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'Save us from NGOs and the LTTE'

by S. Haputhanthri
for The Committee of The NATIONAL MOVEMENT AGAINST TERRORISM

On the 5th of March 1998, at Maradana just before noon a LTTE terrorist bomb massacred 43 civilians including several school children. 250 people were injured. The mangled remains of several of the victims could only be gathered into buckets and placed in the mortuary. The names of the massacred were on a list at the mortuary but most of their remains were not there. A middle- aged man was seen clinging on to a bit of cloth trying to match it with any cloth which clung onto shattered bits of human flesh. Parents of Gothami Balika Vidayala who cried out for their daughters who had not returned home were led finally to the mortuary and asked to check there. The agony of the mother and sister of 18 year old Ereka Harshini, who was killed, the agony of parents of 18 year old Sulochana Sammani who was killed will never be known and will never be told to the country or the rest of the world.

Not one of the women's organizations which float around the country screaming about some victims cried out for Sulochana or Harshini. They were Sinhalese and they were massacred by the LTTE - one could conclude that these women's organizations are not paid to cry for the people killed by the brutal LTTE. We cannot see any other reason.

On the 5th of March 1999, one year later, nobody in this country except the grieving kith and kin of the 43 civilians killed, even spared a thought for these massacred people. Every single newspaper, every single TV station in this country forgot the mothers of Sulochana and Ereka. They forgot Renupiya Rohana the young wife of Anura Rohana who was killed in the Health Department lorry, and they forgot his three children Chathuranga who was 6 years old, Madushani who was 3 years old, and Madurangi who was 4 months old when their father was blasted into smithereens on the 5th of March 1998.

They forgot Padma Malkanthi, young wife of Shantha Sarath Dissanayake, who was massacred on that day. No one remembered that he left behind a son Wimal Janaka who was 7 years old and Eshan Chamara who was 2 years old - to cry alone. No one lamented with Enoka Niroshini who was left alone to fend for her two daughters 6 years and 1 year when her young husband Sujiva Nishantha and his three wheeler was blasted to bits.

Aged B.D Joselin Nona lost her sole relative and bread- winner when her 17 year old grand son E.D Prasanna was killed. The successful sparepart dealer in Panchikawaththa young Siri Mudalali sacrified his life along with his assistant Rienzie when they prevented the bomb fitted bus from going to its ultimate destination - possibly a school just half a kilometer away. Siri Mudalali left behind his young wife and their two sons 9 and 5 years old, both students of Ananda. What about these women and children?

On the 5th of March 1999, no newspaper carried the grieving faces of these mothers wives and children - victims of an LTTE massacre. But every single newspaper without exception carried the pictures and cried out aloud for, those who or not be buried in the so called Chemmani graveyard. If the NGOs' and their well-oiled media contacts who shed buckets of crocodile tears for good dollars, by the alleged grave site manage to get some of the more competent armed forces personnel hauled up before courts on charges of cooked-up human rights abuses, they have fulfilled their assignments and they have achieved the task for the LTTE.

This is not the time for the State to give into the whims and fancies of foreign funded schemers who are motivated by their own hidden agenda. Prior to removing Jaffna mine fields so as to make it safe for the civilians, the state has to ensure that this very same act will not make Jaffna unsafe for the military and pave a safe path for a re-entry by the LTTE. The security forces are fighting one of the most ruthless terrorist organization in the world, in the defense of this land. We should continue to support them unreservedly.

So too, the LTTE massacre on the 31st of January 1996, of young Enoka Gunaratna from American Express Bank, 39 year old Varuni Jayasekara and Eresha Perera from Airlanka and several other lady legal officers and librarians of the Central Bank must go unlamented because, there are no dollar-fueled voices on their behalf.

Beautiful Nanayathara Gunasekara, attorney-at-law, legal officer of Central Bank must rightly be rendered blind so that the "Liberators of the Tamil people" can finally get their diabolically conjured -up homeland.

