.

Poster war dominates NWP polls
Basic human values set aside at Wayamba

by Sumadhu Weerawarne
Pix by Eranga Jayawardena

Today the residents of Wayamba should be having the peace they want, with electioneering officially having ended on Friday at midnight. But if the track record of the politicians over the past few days is anything to go by, they will not. Every law and rule of electioneering has been flouted in this election, unconscionably so. Sadly, this is nothing new. It is what Sri Lankan elections have been for quite a while not least at the last local government elections. Of course, the PA promised to be different, but so do they all...

Unfortunately for the hapless people of Wayamba, electioneering is not quite over yet, because the losers will in all probability be taught what is means to lose. The people will have to wait a few more weeks until the dust settles and they are forgotten and left to their own devices, until of course another election comes their way. The electioneering will then move onto some other unfortunate destination, where there will be a similar scenario. In fact, it is quite like a duel. The two parties decide on a location, bring in their strongmen from outside, fight it out, and then move on elsewhere.

Early Wednesday morning at 5.45 a.m. we made a trip to Wayamba the current hotseat of Sri Lankan politics. In usual circumstances an election in Wayamba would have meant little to those of us in Colombo. But the circumstances in this case are certainly unusual. It is being viewed as a test ground for public opinion and a crucial election for that reason. This is evidenced by the concentration of stalwarts from the major political parties at the site. As the popular saying goes if one were to throw a stone at random it would most certainly hit a minister or an ex-minister.

PA Blues
We went to Wayamba in anticipation of street violence with pocket clashes and skirmishes between the various parties. This was what reports had led many of us believe. But the scene that met our eyes was peaceful enough and disconcerting in the sense of calm it seemed to exude. On entering the Kurunegala district the very evident signs of electioneering were two giant cutouts looking down from buildings. They were both those of PA candidates. The streets too seemed to be lined with blue streamers, and faces of PA canddates beamed at us from the walls. Those of other candidates were few and far between. This immediately served to create a prejudice against the People's Alliance. Even staid election monitors have expressed gave the PA dominance in posters as a sign of the unfair practices prevalent in the election compaign.

The obvious conclusion that one would come to is that the People's Alliance is so dominant, that the other political parties are being barred from engaging in what would be the most popular mode of electioneering in Sri Lanka, defacing the walls with posters. This was of course not so far from the truth, but it is not entirely true.

There is no doubt that the mass of posters on the walls and every conceivable place that a poster can hang on can hardly be due to the great popularity that the PA had amassed. It is quite unlikely for a party in government to be as popular as it was when it started out. But neither is it only on account of the fact that the PA has greater manpower than the UNP and was therefore able to be streets ahead of that party in the poster war.

The UNP chief ministerial candidate Gamini Jayawickrema Perera was eager to explain, "They pull down our flags and streamers, and remove our posters as soon as they are put up. So there is no point in putting them up." The "they" of course was the PA. However, there were other reports to say that the UNP had decided to desist from engaging in the poster war, which was a clever piece of psy-ops because it would serve to prejudice one against the PA.

Whatever the real theory behind the PA's dominance in the streamer poster campaign the dominance of the blues was a very evident fact. Incidentally, it appeared that all the political parties had failed to heed a request made by the Environment Minister to desist from using polythene in their campaigns.

Kurunegala
The ride to Kurunegala town was no different in that the streamer-poster campaign continued to be dominated by the PA. At times it seemed as if the election was a single party one. The reason for the dominance of the blues that day may also have been for the simple reason that the President was expected to address a rally at Wariyapola that evening and that the UNP was concentrating its efforts in Chilaw where the Opposition Leader was scheduled to address a rally.

While having breakfast in Kurunegala town, we ran into the first important personage who had transported himself from Colombo, former Minister Nanda Mattew. He was confident that the UNP would win. "We will definitely win in the Kurunegala town. Hopefully there will be a high voter turn out in the outskirts, in which case we will most certainly win in those areas," he said.

The next personage we ran into was the Deputy Minister who had given up his seat in Parliament to contest the election, S. B. Nawinna. He was on his way to a series of pocket meetings. We caught up with him at Monnakulama, where he was addressing a small gathering on the benefits of voting in the PA. The organiser for Nikaweratiya Soma Kumari Tennekoon too was present at this meeting.

The opulence of Nawinna's vehicle greatly contrasted with the haggard and shrivelled appearance of those who had gathered, and the very run down appearance of the hastily erected shed in which the meeting was being held. Nawinna himself seemed simple enough in his white chemise and sarong. The end of the meeting was hailed by a political version of the school time hip hip hurrah, to which the people barely responded. But one of the attendees when asked whom she would vote for, very categorically gave the PA to be her choice. What was notable was the unwavering tone in which this was said. She was obviously a very staunch PA supporter.

Nawinna himself was happy to speak with us at the end of his meeting. He drew us to the shade apologising. "I feel faint. I have not had much sleep in the last few days." He was confident of a PA whitewash. "We will poll 70 per cent of the vote," he said. He explained that once he had entered the fray, the PA had come a great way forward. "Besides the President has campaigned in virtually all 19 seats. There is just three to go. This has also been a main factor," he added. As always there was reference to the UNP's years of terror. "There is no need for violence. The people are aware of the persons who had lists drawn up during the reign of terror. This is sufficient for the people to turn away from the UNP," he said.

Denial
Asked about reports of escalating violence he said that it was those who engaged in violence who requested protection. "People do not like violence. I am surprised when I read the newspapers. I wonder if it is my village that they are talking about," he said. He dismissed allegations of a terror campaign. "Any small problem is given is given political dimension. If a rooster is lost, this is also given a political dimension," he said.

Most of the election speeches have amounted to little more than mud-slinging. There is a harking back to events of two or even three decades ago in which the opposing party is put in the worst possible light. The prospective PA Chief Minister finally got down to the point, but only when we asked him. Speaking of his plan for Wayamba, he said that it would be a agriculture-centred one. "The UNP concentrated on the industrial aspect. We have three areas of concern. We will repair existing tanks and there is a plan to direct the Ma Oya to Deduru Oya and build three tanks to which will be able to provide water to seven seats in the area."

Continuing at length, he added that '"There is also a project to upgrade all nineteen hospitals in the area with ADB aid, and a plan to upgrade more schools in the area to national schools." Asked to comment on seemingly rampant voter apathy, he said, "People want to vote. They are aware of the village development programme and they want it to continue. They are very keen to vote. There will be a high voter turn out," he said.

