• Should be treated as a distinct offence
  Ragging: Will the new law be effective?
• TULF, Budget and the original people
• J .R Jayewardene and Golden age of Tamil Separatism

Should be treated as a distinct offence
Ragging: Will the new law be effective?
by Dr. Neelan Tiruchelvam

The phenomenon of ragging in universities and other educational institutions has reached alarming and disturbing proportions and there is agitation amongst parents on the need for effective action. The Supreme Court in the unreported judgment in Navaratne v. Chandasena (1997) accurately summed up our concerns with regard to the phenomenon of ragging.

There are several reasons why ragging needs to be distinguished from other forms of student misbehaviour. First, ragging invariably causes pain or suffering, physical or emotional distress to the victims. Second, it often takes the form of cruel, degrading and humiliating treatment and even the torture of the victim. Third, it often takes place in open and in full defiance of persons in authority who are generally afraid to intervene. Fourth, like torture it is difficult to prove, victims are afraid to complain, senior students protect the perpetrators however heinous the offence, and the authorities are reluctant to get involved. Fifth, even where disciplinary proceedings are instituted the authorities are intimidated into mitigating or cancelling punishment.

The recent death of Varapragash, an engineering student at University of Peradeniya and other highly publicised incidents where ragging has resulted in loss of life has triggered public opinion to demand that the state intervene and this legislation is a clear response to this demand.

However, we need to ask ourselves the question as to whether the proposed legislation would be effective in deterring the recurrence of widespread and severe incidents of ragging. There has always been a live debate about what is the proper role of criminal law and of the criminal process. The utilitarian view is that the ‘proper role of the criminal process is the prevention of anti-social behaviour." The opposing view is the theory of retribution. According to this position, it is legitimate for society to demand the authorities to punish those who are morally derelict or who unjustifiably inflict injury on others. The Victorian jurist Fitzjames Stephen colourfully summed up the retributive position stating that "the sentence of the law is to the moral sentiment of the public in relation to any offense what a seal is to hot wax." However, we need to justify this legislation not merely on the theory of retribution but on pragmatic considerations of its effectiveness.

The definition of the offence

The legislation is not merely directed towards the phenomenon of ragging but also seeks to cover other forms of violence in educational institutions including acts of criminal intimidation, hostage taking, wrongful restraint, unlawful confinement, forcible occupation and damage to property. All of the latter forms of violence are in any event offences under the Penal Code and the present law seeks to impose minimum punishments in respect of such offences. Since the Supreme Court ruled that mandatory minimum sentences were unconstitutional, the committee stage amendment merely increased the maximum punishment. We would have been more comfortable if the legislation was more narrowly focused on the more immediate issues relating to ragging. During both the civil rights movement and the student unrest in France, the forcible occupation of buildings was part of a conscious political strategy. These acts of protests took place in the context which is totally different from that is which ragging takes place.

With regard to the definition of ragging, civil rights groups have been troubled as to whether the definition of ragging is overbroad and as to whether it would interfere with the freedom of expression and otherwise legitimate interaction between students. Some of these concerns have also been examined by the Supreme Court in relation to the permissible grounds of limitations on fundamental rights. Our concerns are as follows:

First, whether causing ‘embarrassment’ to a student can include hostile and abusive language and gratuitous compliments and expressions of admiration. The Court has ruled that the word ‘embarrassment’ be excluded from the definition. Second, the definition of ragging includes verbal abuse which, in turn, has been defined to include words which are in contempt of the dignity and personality of a student. It has been argued that students who are new entrants to educational institutions are entitled to have their dignity and personality respected. The Supreme Court has been apparently influenced by the consideration that such acts could, in any event, be actionable under the civil law as an ‘action injuriarum.’ But this is no reason why such actions should also be punishable as a criminal offence. There should be some added element such as the use of obscene or degrading language for verbal abuse which impairs one’s dignity to be subject to criminal penalties. I would, therefore, go beyond the determination of the Supreme Court and urge a more restrictive definition. During the Committee Stage, the reference to ‘verbal abuse’ was excluded from the definition. Third, the inclusion of members of staff in the definition of ragging is inappropriate. The evil that this legislation is intended to cure is ragging by students. Here again, the definition was amended to substitute the word ‘any person’ for the words ‘a student or a member of the staff.’ The rationale was that there were outsiders such as former students who sometimes participate in ragging. Fourth, the definition of educational institutions seems overbroad and includes not only tertiary institutions, but also schools and any other institution established for the purpose of providing education, instruction or training. No doubt there have been incidents of ragging in schools, but this has been the exception rather than the norm. Given the scepticism with regard to the enforceability of this legislation, and the practical problems that need to be overcome, the legislation should be limited initially to institutions of higher education. As amended the new definition of ragging reads as follows:

