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Men & Matters
Conflict resolution and Ranil's response
by KautilyaThis island was often called 'Britain's best bet'. It was also an experimental laboratory. Consider the introduction of universal franchise, before many a European country, certainly not the women.
And Britain produced 'the longest war' of its kind, now fashionably termed 'ethnic conflict'. London could do little to resolve it... until prime minister John Major made the first promising move...in ''conflict resolution''. Alas, only to lose his job in No. 10.
And on Tuesday, The Island had this bold front page headline: Ranil tells govt. accept Prabhakaran's peace offer.
In an interview, the Opposition leader told Reuters that the government should take ''serious note of an offer of peace talks by LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran and initiate a dialogue...This is a major move by the Tigers and is a very positive one to which the government must respond. They can't stay silent.''
A major move, indeed. Students of British politics, and the problem of Northern Ireland, usually described as the ''Longest war'', of its kind will appreciate Opposition Leader Wickremasinghe's use of 'major'.
It was John Major, prime minister of Great Britain, who paved the way to the first serious attempt to negotiate on Ulster. Alas that brave step did not help him enough to win the general election. But his bold initiative was an important contribution, important enough to impress the Labour leader Tony Blair, soon destined to move into No. 10.
Yes, bipertisanship on what the pundits call ''the National question''.
Yes, we were called 'Britain's best bet'. The party system accommodated the conservative U.N.P. with the social-democratic SLFP, loosely described as ''socialist'' at the centre, with an assorted ''Marxists'' (Trotskyists, Stalinists, Maoists and finally Guervarists) representing all the 'isms' in the world Marxist Movement!
Under a serious threat Britain saw the main parties suspend the conventional parliamentary war to combat the Nazi menace, a threat to independence freedom and parliamentary democracy. A much stronger understanding between the SLFP and UNP is required to combat a guerrilla (okay, terrorist if you must) leader of Velupillai Prabhakaran's extraordinary prowess ... some may use other words, like genius.
Mr. Kotelawela and his Big Business friends have made a move on one front. A promising move but in this country, there are thousands of fine minds with excellent ideas ... and yet, no real gift for implementation. Mr. Kotelawela and his colleagues should for instance invite professional organisations (OPA?) trade union leaders, leaders who can appreciate the need for compromise when the despute is a violent divisive secessionist threat. All the great democracies have produced a leadership that could match the forces which threatened independence, freedom, democracy.
Our crisis may be of a different order but it poses similar issues and challenges. Once Commandante Prabhakaran; bona fides are checked and his offers of peace or a negotiated settlement are found to be honest, the first move can be made. Here the professionals most be consulted and invited, if necessary, to play an active role.
There may be many diplomats in Colombo who have participated in such ''operations'' ... in short a 'think tank', a back-up group.
So far two useful steps have been taken-the business community, and crucially important, the Island frontpage lead story.
Tiger intelligence
We all know that the ''Tiger supremo ''is served by an excellent espionage apparant. How good is ours,? I am talking of an intelligence analysis, not raw-oops sorry-information but an incisive examination of the information gathered to help the administration, know the LTTE's short-term (Operational plans) and its mid-and-long term plans on the battleground, in the Sinhala South, work in Tamilnadu, right now high priority with the DMK playing a strong hand.And New Delhi .... And of course in those capitals where the Tamil diaspora is a presence.
Road accidents and related insurance
by C. S. A. FernandoInsurance Consultant, DFCC Bank; Life Member of District Representative, Automobile Association of Ceylon (AAC) & Vice President, Ceylon Society for the Prevention of Accidents (CSPA)
The purpose underlying a seminar on the theme, 'Indiscipline on the Road and Law Enforcement' recently held at the Sri Lanka Foundation Institute was undoubtedly intended to ensure minimisation, if not elimination, of road accidents, which are taking a heavy toll of life and property with a serious drain on the country's resources. In fact, as far back as 1979, a husband and wife team, in Dilip and Wimal Sonawane, assessed the then loss to the country at Rs. 11.9 million a day, due to road accidents alone! There have been constant efforts to avert that situation though without success, and it is in such a situation that insurance comes in handy. The class of insurance that is solely concerned with road accidents is Motor Insurance, because motor vehicles accounts for the largest proportion of accidents on the highway. In a motor accident the parties involved could be vehicle and vehicle or vehicle and pedestrian, besides passengers of the vehicles involved, and insurance comes in where accidents are not averted.