Puttalam
We continued in the direction of Puttalam past two Police check-points and an army check-point. The security forces were about their usual business, and pretty thoroughly too, possibly because the President was due that evening. On the thin strip of shore parallel to the lagoon were little huts barely inches away from the water. People were busy fishing, fighting a battle that was more immediate: the one to eke out a living. And in the deeper waters there were patrol boats.

The next stop was the Divisional Secretariat of Puttalam. On the first floor of the very stolid, badly-in-need-of-repair colonial building was the Divisional Secretary who was ex officio the chief presiding officer. The place looked busy enough with several persons stationed outside his office. It was of sociological interest that the "aaratchi" still seemed to wield a certain influence. He was addressed by those who gathered as the "Aratchi Mahattaya", and seemed to be very zealous in his duties as the Secretary's guardian. We were turned away and asked to report an hour later.

A young man himself waiting to meet the Secretary was happy to chat with us. He was part of an NGO that had launched a campaign of its own calling for a vote against alcohol and for a vote for those who abstained from such. We recalled that we had seen banners displayed by this organisation. He was of the view that the people were not so concerned about the election and often times afraid to talk because of the fear of being penalised for saying the wrong thing, by one side or the other. The truth of his words was evidence by another also awaiting a meeting with the Secretary, who refused to commit himself one way or the other. "Who knows who will win," he ventured non-commitally.

No difference
We retraced our steps to Kurunegala in the hope of tracking down the UNP's chief ministerial candidate. On our way we alighted at a little "the kade" at Puranagama. The owner of the boutique Ariyadasa, himself a former Communist Party activist was happy to express his views. In fact he was quite keen. "Both parties are the same. I cannot sleep at night. It was never like this those days when I was a member of the Communist Party. I am afraid to keep the shop open at night. If someone throws a lighted match in the direction of my shop, how will I look after my children?," he queried.

Asked where his loyalties lay he said that he "fully supported navavi (one of the PA candidates)'. I will vote for him, but have not decide on the second vote," he said. He was categorical in his declaration that he "neither the UNP in its 17 year nor the PA in its three years of rule had done anything for the common good." I have two children who have completed their A/L who have no jobs. This is not what I am talking about. They must at least build the road etc. which is for the common good," he added. And the violence... He said that the people of the village were silent were no part of the violence. "There is a saying that the residents of the village will not attack the village. It is the outsiders, the thugs who have been especially brought for the election who engage in violence," he said.

Commenting on voter apathy he said that some would vote while others would not "There are those who have traditionally been with one party or the other. They will vote. It is the younger ones who are indeterminate," he said. He was one of those who chose to criticise the party from within its ranks, but the impact of such criticism could badly be gauged.

Ariyadasa's sense of communion with his fellow villagers was readily evidenced by what followed. A worker on a ladder hurriedly connecting electrical wires all in view of the impending election fell off his perch. Ariyadasa was quick to rush to his aid. Others too gathered around. Ariyadasa beckoned to his daughter to bring a bottle of soda and a pillow. The man was then taken to hospital in a three wheeler that had volunteered its service. It was heartening. The violence had not driven the sense of community among the residents of the area.

Silence
Others we met were not so willing to express their point of view. People gathered outside a boutique at Walaswewa were quite reluctant to take and would only smile apologetically. However, on producing the information department identity card to verify our identity, one person was willing to talk. "We do not want to embroil ourselves in anything by saying the wrong thing," he smiled once again apologetically.. He said that he would not only vote if the situation was good. "Not otherwise." He added that it was the same day or night, and that it was the outsiders who come into village and assault people, and not the resident themselves.

A young boy had listened all these while volunteered that if one travelled at night, the tyres of the bicycle were slashed. Another inside the shop beckon to the boy and in all probability warned him to not to talk too much. These fell into the category of those who would vote only if they felt sufficiently secure to venture out on election day.

No dominance
The claims that the PA dominated the province were disproved by what met our eyes on our return to the Kurunegala town. The JVP was holding a pocket meeting, in its own endemic style, while the New Left Front was also holding a rally. We went to the UNP office in the area in the hope of meeting with Gamini Jayawickrema Perera. The immediate environs of the office bore signs of the UNP's presence, with posters stamped on surrounding walls, and the front garden of the office bearing a tree of flags. We sat inside for a while and listened in on the many conversations that took place.

One of the UNP's staunch supporters of the area, his outstanding feature being the very thick bracelet on his wrist, explained that an armed group of PA supporters had stripped a group of UNP candidates and supporters on a house to house campaign, including a female. He expressed disgust in the most strong terms, as was to be expected. The group had also included former UNP province minister Mahinda Galappathy. That very moment he received notice of a further six supporters who had been denuded just a few hours ago.

Independent election monitors from PAFFREL confirmed that several incidents of rape and child abuse had taken place in the midst of the upheavals in the province. Those who committed these bestial crimes were able to avoid being caught by the long hand of the law as the police had become inactive. A recent PAFFREL report stated that "Ugly incidents demonstrating the callous disregard of basic human values have been reported from Anamaduwa where on two occasions the children of candidates from opposition parties have been subjected to violence and humiliation.

PA absence
As there was no sign of Gamini Jayawickrama Perera in his office, we tracked him down to the YMBA where he was attending a meeting convened jointly by the religious heads of the area. He was there in company with Colombo Mayor Karu Jayasuriya. A representative of the JVP too was present. There was no representative of the PA. The meeting was one at the end of which the various representatives accepted a request made by the religious parties to abstain from violence.

The acceptance it would appear is symbolic, because the parties present along with the PA had been signatories to document pledging to desist from violence. But it was clear that they were blatantly ignoring it in practice. The JVP it appeared would have a better case. The other two parties had already seen the death of two of its members, and had been responsible for the death of a member of the opposite ranks.

One of the religious leaders, Bishop Raymond Peiris piously and wishfully hoped that "flowers of peace would bloom in the hearts of politicians of both sides". The JVP representative made an astute observation in that the religious leaders too contributed in some measure to political violence by affiliating themselves with one party or another. "We are thankful that they are coming together in this manner and are supportive of such moves," he said.