ragging means any act which causes or is likely to cause, physical or psychological injury, or mental pain or fear, to a student or a member of the staff of an educational institution.

The question of punishment

In addition, the punishments contemplated by the Bill for ragging, sexual harassment, and other forms of violence seem problematic. First, the removal of judicial discretion and the imposition of mandatory minimum sentences are per se objectionable. Second, the Supreme Court also commented adversely on the disparities in sentences in respect of offences under this law and under the Penal Code 3. There is a need for greater internal consistency in respect of sentences if there is to be a coherent sentencing policy. Third, section 9 which imposes mandatory expulsion of the student, who is further barred from entering any other educational institution is excessive as it fails to consider varying forms and degrees of ragging, and degrees of complicity of individual offenders.

The Supreme Court ruled that ‘mandatory minimum sentences should not be prescribed, and that the imposition of different disabilities and penalties should be left to the trial judge.’ Accordingly, at the Committee Stage, the following amendments were accepted:

* The mandatory sentence of five years in respect of ragging causing sexual harassment or grievous hurt was deleted, and the maximum sentence that the court may impose was increased to ten years.

* The courts were also given the judicial discretion to determine whether the accused should be ordered to pay compensation to the victim.

* The mandatory expulsion requirement in Section 9 was deleted and the courts were given the discretion to determine whether it should order expulsion having regard to the ‘gravity of the offence’.

* Similar references to mandatory sentences in respect of other offences under the Act were deleted, and judicial discretion restored. The maximum sentences were, however, increased.

The complexities of enforcement

The question remains as to whether the law would be effective in deterring incidents of ragging in educational institutions. Will the creation of a new offence and the enhancement of the maximum punishment for ragging which results in sexual harassment or grievous hurt make a qualitative difference? Will victims be more willing to complain, and will the authorities be more vigorous in detecting, investigating and punishing such behaviour? Who will police the law - the state or the university authorities?

Very little empirical work has been done in Sri Lanka on the sociology of crimes and the effectiveness of law enforcement. An important exception has been John D. Rogers study, "Crime, Justice and Society in Colonial Sri Lanka," where he looked at three specific

crimes - cattle stealing, homicide and riots. One of his conclusions was that the administration of law and order failed to generate moral authority amongst most sections of Ceylonese society. Very little subsequent attempt has been to probe the relevance of this thesis to the understanding of the criminal justice system in post-colonial society. However, the weak and lax enforcement of modern statutes makes us increasingly conscious of the complexities and limitations of law as an instrument of social control.

The issues of order and discipline within the university community also pose distinct problems. Ivor Jennings conceptualised the University of Ceylon to be an "independent and autonomous institution dedicated to the highest purposes and values of higher education." But the subsequent history of university education in Ceylon has been a complex and tragic failure to meet these expectations. K. M. de Silva writing in 1995 has observed "student violence - in its many forms - has figured prominently in the life of the University of Ceylon since the mid- fifties. Even by the standards of student violence and political militancy endemic in some South Asian universities the incidence and levels of violence seen in Sri Lankan universities, in particular at Peradeniya, in recent years has been extraordinarily high."

One of the issues that university authorities had to grapple with in responding to the challenge of violence and other forms of student unrest has been to define the jurisdisdictional limits between the state and university with regard to the maintenance of order. There were many who contend that university autonomy means that the property on which a university is located is private property and that a university is a self-managed institution which must have the sole responsibility for maintaining order within its precincts. This view of the university as an autonomous, self-regulated enclave insulated from civilian authorities was contested by Ivor Jennings. Jennings writing to the Warden of James Peiris Hall in 1953 observed, "If an offence has been committed, or was about to be committed in a University in England, the police and private citizens have the same right and duties as if the offence had been committed... in a technical college, a hotel or a private house... It is of course the practice of this University ... to endeavour to maintain discipline amongst its students, including the observance of general laws, without requiring the assistance of the police... This practice does not however deprive the police of the right and duty to take such steps as may be lawful for dealing with actual or threatened breaches of laws."