Silence on the part of women's organizations on the brutal massacres by the LTTE speak reams for the total lack of bona fides on the part of these paid women. It is a national crime detrimental to national security to allow these organizations to operate without strict scrutiny.

Now, once again the Tigers, possibly, banking more than ever, on the warped chronic mental processes of this country's so called leader, religious dignitaries, the peace peddling mafia, have, initiated their gruesome pastime - bombing human beings, train carriages, buses and transformers. On the 10th of this month, a bomb was placed on the Galle bound passenger bus a little after 9 PM by a couple who subsequently walked out. An hour or so later the bomb went off killing two passengers and injuring 15 others.

One of the victims, Viraj Dayaratne was 22 years old and was from Panagoda, Abulgama. He was taking the Galle night bus to attend an interview the next morning in Galle. He was a member of the Young Zoologist Association and was actively involved in the preservation of the Fauna, Flora & the environment of this land with several other societies. All his hopes for a better tomorrow for himself and his country has been blatantly shattered by the LTTE.

On the same day at 8:50PM a bomb placed in the train returning from Matara exploded in the Fort and two engine drivers were injured. Thereafter a transformer was blasted at Gas Works street.

On the 16th of March in a LTTE bid to assassinate Chief Inspector Nilabdeen, 3 civilians were massacred. One was a Muslim three-wheeler driver called Mohamad Annis from Mt. Lavinia, another was a woman who died on the 21st at Kalubovila hospital who has muttered her name as Malini and whose identity and family is still unknown. The other was 28 year old Devika Kumari Dissanayaka from Samagipura Ragala. She was an agricultural graduate from the University of Peradeniya and at the point of her massacre she had obtained the post of agricultural officer at Sarvodaya. She was on a five day training program at the Sarvodaya and when she was killed her destination was the Sarvodaya training center at Pirivena Road, Mt. Lavinia.

On our part the National Movement Against Terrorism, in the memory of hundreds of innocent civilians massacred by the LTTE, call upon the Nation to act with responsibility and totally reject the call for negotiations with LTTE terror.

We request this country's voter to reject any candidate who comes on the political platform on the basis that they are for a negotiated settlement with the LTTE. For this country all attempts at "Peace talks" with the LTTE has only resulted in piled up mountains of dead bodies and blasted commercial centers.

In order to substantiate and emphasize our heart-felt plea we sorrowfully lay out below some of the documented civilian massacres by the LTTE in the months of January, February and March - 1999 down to 1987.

Month of January

At 6:10 A.M. on the 25th of January, 1998, suicide bombers of the LTTE exploded a massive truck bomb at the entrance to the Dalada Maligawa killing eight persons including a two year old infant and injuring 25 others, all peaceful civilians, who were on their way to offer alms at the temple that morning.

31 January 1996, A lorry laiden with explosives, was exploded by a LTTE suicide killer at the Central Bank Colombo, killing a total of 86 people and injuring 1,338 persons -some of whom todate are totally blind. 26 January l992, A private bus plying between Maha Oya and Ampara was caught up in a landmine between Aranthalawa and Boropolla. Due to the explosion 9 civilians and 10 airmen were killed and 17 injured. 23 January 1991, At Bogamuyaya Maha Oya Ampara, terrorists hacked to death 25 Sinhalese villagers injuring others. Subsequently, 4 injured persons succumbed to their injuries.

Month of February

6 February 1998, a LTTE suicide bomber blasted herself at the Airforce headquarters checkpoint at Slave Island. 9 people including 3 airmen died.

27 February 1989, At Borawewa Polonnaruwa, armed terrorists shot dead 37 Sinhalese villagers.

22 February 1989, terrorists attacked Tract number 13 Sinhapura Weli Oya and 6 Sinhalese were killed and 7 injured.

11 February 1989, Dutuwewa Horowpathana. Terrorists shot dead 34 Sinhalese villagers.

2 February 1989, Bogamuyaya Maha Oya Ampara, terrorists hacked to death 11 Sinhalese villagers.

7 February 1987, Aranthalawa Ampara, armed terrorists killed 28 Sinhalese villagers by slashing their necks.

Month of March

16th of March 1999, a little after 5PM a LTTE suicide bomber blasted herself on the vehicle of Chief Inspector Nilabdeen. Three civilians were killed and eight injured.