Gandhian
Gamini Jayawickrema Perera made ready to answer questions at the end of the meeting. He made a litany of complaints against the PA severely criticising the stripping of the UNP supporters. "I ask the President as a women how she can condone such acts. She is a heartless woman," he said. He explained the policy that the UNP had espoused since recent times. He claimed that the UNP was following the non-violent Gandhian philosophy. "If we use violence to fight violence there will be no end to it. We believe in the Gandhian system of agitation," he said.

The prospective UNP Chief Minister cited two instances where the villagers had come to the rescue of two of the UNP's candidates who had been attacked by the PA. He claimed that the PA was resorting to violence because they would not be able to win the election under peaceful circumstances. He added that the people would come forward to ensure that the election was a free and fair one, and that they would not be intimidated. "In fact in granting jobs I will give preference be they UNP or JVP, who will come forward to protect democracy. He said that he had even asked the JVP to get together with the UNP on the issue of election. Opportunism certainly makes strange bedfellows, that is of course if the JVP agrees.

On the moral right of the UNP to condemn violence etc. in view of its own violent past, he said that the PA was a party that had promised to stamp out thuggery and violence. " How can they then do what they do. The President is on the same stage with a man against whom an open warrant has been issued," he said. The man in question is PA strong man D. M. Dassanayake.

Asked about voter apathy he said that people would vote against violence. "They will reject violence," he said. "The people hate politics, and this is a sad state of affairs." He recommended the UNP's panacea for ills the introduction of independence Police, Election, Judicial Services and Public Services Commissions as the long term solution to the problem. He dismissed PA claims that the UNP had nothing for the area. "The telecom projects currently under implementation are those negotiated by us. We opened four industrial parks in this area. Kurunegala is a bustling town and many of the businessmen are from the South," he said. He predicted a UNP victory with a 68-70 per cent majority. As always only time will tell.

Winning matters
Despite the disruption that the election has brought to the lives of the Wayamba populace, the vast majority of them get about their normal lives. Perhaps it is a little harder than usual at times due to the streets after about 5 P.M. which has inconvenienced commuters. But to those who visit the province, there is little to suggest outward fear in the lives of ordinary people. We could only sense a certain hesitation to talk openly about their political preferences with strangers.

What is striking about this election is the plain and simple inability of civil society to restrain the thuggery of the political parties. There is a universal agreement among the people in the Wayamba, and an open codemnation of violence and thuggery by civic leaders, most notably the religious leaders, not to mention the host of civic organisations and NGOs, such as PAFFREL and CMEV. But to no avail.

The elections that are being carried out are not empowering exercise for the people, but have actually disempowered them. No one is listening to them. Instead the formidable political machines of the two main parties are engaging each other, brutally and mindlessly, without a care for the people who should matter. At the moment it is evident that the people do not matter to the politicians of the two main parties. Winning is all that matters, or so they seem to think.

L E G A L W A T C H
Will voters' wishes prevail in Wayamba?

Whatever its final outcome, there are signs that the ferocious election campaign in the North-Western Province may have finally shocked the conscience of a hitherto largely apathetic society.

Veteran election monitoring groups such as PAFFREL have been joined by a host of newer observers including the Organization of Business and Professional Women, as a growing segment of hitherto apolitical citizens have begun to speak out against the barbarism that passes for electoral politics in this country.

However the question remains as to what - apart from witnessing and reporting - can be done to stop the lawlessness.

As we have emphasized in this column, the powers and functions involved in conducting the poll are constitutionally vested in the Commissioner of Elections and no political authority or other group is entitled to interfere with the Commissioner's discretion.

These powers and functions are set out in the Provincial Councils Elections Act No. 2 of 1988 and include the power to issue all such directions to the officials under him as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Act. He can also order a variation in the polling hours at a polling station or change the location of a station where necessary due to any emergency.

The Commissioner can even order another day for polling in any administrative district where a poll cannot be conducted due to any emergency or unforeseen circumstances. This drastic power will doubtless not be lightly exercised, but there is perhaps an unfortunate lacuna in the law in that the Commissioner does not appear to be authorized to order a re-poll in any one or more polling divisions within a district where he is satisfied that a free and fair poll has not been possible. The declaration of the District result would of course have to be delayed in such event.

Returning Officers and Presiding Officers have their designated powers and duties including the maintenance of order at polling stations and the exclusion of unauthorized persons therefrom, if necessary with the aid of the Police or any other person authorized in writing by the PO or the RO. However at certain past elections including the 1997 local government polls, booths had been invaded by gangs of thugs intent on stuffing ballot boxes, which the POs had been unable to prevent, although remedial action was reportedly taken at the point of counting. It is to be hoped that the unprecedentedly large number of police personnel who are said to have been deployed for the Wayamba election will be able to cope with such incidents, although the police record of preventing violence during the campaign was not impressive.

Counting officers have power to decide on the acceptance or rejection of ballot papers at the count, and during the 1997 local government elections such officers had to identify and remove ballot papers which presiding officers had reported as having been forcibly stuffed into ballot boxes by gangs of persons who had invaded polling booths.

An election can be set aside where it is shown that there was non-compliance with the provisions of the Act, if it appears that the election was not conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in such provisions and the non-compliance materially affected the result. While not invalidating an election for petty lapses, this section is meant to safeguard the integrity of the poll against significant acts of malfeasance by officials.

Any tampering with, or unauthorized distribution of poll cards or ballot papers is a criminal offence punishable after summary trial in a Magistrate's Court with a fine, imprisonment or both.

As no special rules are laid down for reporting such offences, the normal procedure under the Code of Criminal Procedure would apply. This means that proceedings do not have to be initiated only by the Police.

Under Section 136(1) of the Code any person may make an oral or written complaint to a Magistrate having jurisdiction over the area where the offence is committed, or a Magistrate himself/herself may initiate proceedings upon knowledge or suspicion, although in such event the case must be heard by a Magistrate other than the one who initiated the proceedings.

The same applies to all other illegal acts set out in the Provincial Councils Elections Act including voting more than once, voting while knowing that one is disqualified, forging polling cards, canvassing within the precincts of a polling station, or fraudulently defacing the ink mark placed on the finger after voting.

It is important for election officials and private election monitors to remember that the reporting of such incidents need not be confined to their post-election reports, but that they have full power to report such incidents then and there to the Police or to the Magistrate of the area.