The question that arises is whether the criminalisation of ragging will result in a shift in responsibility from the university authorities to the police for the detection and investigation of such conduct? Even if such a shift in responsibility is intended, can there be effective enforcement without the cooperation of the disciplinary authorities within the university? Section 8 of the Bill in its original form was intended to provide the vital link between law enforcement and the authorities within an educational institution. This clause imposed a statutory obligation on any member of administrative staff to investigate and report a complaint of ragging. The failure to investigate without reasonable cause would expose the administrative officer to prosecution and to a fine not exceeding ten thousand rupees. The difficulty with this section was that the definition of administrative officers was too restrictive. It made no reference to proctors, marshalls, and wardens who have direct responsibility for student welfare, discipline and security. Besides, there was no reason why such a responsibility should not have been extended to the academic staff who are often able to observe incidents of ragging in the university premises. However, the government facing strong hostility from the university community decided to delete clause 8 and thereby removed the statutory responsibility of the university authorities for the enforcement of this law.

Conclusion

The anti-ragging Bill compels us to reflect seriously on the purposes and limits of the criminal process and of criminal sanction. Professor Herbert Packer of the Stanford University in his classic study of the Limits of Criminal Sanctions articulated five criteria which should influence the choice of criminal sanctions. First, the conduct in question should, in most peoples view, be regarded as socially threatening behaviour, and be not condoned by any significant segment of society. Second, subjecting such conduct to the criminal sanction must not be inconsistent with the goals of punishment. Third, suppressing such conduct should not inhibit socially desirable conduct. Fourth, the conduct should be capable of being dealt with through even handed and non-discriminatory enforcement. Fifth, controlling it through the criminal process should not expose such process to severe qualitative and quantitative strains. Finally, there should be no reasonable alternatives to the criminal sanction for dealing with it. Having regard to these criteria we can reach the following conclusions:

(a) there is a strong body of public opinion that considers ragging socially reprehensible behaviour and there is no responsible or significant segment of society willing to condone such behaviour;

(b) retribution cannot, however, be the basis of anti-ragging legislation; it must also have pragmatic consequences such as deterring incidents of ragging;

(c) the definition of ragging still remains overbroad and the inclusion of other acts of violence linked to student agitation detracts from the central purpose of this exercise,

(d) the weakness of the legislation is that it underestimates the complexities of enforcement. Successive commissions of inquiry into universities have drawn attention to the weakening of the disciplinary structures within the university system. These structures which include the system of wardens, proctors, marshalls, student welfare counsellors, and the boards of residence and discipline have come under immense stress during periods of breakdown and of violent student unrest. The legislation makes no effort to strengthen and empower the disciplinary structures which are internal to a university. If victims remain reluctant to complain knowledge that an offence has been committed would depend on detections by officials. This would remain a haphazard and uncertain process without the active co-operation and involvement of the university community.

TULF, Budget and the original people
by Nalin de Silva

The Tamil United Liberation Front has decided to vote against the budget. This has nothing to do with my good friend Dr. G. L. Peiris or with his budget proposals. In fact they are not concerned with the budget. They have not even analysed how the budget is going to affect the Tamils in Jaffna or outside Jaffna.

The TULF is going to vote against the budget not because of the money allocated for the so-called "war". If that was the case then they should have voted against the previous budgets of Dr. Peiris. But they did not do so.

The reasons behind the decision of the TULF are political and not economical. It is very clear that the TULF is thinking of withdrawing gradually, its support to the government and they may be already looking towards the UNP and Mr. Ranil Wickremasinghe.

. This government though voted in by the people was manoeuvred into power by the non-national lobby. They had only one objective. That was to devolve more and more power to the Eastern and Northern provinces and pave way for the Eelam through a federal state. The Marxist parties continued to support the government even with an ‘open economy’ policy. They were and are more interested in devolution of power than in economics. The Tamil racist parties rallied around Ms. Kumaratunga, as they believed that she was genuinely interested in devolving more power to the Tamils.