10 of March 1999, a bomb which was placed on the Galle bound passenger bus by the Tigers.

Terrorists exploded around 11 PM killing two people and injuring 15 others.

In the 1st week of March 1999, 7 fishing trawlers that left the shores of Trincomalee and 2 trawlers from Devinuwara were attacked and destroyed by the LTTE on the seas off Mulativu. Approximately 39 fishermen are missing and are suspected to have been killed by the LTTE.

5th of March 1998, Maradana bus bomb explosion killed 43 civilians including several school children and injured 250 people.

16th of March 1994, 10 fishing boats close to Kudiramalipoint were attacked by the LTTE killing 17 Sinhalese fishermen and injuring 3.

24th of March 1991, Bomb exploded at fish market at Akkaraipattu, killing 9 Muslims and injuring 32 others.

31 March 1988, LTTE attacked the village of Sainamadaradu Kalmunai killing 10 Muslims and 7 Tamils.

29 March 1988, Wewalketiya A'pura, bomb exploded inside CTB bus 29 Sri 9037 killing 9 passengers and injuring 14 others.

22 March 1988, Medavachchikulam Vavunia armed terrorists shot dead 9 Sinhalese.

22 March 1988, Pudukulam Terrorists attacked a Sinhalese village and killed 6 villagers and injured 3.

17 March 1988, Deegavapiya Damana Ampara, Terrorists hacked to death 13 Sinhalese.

15 March 1988, Kivulkade Morawewa Trinco, two group ofterrorists entered the village and killed 7 Sinhalese villagers.

14 March 1988 Kantalai, terrorists shot dead 13 Sinhalese villagers at Galmetiyawa.

11 March 1988 Suhadagama Porowpothana, armed terrorists atacked bus 22 Sri 2128 with small arms and grenades, killing 19 passengers and injuring 9 others.

5 March 1988 Sittaru Kantalai, terrorists exploded a landmine in a civilian lorry killing 16 Muslims and 8 Sinhalese. 2 March 1998 Morawewa Trinco, armed terrorists shot dead 14 Sinhalese villagers. 23 March 1987 Serunewa Horowpathana, armed terrorists shot dead 26 Sinhalese. 7 March 1987 Arantalawa Vavuniya, terrorists exploded a land mine killing 6 civilians, 7 soldiers and 4 NAF soldiers.

(The above mentioned dates and figures have been obtained from information tabled in Parliament on the 6th of Feb 1996 and thereafter. )

This Tiger - terror-ridden country is watching these Tiger apologists closely.

We emphasis that no political leadership of whatever hue, no religious dignitary however designated, no foreign government however powerful has the right to sacrifice this country to the barbarous war tactics of an invigorated LTTE, by rizing the State into "peace talks," cease-fires and pacts with the terrorists.

Perils inherent in peacemaking exercises

by "Foxwatch"
As the peacemakers pour out of the woodwork again - Foxes, Fatchetts, Inderfurths, sundry Norwegians, clergymen, NGOs - the time is right to look back and see what went wrong with every previous attempt, and why. For the sake of the thousands of servicemen and civilians doomed to death or mutilation if there is yet another fiasco, the effort must be made.

Local peacemakers in particular are long on good intentions but lacking in knowledge. And as for the general public, bless their cricket-crazy hearts, they have remarkably short memories (rumour has it that Prabakaran estimates the maximum attention span of the Sinhalese for the direst catastrophe at ten days).

This article therefore 1) describes the last three major peacemaking attempts, and their outcomes, 2) alerts peacemakers about the LTTE ultimatum of November 1998, inexplicably hailed as a peace message in some quarters; 3) lists weaknesses in peacemaking procedures which have doomed them to failure; 4) forewarns peacemakers about emerging trends in international attitudes to peace deals; and 5) suggests what has to be done if peacemaking is to have a chance.