The Elections Act also contains more elaborately defined offences which are said to amount to corrupt or illegal practices. These offences not only give rise to more serious criminal penalties than those mentioned earlier, but can also be the cause of unseating a candidate by an election petition.

"Corrupt" practices include impersonation, treating of voters, bribery, undue influence, and the making or publication of a false statement of fact in relation to the personal character of a candidate with a view to affecting the result of the election. Undue influence includes the use or threat of force, while bribery includes both direct material inducements to electors and material inducements to others to get electors to vote in a particular way.

"Illegal" practices centre around such matters as conveyance of voters to the poll, publication of false reports in newspapers and printing of posters without carrying the names of the printer and publisher.

However a criminal prosecution for a corrupt or illegal practice can only be instituted with the sanction of the Attorney-General. Given the perceived politicization of the office of AG, a requirement to obtain the sanction of the Commissioner of Elections might have been more appropriate in the circumstances.

In the case of corrupt or illegal practices, the persons accused of the offences must be named in any election petition. However an election can also be set aside on the grounds of general bribery, treating or intimidation, and judicial decisions have established that the names of persons need not be given in such cases, e.g. where gangs of unknown persons have staged attacks, as long as details as to time and place are given with sufficient clarity so as to enable identification of the incidents referred to.

However in order to set aside an election on the general grounds listed above, the petitioner must be able to show that a section of electors was prevented from voting for the party or group which they preferred and that the result of the election was thereby materially affected.

This proviso has caused problems for petitioners in the past, most notably following the l998 Presidential election where an unknown quantity of "JVP" or "DJV" violence was alleged to have affected supporters of both the major parties. But it is not likely to cause such difficulties in the Wayamba where there are no such hidden forces operating and the violence is being perpetrated by supporters of contesting parties.

Finally, in the context of reported incidents of theft of polling cards, voters should be advised that a polling card is not essential in order to cast one's vote, as long as the voter's name is on the electoral register for that area and he/she can identify himself/herself to the satisfaction of the presiding officer. The earlier a voter goes to the polling station, the less likelihood of impersonation.

Experience has shown that the challenging of imposters largely depends on the alertness of the polling agents of the respective parties and independent groups, and failure to get such agents into the polling booth can have serious adverse consequences to the party or group concerned. Polling agents have in the past been targeted by groups bent on interfering with the election.

A voter who finds that he has been personated is entitled to, and should insist on being allowed to mark his vote on a "tendered ballot paper". These tendered ballot papers are separately counted and preserved, and while they will not count towards the result, they will be useful evidence in the event of an election petition being filed.

The week that was
NWP polls
The PA has a stiff fight on its hands

by Shan Wijetunga
The whole government party was in the NWP since Thursday. Not only the politicians like ministers, deputy ministers and MPs were there. There were many ministry staffers too flocking to the Wayamba.

So also the opposition. The leader of the opposition accompanied by his party MPs have been campaigning hard in the NWP for part several days.

The JVP too is intent on making its presence felt and has been campaigning hard in the province.

This election is more important for the government than the two other parties running. This is the second election the PA is facing after it came to power four years ago. At the last local government elections in 1997, the government won easily partly due to the public opinion over the Nalanda Ellawela killing around that time.

But this time the government will have to face stiff competition due to the UNP being well organised at the village level through its cluster organisations.

The UNP which had lost three previous elections has thrown its full weight into the Wayamba battle. It believes that a victory here would be the turning point.

The JVP too is determined to make an impact and show itself as a third force. They are throwing more effort into the Kurunegala district than Puttalam because they feel they have greater influence there.

The government aware of its opponents strategies has nominated S. B. Navinna as chief minister designate against Gamini Jayawickrema Perera.

The PA also believes that a victory at tomorrow's election is important for its future electoral fortune. It has therefore thrown maximum resources into this battle including the unrestrained use of the state machinery and media for political purposes.

Lots of goodies have been thrown to the voters, many of whom are unhappy about the violence demonstrated in a contest that is more a yuddhaya (war) than a chandaya (election).

The election inducement includes provision of credit facilities, repairing of roads, telephone facilities, electricity supply, etc. to create previously unblessed by such benevolence. Compensation have also been paid to missing persons in the area and a university for the NWP promises.

The election fever has spread from the town to the villages.

There is little outward evidence of UNP electioneering as the whole of North Western Province is plastered with blue. The green and the red were rare sights.

When Gamini Athukorale, General Secretary NWP was asked whether the party propaganda machine has broken down he stated Mr. Ranil Wickremasinghe had ordered their party contestants to refrain from putting up posters or banners. Confining UNP candidates posters only opposite to avoid clashes provoked by undesirable elements..

In its place the UNP has evolved a campaign from house to house, and holds pocket meetings and protest campaigns.

In contrast People's Alliance election propaganda was high flying with large banners and posters.

Vehicles belonging to ministries and pradesheeya sabhas are used in the People's Alliance propaganda campaign.

UNP MP, A. H. M. Azwer alleged that certain ministers were using over 30 to 40 vehicles in the election campaign.

We did not see any vehicles without registration numbers in our tour of Kurunegala and Puttalam, but saw two vehicles with garage numbers being used in the People's Alliance campaign.

We met UNP MPs Nanda Mathew, D. M. Ariyadasa and Upatissa Silva at the Rantaliya rest house when at breakfast.

The MPs alleged that the government intended winning the elections through election violence. But they hoped to get the voters to the situation without being intimidated.

While proceeding to Puttalam we met People's Alliance MP, Mahinda Amaraweera at Wariyapola. He was confident of the PA winning Wariyapola.

S. B. Navinna, People's Alliance Chief Ministerial contestant who spoke to us at Nikaweratiya rejected allegations that the People's Alliance was involved in political violence, and said any dispute in the villages is considered as political violence.

He is so confident of the PA winning the polls that he had already programmed the development projects envisaged by him for the development of the north western province after he becomes the chief minister.

Puttalam was under a tight security net with police STF and two navy attack crafts berthed in the Puttalam canal in anticipation of the President's visit to participate in an election propaganda rally.

In Kurunegala we observed political activity among the urban people while the villagers kept cool indicating a feeling of despondency.

The most daring violent incident was the shooting in front of his residence the UNP candidate, Gamini Dissanayake where a youth named Siva was killed on the spot.

In another incident at Anamaduwa a People's Alliance supporter was shot dead.