In fact Ms. Kumaratunga was and is interested in devolving power. She is convinced that the Tamils have grievances and that is exactly why she was made the leader of the PA by the non-national forces. Having come to power she immediately commenced negotiations with the LTTE.

The G.L. - Neelan political package was introduced and a huge campaign was launched to promote it. The Sudu Nelums, Thavalams and Yathras were seen on the roads in addition to peace merchants trying to sell peace to the captive audiences in schools and in meetings organised by the MPs. The government media worked overtime to take the package to the people. The NGOs thought their dreams were coming true and they started day dreaming.

However it did not last long. Even without the SLFP, the party that traditionally championed the Sinhala Buddhist cause, which was hijacked by Ms. Kumaratunga and her SLMP type politics, the Sinhala people were able to campaign against the package at all odds. The LTTE was never interested in the package and the so-called war was resumed to ‘liberate the Eelam from the Sinhala imperialists’. The UNP first wanted to test the public opinion and then feeling the pulse of the electorate decided not to support the package.

The NGO bandwagon, especially the free media people, were the first to realise that the package was not on. Then the others gradually came to the same conclusion and now the peace merchants have to satisfy themselves with dubious opinion polls. However not all are seeking the comfort of opinion polls. For example we have amongst us Mr. Fatchett, the British under secretary for Foreign and Commonwealth affairs, having come all the way from London, to get the UNP and the PA to come to some kind of agreement on talks with the LTTE. The big business community is seen to be giving him a big helping hand.

08. If Mr. Fatchett and the big business community fail in their attempt then the Tamil racists and their sponsors will again turn to their traditional supporter the UNP. The TULF is already on their way towards the UNP. As a first step they have decided to vote against the budget.

The TULF in the meantime has expressed shock over a statement made by Ms. Kumaratunga in South Africa to the effect that the minority community in Sri Lanka was not the original people of the country. Mr. Lakshman Kadirgamar, who has denied that Ms. Kumaratunga made such a statement, has been criticised by the TULF. Dr. G. L. Peiris can rest assured that the decision by the TULF to vote against the budget has nothing to do with his economic management.

This incident shows how the Tamil racists try to bully the Sinhala people with their false propaganda. All the Tamil racists have join hands in criticising the statement made by Ms. Kumaratunga as if it was a deliberate lie. These are the tactics of Tamil racism. They fear the truth. They do not want to accept the history of the country. They want the whole world to believe their false propaganda, according to which the Tamils have lived in this country from time immemorial.

Ms. Kumaratunga should not give into their false propaganda. She has spoken the truth except for the use of the term minority. The majority and minority communities are concepts coined by the ancestors of Mr. Fatchett and we should try to avoid using these terms. Let the TULF vote against the budget. Nothing will happen to the government.

The Tamil racists base their false propaganda on work by people like Gnanapragasar, who claimed that Sri Lanka was originally a land of the Dravidians. For the benefit of those who have not read the Ph. D. thesis of Dr. Karthigesu Indrapalan who later became the first Professor of History at the University of Jaffna, I quote below extensively from chapter 2 of that unpublished thesis.

"It has been claimed by certain writers on the history of Jaffna that the people of northern Ceylon at the time of the earliest Indo-Aryan settlements, called Nagas in the chronicles, were Tamils. ( S. Gnanapragasar, Ceylon originally a land of Dravidians) Some others have claimed that these Nagas were Tamil in culture and language, although ethnically they were not Dravidian.( S. Rasanayagam, Ancient Jaffna) These conclusions, as we shall see presently, are based on the legendary accounts of the Nagas in the Pali chronicles and the Tamil Buddhist epic Manimekalai as well as on the erroneous identification of some of the place-names mentioned in early Tamil literature. Gnanapragasar, a leading proponent of the theory that the Nagas of the Pali chronicles were Tamils, has put forward four main arguments in support of it." Dr. Indrapalan then goes on to demolish these arguments.