Motor Insurance
A motor insurance policy comprises two sections, Section I covering one's own vehicle and Section II covering 'third parties' viz., members of the public. While Section I of a motor policy is optional, Section II is mandatory under the Motor Traffic Act (MTA). In other words, a motor vehicle is not permitted to be used on a highway unless it is covered against risks to third parties.In the case of Section I of a 'comprehensive' policy, which covers an insured's own vehicle against loss or damage by any cause (except of course, wilful damage) an insurer can impose any condition he considers desirable, according to insurance principles, but not so in the case of Section II, which is issued in terms of the requirements laid down in the MTA, by an insurer authorised to insure third party risks, and referred to in the MTA for an 'Authorised' insurer.
An authorised insurer is permitted to have only conditions laid down in the status. They are referred to as 'Exclusions', which relate to the driver and the use of the vehicle. They, are usually as follows:-
Excluded Use:
i) business purposes other than the business purposes of the Policy-Holder.ii) the carriage of persons or goods for fee or reward (in the case of private vehicles).
iii) Races, Rallies, Trials, Exhibition or speed contests or in connection with same.
iv) on a contract of letting and hiring (in th case of private vehicles).
Excluded Driver:
i) any person other than the Policy-Holder or a person driving with the Policy-Holder's express or implied permission.ii) any person who is not the holder of a driving licence valid to drive such class of vehicle unless he has held and is not disqualified for obtaining such a licence.
Section I of a comprehensive insurance cover is referred to as an insurance of indemnity in technical parlance, while third-party insurance is an insurance of liability, and the insurer, in the latter case, absorbs, vicariously, the liability of an insured motorist in consideration of a payment called the premium.
Under a third-party motor insurance, an insurer is liable to meet any injury to persons or loss to property of the public caused by the negligence of the insured or his driver, and that liability of an insurer is referred to in the insurance policy as 'legal liability'. By reason thereof some insurers in Sri Lanka are inclined to withhold meeting even legitimate third-party claims unless an offending driver is convicted in a court of law.
Liability, however, being a legal binding, the word 'legal', to qualify liability there, would appear to be superfluous in the first instance, if not redundant in English. Legislation is in the process of being revised, and it is believed that there will be provision for damages to a third-party injured in a motor accident on a prima facie case of negligence without a third party claimant having to establish guilt of the offending motorist in court.
Unlike in the case of an 'own-damage' claim (in respect of one's own vehicle), consequential losses arising from which are not payable under a comprehensive motor policy, under third-party liability of an insured (to be absorbed by an authorised insurer), not only personal injury and/or property damage of a third party are covered but also losses consequential thereto, a restriction only occurring under a commercial vehicle insurance, where third-party liability for property damage only is limited to a specified amount in the statute.
Incidentally, it may be worth mentioning that none of the local insurers could be strictly considered to be 'authorised' to issue third-party insurance certificates under Part VI of the MTA. During the prenationalised era of motor insurance in Sri Lanka, private sector insurers were authorised by government. With nationalisation of the industry, the monopoly insurer would appear to have taken for granted that the 'authority' was inbuilt in the monopoly. Motor insurance has since been privatised and the private sector insurers too would seem to follow suit.
The result is that an aggrieved third-party has no proper authority to turn to against a defaulting insurer. Moreover, operation of insurance (as a trade) has to be authorised by th Ministry of Trade; but today the subject of insurance comes under the Ministry of Finance. If, on the other hand, third-party insurance is a statutory requirement under the Motor Traffic Act, it should more appropriately come under the purview of the Ministry of Transport.
Motor accidents are undoubtedly a heavy drain on insurers' resources and one way in which they can minimise their losses is by collaborating with the authorities and disciplines concerned with accident-prevention, namely, such NGOs as the Automobile Association of Ceylon and the Ceylon Society for the Prevention of Accidents (CESPA) and by any other means of propaganda. In that connection due credit has to go to one private-sector insurer, who is already engaged in long-term safety programmes. What insurers must appreciate is that accidents lead to claims and claims to losses.
Between the Lines
BJP should sit in the opposition
BY Kuldip NayarEven after the defeat in its stronghold, the three Hindi-speaking states in the North Delhi, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan - the Bhartiya Janata Party is not facing the facts. The price rise or lapses in the administration are important factors. They have aggravated the situation. But they do not constitute the situation.