The suspects in this incident, according to the complaint to the police, were Puttalam UNP candidate, Asoka Wadigamangawa, Susantha Punchi Nilame and Mahinda Ratnatilake.

The suspect surrendered to the police and after being produced in courts were released on bail.

In an incident at the Pannala bus stand an armed gang had disrupted a JVP propaganda rally and assaulted some of their supporters mercilessly. Several of them were admitted to the hospital in critical conditions.

North Western Province residents maintain it is outsiders who are committing violence but the question of who got them down is not answered.

The Maha Sangha and dignitaries of other religious institutions in the North Western Province met recently and forwarded a memorandum to all chief ministers appealing for a free and fair elections.

The memorandum was signed by forty religious dignitaries including the Maha Sangha of the north western province.

This meeting convened by Prof. S. B. Hettiarachchi and held last Thursday at the auditorium of the YMBA, Kurunegala.

Though all contestants in the north western provincial council elections were invited to the meeting the PA contestants neither nor their representatives were there to receive the memorandum.

Gamini Jayawickrema Perera, UNP chief ministerial contestant after accepting the memorandum from the religious dignitaries, said the People's Alliance was escalating violence as it is aware that the UNP will win the elections.

UNP Secretary General, Gamini Athukorale last Tuesday evening was given all details of a lorry carrying illegal ballot boxes leaving Colombo. He informed O. K. Hemachandra of the Criminal Investigations Department and the Commissioner of Elections regarding the transport of these illegal ballot boxes.

The weekly conference to discuss problems connected with provincial council elections convened by the Commissioner of Elections was held on Wednesday at the office of the Commissioner of Elections commencing at 10.30 a.m.

Inspector General of Police, Lucky Kodituwakku, Deputy Inspector General of Police, North Western Province, Jagath Jayawardena and representatives of the UNP, JVP and the New Left Front were present.

Notable absentee was the representative of the People's Alliance.

After lengthy discussions on election problems UNP Secretary General spoke about the lorry load of illegal ballot boxes which had left Colombo city.

Inspector General of Police assured Gamini Athukorale that detailed investigations had already been instituted.

Ravi Karunanayake
The dismissal of Ravi Karunanayake from the United Lalith Front and Srimani Athulathmudali returning to the platform of People's Alliance, political observers believe was the result of certain actions behind the scene.

In the first instance the United Lalith Front Executive Committee and its leader, Srimani towed the UNP line but shifted gradually loyalties while Ravi Karunanayake and the members of the Executive Committee continued to support the UNP.

Vardharaja Perumal
Former Chief Minister of North East Provincial Council, Vardharaja Perumal who was been hiding in India for several years has returned to Sri Lanka. But his lodgings here are a secret.

Last Tuesday he had paid a visit to the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Prof. G. L. Peiris and held discussions for over an hour.

Devolution in Sri Lanka
The North-East Provincial Council, 1988-1990

by Dayan Jayatilleka
This article, by a political activist who was, for a short time, one of the five Ministers of the North-East Provincial Council at the time it was established, is partly a memoir and partly a political analysis of the realities of devolution of power on the Sri Lankan context. It deals with a vitally important phase in India's attempt to mediate in Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict. The contents of the article reveal the extent of India's pressure and influence in the establishment of the Council, and in the running of its affairs. It also shows how the Chief Minister of the Council was intent on a provocative political agenda which attempted to go well beyond the powers granted to Provincial Councils through the 13th amendment to the 1978 constitution.

There is a substantial volume of publications on the events of the years 1987 and 1988 in Sri Lanka, from the negotiations that led to the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord, the actual signing of the accord, and the entry to the north and east of the island of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) the eruption of fighting between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the setting up, in November 1988, of the North-East Provincial Council (NEPC). This part of the present article hopes merely to bring to light one or two lesser-known facts and thereby fill in a blank spot or two.

Experience
The article as a whole is partly a memoir of the author's own experience as a Minister of the NEPC, and partly an exercise in political analysis of a turbulent period in the island's current history. Many writers, Sri Lankan and Indian, have written at length on the resistance to the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord of July 1987, and even steps of actual sabotage on the part of the Government of India and the LTTE. That is only a part, perhaps the overwhelmingly larger part of the story, but not the complete one. There were at least three other elements or factors, which contributed to the actual outbreak of war between the LTTE and the IPKF on 10 October 1987. Or, to put it in a more accurate, nuanced manner, three other factors which contributed to giving Velupillai Prabhakaran, leader of the LTTE, an excuse to do what he was intent on doing anyway.

The first was the People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), which upon re-induction to Sri Lanka following the Accord and the IPKF deployment, initiated a campaign of serial assassinations of Tiger cadres-a course of action that could be termed pre-emptive, if one were charitably inclined. This course of sustained assassinations provided the Tigers with the excuse to re-arm on a significant scale, picking up their recently cached automatic weapons and perhaps more importantly, prompting an influential number of Tamil people to sympathise with the LTTE's refusal to disarm.

Accurate
The second element was Vardharajah Perumal, the future Chief Minister of the North-East Provincial Council, whose accurate reading of the fascist character of the LTTE led him to the strategic conclusion that a situation must be created in which the IPKF would fight the LTTE. He was to opt for a strikingly similar strategy later, in relation to the Sri Lankan state and the IPKF. Perumal was not the leader of the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), but in the aftermath of the Accord, it was he who represented the organisation in Colombo which entailed the all important liaison with the Indian High Commission and the Colombo government-cum-security apparatus.

Accord
The next element that contributed, this time unwittingly, to the unravelling of the Accord was the Indian High Commission itself led by the formidable High Commissioner Mani Dixit. This writer is personally aware that the attitude of the High Commission to the Thileepan fast was one of "not blinking" and being seen not to blink. Part of this attitude stemmed from "establishment" thinking-"we, the Delhi and Colombo establishments shall not let the Accord be put under pressure by these young LTTE yokels; they have to be taught a lesson."

Attitude
Interestingly, the other wellspring of this hardline attitude was the Indian political culture that the High Commission officials felt themselves heir to: "Hunger fasts as a tactic against us Gandhian Indians who invented the game? They must be joking." The High Commission officials were in no hurry to get to Jaffna and handle the crisis; they were consciously quite willing to let Thileepan die, if push came to shove. In their myopic arrogance what they failed to spot was that Prabhakaran was equally or even more willing to let Thileepan die. The Indian authorities simply fell into Prabhakaran's psycho-political trap.