"In the first place , he has argued that the island of Ceylon as well as the language spoken there were known in ancient times as Ilam and that the name of the language was later corrupted to Elu. These factors, in his opinion , "should lead one to conclude prima facie that , at the earliest times, Ilam was occupied , at least in the main, by a Tamil speaking people. This argument is far from logical. Presumably it rests on the fact Ilam is now used only in Tamil as a name for Ceylon. But the origin of this name , far from indicating that the island was occupied by Tamil speaking people in ancient times, shows that the people from whose name Ilam is derived were Sinhalese. The earliest occurrence of this name is in the Brahmi inscription of South India. In these inscriptions, from Tirupparankunram and Sittannavasal, occurs the Prakrit form of this name, namely Ila. Evidently it is from this Prakrit form that the Tamil Ilam is derived. It could be shown that Ila is derived from Sinhala through the Pali Sihala, or more probably through another Prakrit form Sihila.......... Thus, Ilam could be derived from the name Sihala and would therefore, mean the land of the Sinhalese rather than indicate that Ceylon was originally settled by the Tamils. Gnanapragasar’s arguments, on this score, will become groundless. The derivation of Ilam from Sinhala is accepted by leading Tamil scholars. ( S. Vaiyapuri Pillai, Madras Tamil Lexicon p 382 & S. Krishnaswamy Aiyangar in the Preface to S. Rasanayagam’s Ancient Jaffna)"

"Secondly, Gnanapragasar has argued that the original inhabitants of Ceylon came from South India and that these pre-Aryan aborigines were Dravidians who seem to have spoken a Tamil dialect. He base this on the assumption that the pre Aryan inhabitants of India represent an earlier wave of immigrants from the Mediterranean area and that no trace of any language other than Tamil is found in India till the arrival of the Indo-Aryans. Although the pre-historic relations between India and Ceylon are undeniable, the rest of his arguments are based on mere assumptions. It is not true to say that all the non-Aryan inhabitants of India were necessarily Dravidian. There were others as well, chief among whom were the Munda speaking people. The chronology of the Dravidian migration to India is itself an unsettled question."

"His third argument is that ‘hundreds of Tamil place-names in Ceylon are pre-Sinhalese. He has given a few examples of elements of present-day Sinhalese place-names and what have been considered by him to be their Tamil origins. It is clear that this argument is based on superficial similarities and not on any historical study of the development or evolution of these names. This could be seen in the two sets of elements as well as from their phonological development. He has claimed, for instance, that the Sinhalese element dena, meaning ‘low-lying land or valley’, is derived from Tamil tinai, meanung corn. But dena and its more common variant deniya are derived from Sanskrit droni (valley), through the Pali doni and medieval Sinhalese dona and deni.

The fourth argument that Sinhalese is based on Tamil and that, therefore, ‘the original inhabitants of Ceylon’ spoke Tamil is unconvincing. Gnanapragasar arrives at this conclusion by adopting unscientific methods in his linguistic research. One can only quote the views of Wilhelm Geiger on this matter:- ‘Gnanapragasar’s methods are not at all Indian; they are simply a relapse into the old practice of comparing two or more words of the most distant languages merely on the basis of similar sounds without any consideration for chronology, for phonological principles, or for the historical development of words and forms.’ ".

So much for Gnanapragasar. Dr. Indrapalan then goes on to deal with Rasanayagam. The problem of Tamil racism is a problem of history and the history of the problem reveals that the Tamil racists are not prepared to accept the history of the country. Ms. Kumaratunga’s statement in South Africa is probably the only correct statement by her on the problem. Perhaps Ms. Kumaratunga should request her minister for cultural affairs to take steps to see that .Dr. Indrapalan’s thesis is printed and made available to the general reader.

J .R Jayewardene and Golden age of Tamil Separatism

(Continued from yesterday)

India remained firm and refused to let go of the issue. India publicly championed the rights of the Tamils. Indira Gandhi, then Prime Minister, following the riots of 1983, swiftly initiated action which set India on the route to assuming the role of an intermediary in Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict.

She persuaded the now rattled and unnerved J.R. Jayewardene to let her representatives come into Sri Lanka and try to defuse the situation. Narasimha Rao arrived first and reported back to Gandhi. (de Silva & Wriggins. p 568) This was followed, in the next four years by visits from G Parathsarathi, a Indian diplomat who was a South Indian Tamil. Romesh Bhandari, Indian Foreign Secretary visited, and later P Chidambaram, another Tamil who was a minister of state. (de Silva & Wriggins. P 620) India had the option selecting non-Tamils as intermediaries, but did not do so, thus indicating its intention of using the Tamil issue for its own gain.

