over the past few years, that a retaliatory massacre did not take place. The human rights training for the security forces imparted by international and local organisations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, the US Navy and the Centre for the Study of Human Rights of the University of Colombo, seems to have had a positive effect, in addition to the government's own declared "hearts and minds" policy.
STRESSES But there may also be another factor at play, which has changed the attitude of the security forces towards the civilian population. An attack by the LTTE on the security forces near civilian homes is the last thing that the people would want, because they realise that they will be the ones who are in the front line of any cross fire or retaliation. It is likely that the security forces are more aware that the people in the vicinity of an LTTE attack are generally helpless to prevent it.
It also seems that with the growth of the LTTE's military strength, they need to rely less on the voluntary participation of the civilian population. The LTTE is no longer simply a conventional guerilla force, dependent on the people for its resources and hideouts. The LTTE now has its own military camps, sources of foreign funding, local taxation systems, schools, hospitals and orphanages from where it can draw the resources it needs. In other words, over the years of the escalating conflict, the LTTE has emerged as a relatively autonomous actor, with interests that can diverge from those of the people from which it has sprung.
Many areas of stress have recently emerged in the relations between the LTTE and civilian population in the Mannar district. One is the LTTE's repeated disruption of the supply of electricity to Mannar town. A few months ago, the Mannar district was provided with electricity from the national grid for the first time in history. Previously, Mannar town had been provided with electricity from a small thermal generator on the island, which could not provide the town with an adequate supply of electricity nor for the whole day. The provision of a 24 hour supply of electricity from the national grid would count as a great blessing to the people, and be power the economic development of the region.
But the supply of electricity to the town has apparently not been to the LTTE's liking. They appear reluctant to permit the people's lives to improve, while they remain confined to the jungles. Instead they wish to be seen as the direct providers of the people's welfare, even as they strive to ensure their freedom from rule by the government in Colombo. So they have been periodically blowing up the electricity transformers and wires, to the detriment of the people.
Another example is the water supply. Mannar island is an extremely arid place, and the internal water supply only suffices to provide the town with a half hour of supply in the morning and evening.
It is a common sight to see people driving tractors with bowsers attached, and selling water to the thirsty town dwellers. At the beginning of the decade, the governnment laid water pipes and set up a water tower on the mainland, to bring in water from there. But with the resumption of fighting between the government and LTTE in 1990, the LTTE destroyed the water tower, which ended the dream of an unlimited supply of water to the town.
A Tamil heroine unmourned and the sociology of obfuscation by UTHR Jaffna
The TULF snared in its pastContinued from yesterday
The TULF and LTTE share a common past in the ideological and political culture fostered by the TULF (and its predecessor the Federal Party) particularly from the 70s. For all the militant groups, their rise, corruption and annihilation were determined within the confines of this exclusivist - totalitarian ideology. In time the TULF too became its victim. TULF members with a concern for the people like Thangathurai and Sarojini, who found that things had got out of control, tried to make amends and paid with their life.
The TULF was also in a trap. Although it clearly understands where the LTTE is leading the community to, it cannot expose the LTTE without exposing its own share of complicity in murder and deceit in the past it shared with the LTTE. It would also nullify the moral superiority it claims over the other ex-militant Tamil groups as being non-violent, non-gun toting and moderate, for electoral reasons. All the groups at one time, and today to a varying degree, had cadre who were dedicated and sincere, with leadership potential that could have carried them in a healthy direction. Their annihilation, through combinations of internal repression and LTTE action, also owed to the compulsions of this ideology. They are all, like their elite peers and the press, authentic products of Tamil society. When they are despised by fellow Tamils, it is because the latter do not want to look into themselves.
Yet after the past 20 years where nearly all that is good and healthy in Tamil society has been destroyed, the TULF is forced to step into a vacuum partly of its own creation. The people urgently need a political solution which the LTTE cannot and will not deliver. But if the TULF talks to this Government, as it has been doing, and presents a solution which it endorses, the people will accept it as reasonable.There is also a widespread belief among the people that only the TULF has the capacity and the experience to work out a solution. So the LTTE fears its parent, the TULF, and needs to knock off its members one by one in an effort to bring it under its control.
It is very likely that even at central committee level the TULF is unable to discuss frankly the consequences of the LTTE's actions for the country and the Tamil community. They would have to worry about members who are too compromised with that group. So they find themselves having to go on talking as if the LTTE represents the Tamils, that they would step down if the LTTE came forward for negotiations and, now and then pleading with the Government to talk to the LTTE and solve the problem, knowing well that it cannot happen. Knowing well that the LTTE killed Thangathurai and Sarojini, to keep their fractious party together at least, they have to pretend not to know or shift the blame onto the other groups - in fact since the killing of two TULF MPs by the TELO in 1985, probably on instructions from RAW, at least 6 senior TULF leaders have been killed, starting with former DDC Chairman Mr. Nadarajah in 1988, all of them by the LTTE. Of the remaining 5, the one not mentioned so far is Mr. Sambanthamoorthy of Batticaloa. He was killed in 1989 when he went to inspect his paddy fields after receiving an assurance of safety from the LTTE. Even middle level TULF cadre murdered, were almost all victims of the same group - no exceptions come to mind.