Milestones on the peace trail

Indo-Lanka Accord, 1987

Take first the Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987, concluded in conspiratorial secrecy. The genius of the time sonorously announced in an address to the nation on 29th July 1987, the day the Accord was signed, that:

"After this, therefore, there will be no fighting in the North and the East. Terrorism will be a thing of the past, and peace will be restored once again to our land. This would mean a tremendous accession of wealth through the aid that the countries are giving. This would mean a tremendous accession of foreign investment. It will mean tourism looks up again and employment is available for our people. It should mean also the increase of wages to government servants.."

The LTTE encouraged the wave of euphoria by enacting a pantomime of "surrendering" arms to Sri Lankan and Indian generals on August 5, 1987. Within two months the "disarmed" LTTE had started killing Sinhalese and Muslim civilians, commencing in Trincomalee and extending to Batticaloa. Over 200 civilians were murdered, with the Sri Lanka army confined to barracks and the Indians looking on. The honeymoon was over.

Mark well the outcome of this peace initiative. The objectives - the eradication of terrorism and the restoration of peace - collapsed in ruins. But the concessions - the recognition of the North and East as "areas of historical habitation of Sri Lankan Tamil-speaking people" (an euphemism for traditional homelands), the Accord's provisions for an unified North and East, and the prospect of consequential amendments to the system of Provincial Councils towards these ends, remained and constituted the first legal building blocks towards a state of Eelam. So the peace initiative, instead of bringing peace, conferred upon the LTTE the legal foundation for its goal of Eelam

Hilton hysteria-1989-90

Memories are short, and egos rampant, so along came another peacemaker, in 1989. Terrorists were flown to Colombo and installed in five-star luxury. The negotiators sat round a table exuding bonhomie while the cameras flashed. In the orgy of good fellowship, arms and material were gifted to the LTTE and the army was withdrawn from strategic bases in the north. The LTTE fuelled the folly by enacting a different charade this time - the political solution. In the meantime Prabakaran built up the LTTE strength and bided his time. The LTTE struck on June 11, 1990, while the '"peace process" was in progress in Colombo. They attacked six police stations in the Eastern Province in the morning, four others later in the day. Around 600 Sinhala and Muslim policemen, who had surrendered their arms, on government orders on the basis of LTTE assurances that they would not be harmed, were lined up and slaughtered by the LTTE. In the next few days the LTTE extended their attacks to other police stations and army camps in the north and the east.

Consider again the result. As before, peace hopes disintegrated, this time with the hail of bullets which killed 600 policemen. The LTTE on the other hand, obtained free supplies of arms and material from the government,, occupied strategic bases relinquished by the army, and strengthened its grip on the north and the east. The peacemaking of 1987 had presented the LTTE with the legal foundation for Eelam. The peacemaking of 1989-90 strengthened its military power in the territory targeted for Eelam. Also, it doomed thousands of servicemen to death and injury to win back the territory so generously thrown away by the peacemakers.

Heavy metal

The urge to make peace proved irresistible to the new government of 1994, and it duly plunged in with an array of peace delegates whose credentials must have gladdened the hearts of the LTTE. The government proceeded regardless despite the LTTE's sinking of the Navy's largest ship soon after the government's announcement of peace talks, and the LTTE's assassination of a Presidential candidate after talks had begun. Amid the good fellowship the government permitted LTTE cadres to move freely in the north and the east. Again, the LTTE re-armed, recruited, and bided its time. The peace effort ended with a bang on April 19, 1995, when the LTTE sank two gunboats of the Sri Lanka navy, by the end of the month it had also shot down two Air Force Avros with surface-to-air missiles.

Note the result of the latest round of peacemaking. For the government, zilch. For the LTTE, the regaining of control over the Eastern Province, from which it had been evicted until the negotiators so magnanimously permitted the LTTE to wander around freely in the East, and the acquisition of sufficient naval and anti-aircraft power to destroy ships and aircraft

Peace in our time

The outcome of the three peace initiatives is tabulated below.