On the Sri Lanka side, it was strictly a one man show. J.R. Jayewardene, though weak and uncertain, chose to handle negotiations with India all by himself. Actually, he should have resigned after 1983 and let the country choose another leader. Diplomatic protocol was ignored. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was ignored. Sri Lanka’s High Commissioner in New Delhi was ignored — and left out of the negotiations.

Bernard Tilleke-ratne and F.S.C. Kalpage, who were the High Commissioners in Delhi at the time, have commented with great feeling over the fact that they were left out of these very serious discussions. (Island 10.12.97 p 12) Negotiations were conducted by JR alone (sans Foreign Ministry advisers) or by his special envoys, such as his brother H.W. Jayewardene or Ministers such as Lalith Athulathmudali, then Minister for National Security. This policy was also followed in Sri Lanka.

India’s High Commissioner in Sri Lanka, Dixit, had free access to JR, bypassing the Foreign Ministry and everybody else. (de Silva & Wriggins. p 571) Dixit was allowed to sit in on Cabinet meetings and apparently even addressed the Cabinet on two occasions. He dictated to JR, as in the case of the Pulendran affair. (Island 12.12.97 p 8) Commentators on Dixit’s book ‘Assignment Colombo’’ have heavily criticised Dixit’s actions. It should be appreciated that the real offender was not Dixit, he was simply carrying out a brief given him by India. It was JR who gave him this elevated position and fed him Cognac. (Island 10.12.97 p 17) Dixit had Tamil connections. He was, I think, part Tamil.

One consequence of this was that JR also loss the support of the rest of the world. Trying to avoid subservience to India, JR approached other major countries, such as America, China and Japan. They told him to settle matters with India amicably. They would not intervene. This was particularly clear in the Indian violation of Sri Lankan air space, in the Jaffna food drop of 1987.

The Tamil political parties, particularly the TULF now got the opportunity of negotiating directly with India. Something they never had before. After the 1983 Tamil riots, the TULF leaders were living in Madras as guests of the state government. (de Silva & Wriggins. p 585) The extremists and terrorist Tamil parties were also there. The two groups established contact, as well. (de Silva & Wriggins. p 573) In the protracted, on-off negotiations that went on in New Delhi, the TULF stood firm. They wanted one thing only — a North-east Tamil region, with its own government. The discussions haggled to and fro over possible alternatives, such as district councils, provincial councils, and so on, but the Tamil separatist movement was not prepared to move from its single objective — Eelam. This is very clear in the account given by K. M. de Silva & Wriggins and in the account given by Sinha Ratnatunga.

The Tamil parties were able to secure some degree of formal recognition. All the envoys sent by Indira Gandhi, urged JR to commence talks with the Tamil separatist parties. They first suggested chatting to the TULF, then they extended the suggestion to the other separatist parties, such as LTTE and TELO. The Indian envoys like Parathasarathi were allowed access to the Tamil parties. Parathasarathi and his team also had discussion in New Delhi, in 1983, with the TULF team of Amirthalingam, Sivasithamparam, Sampanthan, Yogeswaran, and Tiruchelvam. (de Silva & Wriggins. p 324) It is this which eventually gave the impression that the Tamil separatist had direct contact with Madras and New Delhi and therefore were more Indian, than the other Sri Lankans.

From 1983 onwards there was a series of ‘stop-go’ discussions between the governments of India, Sri Lanka, TULF and other militant Tamil groups. These discussions were controlled throughout by India, not Sri Lanka. As de Silva and Wriggins point out, this resulted in the development of a unique combination of forces in the negotiating process.

On one side there were the Indian central government, the Tamilnadu state government, the Tamilnadu opposition parties, TULF and the other Sri Lankan Tamil political parties. On the opposite side was the Sri Lanka government, alone. (p 570) However, the Sri Lanka Tamil parties were not able to have it the way they wanted. The Tamil parties, particularly the TULF and LTTE had a difficult time with India. India did not meekly agree to what the Tamil separatists said. Instead the TULF and LTTE had to agree to what India said. For instance the TULF, living in Madras, were ordered to attend the All Party Conference in Sri Lanka in 1984.