The truth is that the party has lost its sheen and appeal to the voters. The image it has tried to project has been on the basis of two points. One, given a chance, it would do better because it is the party with a difference. Two, Hindutva is India's ethos and the party will push the country towards that. Whatever its rhetoric, the BJP's image has received a battering on both counts.
The BJP-led government at the Centre or the party's governments in the states have turned out to be no different from the ones, which had ruled earlier. The administration has stayed as corrupt as before and even ministers have not withdrawn their hands from the till. The party has been as much at home with smugglers, tax-evaders and criminals as was Congress or the Janata Dal.
One BJP parliament member was so upset before elections that he wrote to Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and Home Minister L. K. Advani that if they could join hands with AIADMK Chief Jayalalitha, why were they critical of former Bihar chief minister Laloo Prasad Yadav, involved in the fodder scam? At one of the BJP's National meeting, some weeks ago, a few members admitted before the leadership that their rule was no better than that of Congress or the Janata Dal.
If the voters have felt the same way, why should the BJP be surprised over the result? In fact, people believe that the party has let them down. Not that they have forgotten the malfunctioning of Congress, but they were expecting purposeful and positive governance, particularly when the BJP batted at the Centre for the first time. (Its 13 days in 1996 were only an interlude.) Finding that the BJP is no different than others, they have fumed back to Congress in the hope that it has improved in the wilderness. The near return of the backward and the Dalits, once the Congress vote bank, has been crucial.
The point of the Hindutva ethos has hurt the BJP in two ways. Liberals have distanced themselves from the party more markedly. On the other hand, the staunch Hindus have got alienated because they have found the party compromising on his agenda for the sake of power. It took no time to set aside the three objectives - the demolition of mosques at Mathura and Varanasi, the building of Ram temple at the site of the demolished Babri masjid and the deletion of Article 370 to confer special status on Jammu and Kashmir - when the party found that some constituents were willing to support the BJP coalition.
The party has two options before it. One, it can become more stringent and more fanatic. But this may cost it the support of some of the 13 constituents, which sustain the shaky coalition. Moreover, if any lesson is to be drawn from the results, it is that the tide of communalism is receding. Delhi and Rajasthan, where the BJP has been routed, have a preponderant majority of Hindus. The committed RSS cadre is active. Rajasthan does not have many Muslims. So is the case of Madhya Pradesh. In Delhi, the Muslim population is confined to a handful of constituencies. It is really the Hindu community, which has turned its back on the BJP. Will becoming more Hindu help BJP?
The other option before the party is to eschew communalism. It cannot come to power on its own if it does not make up with the 120 million Muslims. Can it secularise its credentials, which are Hindu at present? It is not an easy decision to make because the very growth of the party is on the basis of Hinduising the waters of politics. And how can BJP dare to leave the RSS parivar, which sustains it?
The best course for the BJP is to quit government and sit in the opposition. Not because it has lost in all four states, but because it will send the message that the party respects even the semblance of people's anger to his governance. Its stock is bound to go up. In fact, the BJP should not have formed government in the first instance. It should have asked the nation to return it with a clear majority. After having tried all political parties, the voters would have had no option to but come to it. Even in the last Lok Sabha election, one slogan that helped the BJP was: 'Give us a chance.'
The party has lost the opportunity because it has been found out. The explanation that it was given only seven to eight months does not wash. It is the ineptness of the government that has annoyed the voters the most. How to charter its new policy will be the biggest task before the BJP.
However, the dilemma of Congress is a different one. Sonia Gandhi wants the Vajpayee government to go but hesitates to let her party step in. Somehow, she has come to believe that Congress has only to wait and power will automatically fall on his lap. Statistically, Congress has done well. In the 1993 assembly elections, Congress won 281 seats in the four states against the 261 of the BJP. In the 1998 Lok Sabha election, the assembly segments reduced Congress to 241 and enhanced BJP to 330. But in the current elections, Congress is way ahead with 368 against the BJP's 162.
The reason why Sonia Gandhi is against Congress heading a coalition is the expectation to have a majority on his own. But how is it possible for the party to secure 273 seats in the 545 member Lok Sabha? Congress does not exist in Bihar and UP, having 139 members in the Lok Sabha. The four by-elections in Bihar have made it clear that Laloo Prasad Yadav still sways the voters because he has won all the four. Congress cannot oust the communists from the 60 odd seats, which they win in every election. Although Congress has bagged a by-election seat in Punjab, it does not mean that the Akalis, despite their infighting, can be ousted from more than six out of 13 seats in the state. Tamil Nadu, with 39 seats, is still a toss up among AIADMK, DMK and the Tamil Manila Congress of G. K. Moopanar.