Politics
Gamini Dissanayake, a senior Cabinet Minister and the strongest supporter of the Accord in Sri Lankan politics, was ironically, one of those who helped undermine it. Dissanayake's sponsorship or patronage of the Weli Oya settlement, on the border between the North Central Province, and the Trincomalee district, in the very aftermath of the signing of the Accord, clearly went against its spirit-though he told this writer in 1988 that it was done after Rajiv Gandhi was informed and without any objections from him. The Weli Oya settlement, however valuable and even imperative from a geo-strategic point of view, should have been completed before the Accord or postponed till sometime after, but never undertaken at the time it was. It not only played into the hands of the Tiger propagandists in the period before the outbreak of war with the IPKF, it was one issue that incensed all the Tamil groups and helped lend an anti-Sinhala cast to the NEPC/EPRLF's behaviour.

Unhappy
Then again, another element unhappy about the Accord was of course the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the Indian equivalent of Washington's Central Intelligence Agency. In the final decisive arm twisting operation that took place to soften up the Jayewardene administration into signing the Accord, the RAW was given the task of hammering the cadres of the Eelam groups based in India into an unified expeditionary force under a joint command, equipped with-SAM missiles, SAM 7s-and officered by RAW personnel. While this was being done, the Colombo government caved in and the process that led to the signing commenced. The expeditionary force preparations were a high point of the RAW activity and influence in the Sri Lankan crisis at least until the RAW chief Anand Verma's negotiations with J R Jayewardene, when the Accord and the IPKF operation was in crisis in late 1988.5 From the days of the expeditionary force, there was a steep drop in the influence of the RAW in the decision making processes in Delhi-especially after things went very wrong and fighting broke out between the Tigers and the IPKF on 10 October 1987.

While all the above mentioned elements helped the Accord to go into crisis, wittingly or unwittingly, they were at play within a matrix that was already severely flawed. Colombo, Delhi and the Tamils had radically different views on what the Accord was all about and, what is worse, each side trumpeted its own version even as the ink on the document and the blood on the streets of Colombo had hardly dried.

Announced
President J R Jayewardene announced that the Accord would bring peace to the country. Gamini Dissanayake told the Sinhala audience on Rupavahini, Sri Lanka's state television channel, on the day that the Accord was signed, that it was a better deal for the Sinhalese than the 19 December 1986 proposals, since the latter entailed the excision of the Ampara district. Meanwhile, Rajiv Gandhi told a public rally in Tamil Nadu-footage of which appeared on Sri Lankan television-that the Accord obtained for the Tamils more than they had asked for. Perceptions of the Sinhala and Tamil constituencies, were not sought to be reconciled and were swiftly enough, more skewed apart than the Accord could bear.

Contrary to the views of the prejudiced, Prabhakaran's speech at Sudumalai was not a declaration of intent to undermine the Accord. It was a perfectly positioned, tensely poised statement accurately reflecting the diminished space that the man found himself in, a temporary lack of balance but considerable determination and focus to get out of the trap. The Thileepan fast was one of Prabhakaran's manoeuvres to prise open the space he was trapped in as a prelude to breaking out of that trap completely.

Administrations
Years later, under the Ranasinghe Premadasa and Chandrika Kumaratunga administrations, Prabhakaran was to initiate the war before the peace process reached the point it did in 1987, putting him off balance. Never after 1987, was he to let himself be off balance and pushed politically into that small space and tight corner again. The factors and contradictions among the pro-Accord forces, enumerated above, eventually provided, the opening for Prabhakaran to break out on 10 October 1987.

Contradictory
The contradictory bombast with which the Colombo and Delhi Governments heralded the implementation phase of the Indo-Lanka Accord contrasts sharply with the sobriety and professionalism with which James Baker handled the highly complicated El Salvadoran settlement in which the historic allies and foes of the USA, and strong ideological and nationalistic sensitivities were involved. The other Central American peace processes, the Madrid peace conference on the Middle East and the Kampuchean process in which China played a major role are all examples of far more sensitive, sober, professional and therefore relatively successful handling of politico-diplomatic efforts at conflict resolution.

Merger
A landmine that was embedded in the Accord was the provision concerning the permanent merger of the North-East subject to a referendum. That was possibly the only way to get past the dogmatism of the Tamil groups concerning the merger, but it also meant that long before the setting up of the NEPC and certainly the advent of the Premadasa administration, the non-LTTE organisations had decided that the referendum should be prevented. It is noteworthy that the Eelam Left was every bit as allergic to the referendum as the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) and the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) (it really didn't matter to the LTTE, which placed no importance on the Accord) despite the fact that such a referendum was often advocated by Lenin, for similar situations.

True, there were charges of state-aided colonisation having changed the population balance, but that was just cause for insisting on certain detailed modifications in the arrangements for holding a referendum and not for a near hysterical allergic reaction to the very idea. The hostility to the referendum soon turned into a determination to pre-empt its holding-and this is one of the factors that fed into the Cyprus-Bangladesh scenario-the Turkish partition of Cyprus, and the Indian intervention which ensured the triumph of the separatist struggle in East Bengal-that began to crystallise before the setting up of the NEPC in late 1988. Indeed these were the rails on which the NEPC experiment was doomed to run.

Period
The period between the outbreak of the war and the holding of the NEPC 'elections' lasted a shade over a year. The interaction between Delhi and Colombo that resulted eventually in the installation of the NEPC, has been exhaustively set out by authors as authoritative, albeit antipodal as J N. Dixit and K M de Silva in their respective volumes. What needs to be added on to that composite picture is an awareness of the unchronicled, undocumented processes that were ongoing at that time. These processes ran through three different levels or planes and three different theatres. The three levels were those of the top leaders, the area leaders and the militants on the ground belonging to the non-LTTE groups that were to comprise the council, chiefly the EPRLF. The three theatres were Colombo, the North-East and Delhi. Taken together, we may glimpse the processes operating on both horizontal (Colombo, Jaffna-Batticaloa, Delhi) and vertical (top leaders, area leaders and militants) axes.