On a later occasion the LTTE were ordered to stay in Madras and not come to New Delhi. (de Silva & Wriggins. p 329). In other words, the Tamil separatist found, too late, that India was only interested in using Tamil separatism for India’s own end. Beyond that they did not care what happened to the Tamils of Sri Lanka.

The All Party Conference was held in Sri Lanka in 1984. This Conference had the following participants. All Ceylon Tamil Congress, Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC) Communist Party, (CP) Democratic Workers Congress (DWC) the LSSP, MEP SLFP, and UNP. It also included the Supreme Council of the Maha Sangha, Christian Organisations, Hindu Organisations, All Ceylon Muslim League, the Council of Muslims of Sri Lanka and the ‘Sinhala associations’. In Sri Lanka, where 74% of the people were Sinhalese, there was no Sinhala organisation to represent the group. Sinhalese did not have an organised body. So they cobbled together a team of Buddhist associations as a ‘Sinhala Association’. The Buddhist organisations were All Ceylon Buddhist Congress, (ACBC) Young Men’s Buddhist Association, (YMBA) and the Buddhist Theosophical Society. (BTS) Eventually, the ‘Sinhala Associ-ations’, after listening to the Tamil associations, withdrew from the discussion. So did the SLFP.

Eventually the TULF also suddenly rejected the decisions taken and the APC came to an abrupt end in 1984 itself. The various delegates had put forward diametrically opposed views. The recommendations were varied. However a few of them are worth listing here. The TULF wanted a union of regions and Regional Councils.

The CWC wanted regional autonomy for the ‘Tamil Liguisitic Region’ (Ratnatunga p 338) In a telephone interview from Madras with the BBC, Amirthalingam had insisted that a merger of the councils in the North and East was a pre-requisite for their participation in the APC. (Ratnatunga p 347) The Communist Party also wanted regional autonomy. (p 337) Sinha Ratnatunga has given a detailed account of the proceedings of the APC, and this indicates very clearly the strong opposition in the country for any regional or separatist solution. The UNP MPs tried to kick at this point. But JR threatened them with the possibility of a general election, where they may have lost their seats and their priviledges. (p 351) The Maha Sangha also got worked up.

The APC was a sort of non-event, politically speaking, but it was a great gain for the Tamil separatist movement. It was able to put forward its demands, through the Indian government in the form of the now famous ‘’Annexure C’’. This Annexure C was drafted by Parathasarathy and his team, and offered to JR in November 1983 in New Delhi. (de Silva & Wriggins p 577) Then it surfaced at the APC. In addition to this Annexure, the APC also developed a land formula. This stated that land under major irrigation schemes like Mahawali would be allocated on ethnic basis, 74% for Sinhalese and 26% for minorities.

But land under Village Irrigation schemes would be distributed on the basis of the local population profile. (de Silva & Wriggins p 578 footnote) In addition the TULF argued that they had a mandate from the Tamil people to establish Eelam.

They wanted a merger of the north and east and an armed constabulary to maintain law and order. (de Silva & Wriggins p 324) The CWC went further and suggested that the Armed Forces should reflect the ethnic proportions and also that there should be separate regiments composed exclusively of minorities. (Ratnatunga p 339)

Let us now look at Annexure C which is given below. There was a howl of protest over these proposals. JR disclaimed responsibility and ultimately Annexure C was disowned by everybody. But its contents are an important step towards Eelam.

Annexure ‘C’ was as follows:

(1) The District Development Councils in a Province be permitted to combine into one or more Regional Councils if they so agree by decisions of the Councils and approved by referendum in that district.

(2) In the case of the District Councils in the Northern and Eastern Provinces respectively as they are not functioning due to the resignation of the majority of members, their union within each province to be accepted.

(3) Each Region will have a Regional Council if so decided. The convention will be established that the leader of the party which commands a majority in the Regional Council would be formally appointed by the President as the Chief Minister of the Region. The Chief Minister will constitute a Committee of Ministers of the Region.

(4) The President and the Parliament will continue to have overall responsibility over all subjects not transferred to the regions and generally for all other matters relating to the maintenance of the sovereignty, integrity, unity and security and progress and development of the Republic as a whole.

(Continued tomorrow)