Stretching it to the maximum length, Congress does not seem winning more than 220. This means adding 80 seats to the present strength of 140. Still it has to have some 50 more to have a simple majority. Congress will have to look for partners to reach the magic figure of 273. In the Lok Sabha elections, Congress will have to reckon with regional parties. If the party is going to seek their support in the next election, why not now? Whatever Sonia Gandhi's wishes, India is bound to have a coalition at least for one more election.
Even if the state elections, especially when they were held only four states, do not reflect the nation's mood, the way they were fought with all ferocity has left the impression as if it was a referendum. The BJP is quite right that the state elections are no criterion to determine popularity at the national level. But it cannot deny the writing on the wall? It reads clearly and categorically. The BJP cannot win as it is constituted today. It must realise that it has lost even its bastions. Strange, the party got no advantage even after playing its trump card, the bomb. Bangs do not impress people, the performance does.
Turning a blind eye to Jaffna
Big words for fancy theories
H.L.D. Mahindapala reviews a review written by Prof. Alfred Jeyaratnam Wilson(Continued from Saturday)
However, what is unreal is his claim that state violence will end if the nation-states are dismantled. He presumably means not cross-border violence but internal violence. Consider the case, of India. It was broken up into the two major ethnic republics as propounded by Uyangoda to avoid Hindu-Muslim violence. This is the ultimate ideal of Uyangoda. And according to his theory it should have ended (hey presto!) "state violence" and communal violence. But Babri-Masjid riots in Ayodhya, for instance, has given a mulish kick in the pants of his theory. And again, if his theory has any validity it should have nipped the militant Rashtriya Sevak Sangam in the bud. Furthermore, how does the rise of the BJP striking at the fundamentals of the Nehru-Gandhian secularism fit into Uyangoda’s theory?
The conflicting interests of any minority living beside a majority have always resulted in tensions, frictions and conflicts, some of which are spontaneous and temporary and others permanently rooted in deep-seated antagonisms. But these conflicts do not necessarily require, nor do they necessarily end in, changing borders or in derogating the powers of the centre. Just as much as nation-sates have developed new political associations to live with each other, majority/minority relations too can be resolved under new political contracts which recognise multi-culturalism within the nation-state as an alternative to violence. However, if in a multi-cultural society a minority refuses to recognise the rights of others and insists intransigently only on its perceived "aspirations" at the expense of others by resorting to violence then that minority cannot blame the majority for the ensuing violence, particularly if the minority refuses to negotiate, or shred the pacts whenever it suits them..
The failure a "multiplicity of (ethnic) republics" to end ethnic violence is evident in the realities that emerged after the break of India into two ethnic republics. For instance, there are more Muslims in India today than in Pakistan. To make Uyangoda’s theory work India must divide itself again to create another Muslim state. If that does not happen will that be "majoritarianism", totemism" or exceptionalism", eh? Only a superficial theory would babble about breaking up of South Asia into a "multiplicty of republics". It will certainly please Uyangoda’s political constituency. Prof. Wilson is, indeed, wrapped in the idea of the decaying nation-state. But what is the reality? There are two major trends discernible in global politics today. First, is the separatist movements battling it out with nation-states, sometimes with unnerving ferocity. Second, is economic regionalism over-arching the nation-states which, incidentally, has shown signs of change but not to the extent of dissolving its boundaries, or giving up its centre, as argued by Uyangoda..
Whether the prophets of doom and gloom of the nation-states are correct is yet to be seen. The sudden withdrawal of East Asian countries into national economic fortresses after the collapse of the free markets in the region could mean that nations are not only cautious of globalisation but re-discovered in the nation-state a protective mechanism against multi-national pirates raiding their territories. One George Soros was sufficient for the nation-states to scuttle back to their old form demanding the restructure not of the nation-states but the invading global markets. Mahathir’s bitter reaction to Soros is a reaffirmation of the nation-state rising against globalisation. The countries that escaped the ravages of the financial melt down succeeded because they did not rush headlong into globalisation.