Happening
For instance in the North-eastern theatre what was going at the level of the top leadership was distinct from and indeed kept a different time as it were, from what was happening at the level of the cadres. When K Pathmanabha, leader of the EPRLF, visited the East there was a genuine groundswell of popular support, albeit from the old 'mass base' of the EPRLF which he had done so much to build through the relief and rehabilitation work done by volunteer youths led by him in the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students and General Union of Eelam Students (EROS/GUES) days after the cyclone of 1978. However, Pathmanabha's presence was not a permanent one, for three reasons: he had not yet been amnestied by the Sri Lankan state, his life was in jeopardy from the LTTE and his presence was needed to lobby politically in Delhi and Madras. The permanent presence was of local leaders, like the redoubtable P Kirubhakaran, (EPRLF politbureau member and later a Minister of the NEPC) based in Batticaloa.

Popularity
His role and function turned out to be a classic counter-insurgency one, which far from bringing the kind of popularity that Pathmanabha's tours brought the organisation, actually tended to work in the opposite direction. This was almost-but not entirely inevitable-given the situation he found himself in and the attendant responsibilities thrust upon him. Kirubhakaran's problems were the same that area leaders of all the Eelam National Liberation Front (ENLF) groups found themselves in. The point was that the cadre of these groups had hitched rides back to their home bases, piggy-backing on the IPKF flights. Once back they either had to kill or be killed by the LTTE. They also had to eat and be housed. There was only one way to do that: to function first as spotters and then as irregular auxiliaries for the IPKF. The guns for their self-defence, the food for the boys were all courtesy the IPKF-which underscores the point made earlier in this article, of the weakened state of these organisations.

The area leaders became, o necessity, the intermediaries with the IPKF top brass in the locality-a natural division of labour, since the area leaders were functionally proficient in the English language and also possessed the necessary political sophistication. It was also the case that in order to strengthen their access and lobbying capacities with the local IPKF brass the area leaders sought alliances with those few members of the local elites who had not gone along with the LTTE. The alliance in Batticaloa between Kirubhakaran and Sam Tambimuttu (head of the Citizen's Committee and several Human Rights Organisations, subsequently an EPRLF parliamentarian) was a classic case in point.

Strategic
These alliances were to have important strategic consequences for the unfolding of the crisis as a whole, since they were the main lobbies for the line of entrenching the IPKF presence i.e. the Cyprus scenario which was a derivative and a variant of the Bangladesh model. What is important is that this strategy was being talked of before the NEPC was actually set up, before the 1988 presidential elections which put Premadasa into office and well before the deterioration of relations between Premadasa and Vardharajah Perumal. It was as early as April-May 1988 that Vardharajah Perumal was speculating, to the Sinhala allies of the EPRLF (just amnestied) about the possible necessity of 'creating situations of crisis which would prevent the IPKF from leaving.' In doing this he was giving vent to the anxiety felt by the non-LTTE organisations, particularly their cadres and area leaders-as to their fate at the hand of the Tigers, if the IPKF left; however behind it all was the Bangladesh consciousness, the hope that the Indians would secure a separate state for them comprising the Northern and Eastern Provinces.

Eelam
Around the same time, in Madras the leaders of the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students (EROS) were actually advocating-in just that explicit terminology-the creation of a Cyprus situation. None of this discourse reflected any notion of making the Accord work in any reformist sense-only in the sense of making it work as a stepping stone to secession, not in the form of the Tigers' variant of an independent country but as a separate entity in the Indian union, or as a satellite of India.

Contacts
The non-LTTE groups had representatives in Colombo, operating in four directions as it were. Firstly, they reactivated their contacts with their allies on the Southern revolutionary and radical Left, who in turn introduced them to the broader Parliamentarist Left-which had grouped themselves into the United Socialist Alliance. Secondly, they entered into discussions with the leaders of the United National Party (UNP), or more accurately the pro-Accord faction of the UNP. Thirdly, and this is an even less known fact, the leading representatives of these groups established relations with the Sri Lankan security apparatus. Fourthly and most fundamentally, they kept in close and regular touch with the top officials of the Indian High Commission in Colombo.

Initiated
It must be said in all fairness to the Indians that these contacts were initiated and maintained primarily at the insistence of the Eelam groups. Vardharajah Perumal operated at all these levels, which included being taken for Security Council meetings by Gamini Dissanayake. Given the situation that the EPRLF and its Sinhala allies were in, Perumal can only be praised for his excellent lobbying, but what is interesting is that: none of these contacts in the South eroded his thesis of the desirability of entrenching the IPKF presence, even to the extent of provoking situations of tension for the purpose; and the extensive range of interactions conspicuously did not include the important dissident faction of the UNP, namely the Premadasa wing. This absence is inexplicable given the fact that the UNP leaders and security officials the EPRLF did interact with were those who were their main ideological rivals in previous years while the same was not true of Premadasa (whose populist programme might have been thought to have been more congruent with the ideology of the Eelam Left.)

Netanyahu forced into an early general election

by Dr. Stanley Kalpage
On his election as Israel's prime minister in May 1996, Netanyahu did not conceal his opposition to the Oslo Accords of 1993. He was against giving up more land in the West Bank to the Palestinians until Israel's security was assured.

To begin with, he was averse to even meeting with Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. For some time afterwards, their meetings were few and far between: in fact they had not met since 15 January 1997 when an Interim Arrangement was signed to resume the peace process. However, not much headway could be made because of sporadic extremist violence on the Palestinian side and Israeli intransigence with regard to the release of Palestinian prisoners languishing in Israeli jails and the construction of more Jewish settlements.

Determined to resume the US initiative, President Clinton intervened and sponsored talks in October 1998 between Benjamin Netanyahu and Yasser Arafat at the Wye River Conference Centre in Maryland near Washington D.C. aimed at breaking the 19-month deadlock in the negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians.

In the Wye River memorandum signed on 23 October 1998, the Israelis agreed to withdraw from 13 percent more of the West Bank territory they held and to free 750 political prisoners in return for stringent security measures by the Palestinian Authority against terrorist attacks.

Clinton had invested much political capital in the success of the Wye talks which were crucial to the long-stalled Middle East peace talks. Looming ahead on 4 May, 1999 was a deadline after which, according to the Oslo Accords, the final phase negotiations on issues like the status of Jerusalem, the question of refugees and the borders of a possible Palestinian State would begin.

If no West Bank deal had emerged, Arafat had threatened that he would unilaterally declare a Palestinian state - a move of potentially explosive consequences for the region and one with embarrassing consequences for Netanyahu.