Thangathurai deserves credit for having gone a long way from the TULF's earlier ideological position to state his stand on a solution frankly. About June 1997 he addressed a public meeting in Colombo organised by the Action Group of Tamils in Colombo, a society of well-heeled Colombo Tamils known for its overt support for the LTTE. According to Loganathan, from the article cited above, '.... he was heckled.... for advocating the abandoning of the 'Thimpu principles' and to look at negotiations seriously, practically and without being fearful of any compromises if it ensured a just and long-lasting peace. The hecklers would not hear of it. Coincidentally Thangathurai aired his views at a time when the LTTE and its support base were vigorously advancing the '4 cardinal principles' placed at Thimpu [in 1985].'
The four principles included the recognition of Tamils as a distinct national entity, an identified Tamil homeland whose integrity was guaranteed and their inalienable right to self-determination. It is fair to say that on the vexed question of interpreting UN covenants, such issues have been debated by scholars worldwide for 50 years without consensus having been reached. The value of such principles is in practice prescriptive and regulative, and not absolute. Arguments from historical claims which dominate many conflicts apart from Sri Lanka (e.g. Albanian dominated Kosovo in Serb dominated Yugoslavia) are so bedevilling that the world is tired of them. Thangathurai who moved easily with Muslims and Sinhalese was therefore on strong grounds and had the courage to say responsibly what was today in the interests of the Tamils.
Unlike the members of the AGOTIC, Thangathurai was in close touch with his roots in a very rural part of Trincomalee District. He understood what the war, displacement, being forced out of the district as refugees and educational and economic disruption was costing the people. In the vulnerable districts of Trincomalee and Amparai, the Tamils, through displacement and state aided colonisation of Sinhalese, had gone a considerable way towards losing their parliamentary representation. The Tamils needed breathing space, not permanent conflict. Privately Thangathurai had been even more frank: 'The LTTE will never agree to anything reasonable, they neither understand nor care about what is happening to the people'. There is little doubt that those in the TULF understand this very well. About a month after Thangathurai made his speech at the AGOTIC forum, he was murdered by the LTTE.
R. Sambanthan, a senior TULF member, a party secretary and presently MP for Trincomalee, made a carefully thought out speech at Mrs. Yogeswaran's funeral in Colombo. He said: 'The death of Sarojini Yogeswaran is a great loss to the Tamil people, and particularly to the TULF. Gun culture does not offer solutions to problems. More than that, war will never bring peace. It is through political negotiations that solutions should be advanced....' It may be taken as a appeal to the LTTE, but is far too weak to make an impact on the unhealthy slough of Tamil journalism. It is after all the lack of leadership, ambivalence and nebulousness on the part of the TULF that gives the Tamil media the license to carry on as they do, leaving the people confused and frightened.
It is much easier to blame others rather than come up with the courage and sense of responsibility to look within ourselves. Many allegations are loosely made in the press and accepted uncritically by ordinary people, although deep within they are uncomfortable. Take some allegations loosely made in the Tamil press: The Government is responsible for the war and wants a military solution rather than a political solution; The Government held elections in Jaffna to distract the people into the democratic stream(!), so that it can indefinitely postpone finding a political solution or implementing its political package [worked out with the TULF]; and, The Government is antagonistic to third party mediation because then the predilections of majority Sinhalese can never be imposed upon the minority Tamils. All these could be found, said or implied, in the Veerakesari and Thinakkural (Mathorupahan column in the latter) of 24th May. The TULF knows for sure that all these are extremely unfair or one sided.
If there is a strong gesture from the Tamils that the implementation of the political package would bring peace, it would then be easier to implement. But on the other hand there are strident noises from the AGOTIC types (e.g. Kumar Ponnampalam) that the Tamils do not want the package and only an agreement with the LTTE would do. Although copies of the political package were printed and circulated by the Government, the climate of fear is such that even an august Tamil academic body like the University of Jaffna has been unable to hold a single seminar to examine the package - an issue so crucial to the Tamils. Most tellingly, the Uthayan, the only local paper in Jaffna, was ordered by the LTTE (confirmed by the staff) not to publish the package or its substance! Do these not provide excuses for the Government's dilatoriness, very damaging as it is?
As to third party mediation, it is public knowledge that when the Government called for political talks and the LTTE stalled during the l995 cease-fire, third party mediation was proposed and accepted by both sides. The French Government in a bid to help nominated one of its eminent nationals as mediator. This was turned down by the LTTE with the blatant falsehood that the mediator was a friend of President Kumarathunga.
The TULF by its own limitations is unable to do anything to counter this drift created by propaganda and plain falsehood that is carrying the Tamils towards auto-anihilation. It is clear that the existing party formations cannot contribute anything towards rescuing the Tamils. There are several well-motivated individuals in different parties, but they are all tied down to groups with a history that weighs them down. Still it is the TULF, which carries the heaviest burden for the past, that could break this deadlock. That would mean opening up about the past and dropping its pretensions about its record of moderation and non-violence. Is it not time that all those who share a burden for the community get together, not primarily to talk about the right to self determination, but firstly and urgently to restore healthy public values?