The dissolution of the USSR into the pre-war nation-states is another example which may stump the theorists who believe that the end of the nation-states is nigh. Consider also the current move to globalise justice by setting up an International Criminal Court under the Treaty of Rome. It was stymied by USA’s refusal to let its citizens be tried without its consent. The nation-states are refusing to surrender their centre and their borders to a globalised jurisdiction. General Augosto Pinochet could never have been challenged if he was inside the "narrow domestic walls" of Chile. The increasing role of the UN as a global policeman is also read by some as another example of the eroding powers of the nation-state. But how far can Kofi Annan go to override the will of the nation-state? Iraq? Is that an example of the power of the UN or USA? Is that globalisation or superpower arm-twisting which has prevailed at all times?
What is argued here is not that the nation-states are going to remain frozen in the post-Reformation, or post-French Revolution, or post-colonial format. Rather, the emphasis is on the fact that the more they change the more they remain the same. Ever since the nation-states came into being it has been changing its internal and external scaffoldings. The world is now witnessing an acceleration of that process of transition which has been misread as the death knell of the nation-states. Simultaneously, more than ever before, the nation-states are seeking to secure a fine balance between the past and the future without surrendering the center or the border. Finding that fine balance will not necessarily end the existing nation-states. The totem poles of nationalism are not going to be chopped down overnight, if at all. In the foreseeable future the symbols of nationalism will continue to fly high despite the invasions of technology, international treaties, market expansions, economic regionalism, etc. As against all these overwhelming forces there is, for instance, cricket which binds a whole group of people into a nation. There is language, culture, heritage, and local economic and political interests which are dynamic grassroot forces sufficiently strong to hold people together within their borders and their center. These will not disappear under globalisation.
It is the market forces that drive globalisation. Does this mean that economics can override politics to the point of erasing borders or the centers of nation-states? The invasion of external market forces will put maximum pressure for internal structural adjustments. All this is done in the name of a promised cornucopia in a globalised economy. Whether that is going to materialise has yet to be seen. If, however, there is a catastrophic downturn, it is globalisation that will be forced to adjust to the needs of the nation-states. One other overwhelming argument against the disappearance of the nation-states is that there can be no single global centre which can direct, manage and control the four corners of the earth from one commanding height. The existing local centres built around the nation-states will continue to play, with minor and major adjustments, their traditional role even in a globalised village. The hard realities point to the fact that the prophesied death of the nation-state is a bit premature.
A clear understanding of the forces at work will reveal that our local pundits have, as usual, misread the signs of the times. They believe that the free flow of money and people across borders marks the end of the nation-states. They have failed to grasp the essential nature of the structural changes. What has changed or disappeared is not the border but the size of the wall defining the border. The great walls of nation-states have been reduced to the minimum to allow the free flow of skills and resources to facilitate the interactions of the dominant market forces. But the original concretised borders of the nation state remain intact at ground level. The ambivalent fascination with walls, simultaneouly attractive and repulsive, was summed up by the American poet Robert Frost when he said that good walls make good neighbours though, of course, there is something in the nature of things that do not like walls. The future global relations will be perennially confronted with the problems of the constant rise and fall of the national walls. All in all, the current trends and facts will ensure that the nation-states will certainly outlive Prof. Wilson and Uyangoda and even their generations yet to come. These also portend that Uyangoda’s theory on the "decaying nations" will perish – if it has not done so already - long before the boundaries or the centers of the nation-states.
Those who talk glibly about separatism and multiplicity of ethnic republics have not given due consideration to the impact of the new migratory waves that sweep the globe. The diaspora which originally was the exclusive domain of the Jews has become a common feature to practically most communities. The diversity of cultures invading the open global market makes ethnicity the most dynamic phenomenon in planetary politics. Consequently, ethnicity will loom large as a constant in the tensions between the majority and minority communities in most parts of the globe. Race relations are increasingly rising to the top of the political agenda of each nation. The two million Turkish workers in Germany, or the Algerians in France, or our own Sri Lankans in the Middle East, or the Sri Lankan diaspora domiciled in foreign lands are interacting with the majorities, seeking appropriate accommodation for their traditional lifestyles in new societies.