Setbacks to implementation
The Knesset (Israel's parliament) overwhelmingly threw its support behind the land-for-security deal by approving the Wye River Agreement by a vote of 75-19, with nine abstentions. The opposition Labour Party supported the Agreement.

Unfortunately thereafter, provocation and counter-provocation caused delays in the implementation of the Agreement. For instance, on 14 November, the 10th anniversary of the declaration of independence by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Arafat proclaimed that he was ready to "fight with guns" to ensure that East Jerusalem became the capital of Palestine. Israeli foreign minister Ariel Sharon responded by asking Israelis to occupy vacant hilltops in the occupied West Bank.

Netanyahu added to the tension by confiscating West Bank lands to build roads for Jewish settlements. Further, he promised to build homes for Jewish settlers in Har Homa near Jerusalem, whose clearing in 1997 had sparked stiff opposition from the Palestinians.

Netanyahu faces storm in the Knesset
Despite these and similar incidents, it was clear that the Wye River peace agreement was supported by a solid majority of Palestinians and Israelis. Only the extremist forces on both sides felt aggrieved. The right wing of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's Likud coalition bitterly opposed what they considered to be a capitulation by Netanyahu, in agreeing to the further concessions on occupied territory. On his return from Washington, Netanyahu faced a stormy six-hour session in the Knesset.

"Scoundrel" shouted Israeli lawmaker Yossi Sarid, aiming the barb at Benjamin Netanyahu as the prime minister addressed parliament. "There is not a man in this house you have not led astray". Netanyahu had made so many contradictory promises during his brief term of office.

The tone may have been theatrical, but the sentiment was general. Netanyahu, who had survived for 2 1/2 years by ducking and dodging on the question of peace with the Palestinians, was now boxed into the tightest political corner of his 31 months in office.

Netanyahu postpones Israeli troop withdrawals
With Israeli politics in turmoil, Netanyahu put peace-making with the Palestinians on hold once more. The first phase of the Israeli pullback from occupied territory in the West Bank did not take place on time. Under intense pressure from hard-liners in his collapsing conservative coalition, Netanyahu suspended the scheduled troop withdrawals and refused to free more Palestinian "political prisoners" from Israeli jails, as required by the Wye River Agreement.

The Palestinian leaders, for their part, retreated into pre-Wye behavior, mostly over the question of prisoners. They made incendiary statements. Daily, violent protests in the West Bank left hundreds of young men injured. A suicide bombing of a Jerusalem market on the eve of the ratification of the accord by the Israeli cabinet led to further postponement of troop withdrawals. In such an embittered political atmosphere, many Palestinians doubted whether Clinton during his visit to Palestine and Israel in December could achieve much.

Clinton's visit to Palestine
President Clinton had promised to visit Gaza when the Palestine National Council took the historic step to remove from its Charter the call for the destruction of Israel.

Before his arrival for a three-day visit to the Middle East, Clinton had already displayed his characteristic political legerdemain. As a result, many Israelis were convinced he was the most pro-Israeli president ever. And many Palestinians were equally certain he was the most pro-Palestinian president ever.

And yet, despite his broad appeal to Israelis and Palestinians, who both tend to regard Clinton as the single indispensable leader for achieving Middle East peace, Clinton had difficulty achieving durable results in his Middle East trip. His visit was rich in symbolism but short on tangible achievements. He failed to nudge Israel to resume the troop withdrawals from the West Bank agreed to in the US-brokered talks at Wye River two months earlier.

Boost for Palestinian sovereignty
As the first US president to travel to Gaza in Palestinian Authority-administered territory, President Clinton gave a powerful boost to the cause of Palestinian sovereignty. A military honour guard greeted him at the new Gaza International Airport and the Palestinians cheered boisterously at a speech to the Palestine National Council. Clinton stood solemnly as witness while the assemblage renounced sections of the Palestinian charter calling for the destruction of Israel.

And, while the US position is that Palestinian statehood is an issue that must be decided in final-status negotiations between the Palestinian Authority and Israel, Clinton acknowledged that a visit such as his "would have been inconceivable a decade ago."

Following a contentious three-way meeting with Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Clinton left the region much as he found it on his arrival - with the peace process teetering and mistrust seething between Israelis and Palestinians.

The last day of the president's visit was further marred by the bitter reaction of some Israelis to a speech in which Clinton equated the suffering of Palestinian children whose fathers are in Israeli jails and Israeli children whose fathers were killed by Palestinians. Foreign Minister Ariel Sharon protested the comment to Clinton personally, and Netanyahu was scathing on the subject. Senior Israeli government officials complained that Clinton was implying moral equivalence between Israeli terror victims and imprisoned Palestinian criminals.

Netanyahu's coalition disintegrates
Barely two months after the US-brokered Wye Plantations Peace Agreement, Natanyahu's conservative coalition was in disarray. The United States continued to press for implementation of the Agreement and called for Israel to hand over additional territory in the occupied West Bank in return for Palestinian commitments on security. With mounting pressure from Israeli settlers and extreme right wing politicians, Netanyahu was in a dilemma.

In an eleventh-hour attempt to reassemble his badly tattered right-wing coalition, Netanyahu suspended implementation of the Wye River accord. He declared there would be no further Israeli troop withdrawals until the Palestinians met certain conditions imposed by his divided 17-member cabinet which voted, by eight votes to four with five abstentions, in favour of the Wye River accord.

The Israeli cabinet's conditions called for the Palestinians to renounce their intention to declare an independent state in May, with East Jerusalem as its capital, halt all violence and incitement to violence; drop the demand that Israel release Palestinian "security" prisoners held in Israeli jails, and seize illegal weapons in Palestinian-controlled areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

It was clear that as long as Netanyahu faced political turmoil and a threat to his government, he would find or manufacture reasons to freeze further troop withdrawals. Even Clinton took the Israeli premier to task for demanding that Arafat renounce calls for an independent Palestinian state with its capital in Arab East Jerusalem. "Neither side should try to stop the other from saying what their vision of the future is," Clinton said. "That would be a terrible mistake."

Eventually on 5 January this year, the Knesset voted to dissolve itself and move toward elections scheduled for 17 May 1999 with a possible run-off on 1 June almost two years early. The vote set in motion an unpredictable confluence of events that is likely to shape the future of peace-making in the Middle East.

  | NEWS | PROVINCIAL | EDITORIAL | DEFENCE | FEATURES | LEISURE | BUSINESS | SPORTS | ADS |