Multiculturalism, which may mean different things to different groups, has become the byword in national and international politics. The inevitable reaction to the invasion of migratory waves is the sudden rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen in France, Pauline Hanson in Australia, or the skin-heads in Germany. Under ripe conditions, each one of these racist groups can gather enough votes from their electorates to influence or dominate their parliaments. Pauline Hanson is the third largest force in Australian politics today, next to the ruling Liberal Party and the Labour Party in the opposition. If she takes a commanding lead in the next elections – and this depends on the economic recovery of the global markets - what does Uyangoda recommend to the 150-odd ethnic communities who are now a part of Australia? Does he recommend 150-odd republics within Australia?
Implied in his proposition of "a multiplicity of (ethnic) republics" is the notion that no minority can live with the majority in any state. Or that a state, which is invariably structured and defined by the values of the majority, cannot provide space for a minority. Or that the national identity determined by the majority is a dangerous "totemistic" concept which drives its citizens to die or to kill. If so would not a "multiplicity of republics" breed more "totemism", more "exceptionalism" and "majoritarianism" of their own kind? It is now within the reach of nation-states to contain these obnoxious features with appropriate constitutional and institutional guarantees with simultaneous supervision by international covenants.and treaties. Isn’t that a more acceptable solution than creating Eelams all over South Asia?
Besides, wouldn’t the totemism wrapped round Mr. Prabhakaran be a destructive force of violence not only to other ethnic groups but also to dissenting Tamils? They are now dying without a state? What would be the amount of death and destruction if they are given a state? Will not the creation of another nation-state, which may or may not end the current phase of violence, lead to further escalation of internal and external violence? Where does Uyangoda hope to place the Indian Tamils? In another republics of his or in Prabhakaran’s Eelam? Consider also the fact that without a state of his own Mr. Prabhakaran has set up concentration camps and liquidated his potential and real political rivals. How will Uyangod’a little republic help to end that violence? Or does Uyangoda think that that is not violence? Or does Uyangoda and his NGOs think that they could turn issues of human rights into another big business there? Clearly, Uyangoda’s solution is creating more problems than it can solve.
As we go into the next millenium, the new political agenda will be to redefine inter-ethnic relations within the nation-state evolving into a tightly knit supra-national collective. May be, some sweet day, out in the distant future, Wendell Wilkie’s "One World" has a chance of becoming a reality. Considering the weaknesses of human nature, it is doubtful whether state violence, or violence per se, would ever end even under a globalised environment. Besides, historical evidence do not go along with the elastic theory that violence comes only from a sovereign state struggling to preserve its territorial integrity. Sri Lanka is a valid example which questions this theory. The LTTE –Sri Lankan state confrontation is certainly based on extremist ethnicity. But Uyangoda should know more than anyone else that the violence of which he was a part did not come because Sri Lanka was a nation-state. Any beastly Angulimala can spark off that kind of violence.
According to Stirrat, Uyangoda has introduced a biographical note into his essay. With the sketchy outline available to me now, it is difficult to assess how the "romantic appeal of state violence transformed the sense of (his) self "after the "outbreak of ethnic violence in 1958". Whether he relates that "transformed sense of (his) self" to his subsequent violence in the JVP I do not know. Nor do I know how he came to romanticise state violence in 1958. However, going on the available brief lines, it seems that he is making a big song and dance about the ethnic violence of 1958 to dramatise it as a convenient starting point to his theory dealing with state violence and minorities. I presume that he has skipped the "romanticism" of the fascist brutalities of his JVP movement because it does not get a mention in any of the two reviews. Could it be that he is exaggerating the transformation of his self in the ethnic violence of 1958 because it provides a starting point and a ready-made link to boost his theory of ending ethnic violence by dissolving national borders? Incidentally, "1958" is also one of the starting points of the pro-Tamil lobby. It is amazing how Uyangoda’s moments of revelation coincide with the stale pro-Tamil politics.
There is another striking aspect to Uyangoda’s writings. He projects his "I" as if he is a kind of a modern Moses coming down from the mountain with his inviolable commandments. His jarring "I" represents his bloated egotism more than any credible or reliable authority. His pompous terminology, his inflated "I", his fanciful theories that fly in the face of hard facts, his switching from one theory to another, from "consociotionalism" to separatism, from Wijeweera to Prabhakaran, add up to nothing more than the ululations of an intellectually anorexic Tarzan swinging from twisted branches of NGOs and academia. To put it differently, I never thought in my wildest dreams that, one day, during my life-time, voodoo politics would be planted as a totem pole inside the Colombo University for some witch doctors to chant their sonorous mumbo-jumbo in the hope of driving the evils of violence away from human society. Far superior intellectuals have tried and failed. If Uyangoda seriously thinks that he can eliminate violence in human society by waving his magic theoretical wand then he must be an incorrigible practitioner of "hooniyam" and not political science. There is a limit to theoretical lunacy but Uyangoda goes beyond those borders into flights of his own creepy fantasies.
Mithran Tiruchelvam,one of the editors of "Culture and Politics of Identity in Sri Lanka" claims that the ICES publication is to question the "cultural and political identity in Sri Lanka". Before going for culture and politics, it would be more rewarding for him to enroll in a revision course in Sri Lankan geography. First, he should begin by locating a map that would show him the road to Jaffna. He might then be shocked to discover that Jaffna is an integral part of Sri Lanka. Once he finds that, with the help of someone knowledgeable in cartography, he will realise that cultural and political identities in Sri Lanka must include, at least, some aspects of Jaffna too. He should then engage some research workers to explore the differences and the similarities in the cultures of the north and the south.
But …Ooo! That is a risky business, isn’t it?. If he does that, his chances of survival as a client of the NGOs might be very slim. It is advisable for him to withdraw into one of the thatched patios of the ICES and keep digging into Sinhala graves. However, as the other grave-diggers before him have almost emptied what was inside those holes - Kalutara Bo-Tree, Vihara Maha Devi Park etc, have all gone - he might as well now go to the last unexplored area of the Sinhala identity : he should start lifting the sarongs and sarees of the Sinhala people to discover what hidden identities there are inside those garments. Who knows what he might discover? He might even come up with an astounding original theory about his discoveries. ICES might even put up a proposal in triplicate to the Ford Foundation appealing for funds to publish the stunning discoveries. As most of its publications are predictable, it is not difficult to find a title without even reading the contents. It could be titled simply as : HOW THE SIHALA PEOPLE STOLE THE LINGAM FROM THE NORTH TO INCREASE AN ANTI-TAMIL POPULATION IN THE SOUTH. How’s that for a change
THE NEW MORALISTS
There two kinds of moralists in the developing countries today : 1) the traditional moralists and (2) the new breed of NGO moralists. Perhaps, the weakness of the traditional moralists is that they are aligned to the past and are ambivalent about the overwhelming rush of modernity which is questioning their values and undermining their way of life. Their dilemma is being caught in a clash of cultures. Their refusal to see anything good in the new is not helping them either. However, their integrity cannot be questioned. Their faith in their way of life is not for sale.The NGOs, on the other hand, are mass producing moralists who are hired to plug a political agenda that are designed to undermine and accelerate the transition from a traditional past into a modernity which does not guarantee anyone either security or a certainty in values. Their ideal is the Western model. Their goal is to transform the world into another America. The promise at the end of the NGO rainbow is another American dream laden with consumer goods and services. After the collapse of the USSR there is no rival model to compete with either resources or ideology. They have a free run and they pose arrogantly as the new moralists in the "backward" communities.
Naturally, the dominance of America as the successful symbol of the market forces make it the enviable model of all developing countries. They can’t wait to get there fast enough. The new moralists, however, ignore two lessons : 1) that there are no great leaps in history and those who have attempted have failed miserably and 2) the uneven development of history which recognises that each community must go through the historical stages to reach a higher stage. They are eager to drag their countries crying and kicking into the American model. This is what they are paid to do and they do it with the backing of the Western world who act as their financiers,
They are the mercenary moralists who devalue and degrade morality not only by living off the suffering of their own people but also by selling their morality to the highest foreign bidder. The traditionalists do it because of their convictions. The mercenary moralists do it because their bread and butter depends on it.
In any case, the state is the only legal authority permitted to engage in violence, including the taking of life. State as an The instrument of violence placed in the hands of the state is for the greater good of the community and not for the state to pursue its own ends of power. The community, from which the state derives its authority, looks up to the state to deal with violence for the general good of the community. And the sources of violence are diverse and unpredictable. Perhaps, Uyangoda is implying that the state should not use its instruments of violence to deal with the violence of the Tamil Tiger terrorists. His argument, according to Stirrat, is that violence, or state violence, would end after the borders are democratised. Not even a moronic Mummy walking out of an ancient Egyptian tomb would believe in such concoctions. It flies in the face of the hard realities of violence which has haunted history down the ages.
(Concluded)