Prabakaran's Heroes Day message decoded

Let us now update ourselves by examining the latest authentic signal from the LTTE Prbakaran's Heroes Day Message of November 28, 1998. Some peaceniks appear to be under the delusion that this contains a "peace message." The peaceniks really must do their homework. If they read the entire message, they will realise that the bulk of the text consists of violent attacks on the "Sinhala nation", the repetition of key word and phrases - a well-known technique of rabble-rousing, and repeated assertions of the claims of the Tamils for a separate state. Key words and phrases are: "Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism", "militarism", "racism", "genocide", "atrocities.", "state oppression", "the Sinhala nation", "two nations", "the Tamil nation", 'the Tamil national "question/issue", "the Tamil ethnic conflict", "Eelam Tamils", "our Motherland", and "Tamil homeland". The "peace" message is only the thirteenth para of fifteen paras in English translation. The "peace" message itself, and indeed the entire message, needs to be read between the lines. So here are two extracts from para thirteen and one from para fourteen of the English text, along with decoded meanings.

Prabakaran loud and clear

There is one explicit paragraph in Prabakaran's "Peace" message which does not need any decoding, and it is one which all Sri Lankans, and especially any budding peacemakers, must read and digest. It reads:

"We cannot allow the Sinhala aggressive army to occupy even an inch of our homeland nor will we permit Sinhala state administrative functions in the occupied Tamil lands. We are shedding blood and fighting a deadly struggle with the primary objective of liberating our motherland which is the very foundation of the national existence and economic life of our people. Therefore we cannot permit the footprint of the Sinhala aggressors to remain embedded on our sacred soil."

Note the uncompromising belligerence of this declaration, and the references to "our homeland", "Tamil lands", "our motherland", "national existence", "our people", and "our sacred soil." The peacemakers must ask themselves whether all the bana preaching and Hail Marys and grovelling in the world will make the slightest dent in the mindset underlying the declaration.

Time now to look back soberly on what went wrong. Common factors emerge from the three peacemaking fiascos and their backgrounds.

a) Governments have adopted two extreme and opposite approaches - either negotiating in secret, creating suspicions of skulduggery, or going in with much fanfare, creating high expectations of peace, thereby putting pressure on themselves to deliver something anything.

b) There has been no evidence of well-prepared, professional negotiations, and knowledgeable, tough negotiators on the Sri Lankan side.

c) As a result of a) and b) above, we strike bad bargains, giving much, sometimes irreversibly, and getting nothing in return, because we do not instal safeguards in the event of default by the LTTE .

d) Consequently, when the LTTE defaults, they are left with our concessions and we are left with nothing.

e) Peacemakers are ignorant of such basic knowledge as the variety of fake "alternatives to Eelam". Consequently they sometimes appear to swallow them, and peddle to an equally ignorant public as concessions wrested from the LTTE! Among the aliases for Eelam are the Thimpu principles, "a settlement based on the principle of equality and dignity for the Tamils", the devolution package, and confederation. On closer examination, these sometimes harmless-sounding terms turn out to be Eelam in sheep's clothing. The peacemakers are invited to probe these terms for themselves, and ascertain what the LTTE means by them.

f) In the quest for peace, we have concentrated so heavily on appeasement that we have neglected national priorities such as sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the concerns of the majority. We do not seem to know what our own bottom line is. As a result the LTTE keeps making demand after demand in the knowledge that we tend to buckle under pressure.

g) In our naivete we imagine that the horde of nosey parkers who descend upon us with offers to mediate do so out of concern for Sri Lanka. Foreigners have their own designs - for example, the western powers would dearly love to destabilise India by encouraging devolution in Sri Lanka, which they know will lead to Eelam, which they reckon will lead to Tamil Nadu joining Eelam, which they believe will trigger the disintegration of India. Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese and the Tamils are mere pawns in this game.

The LTTE as negotiators

By contrast, the LTTE are superb negotiators. Their inflexible goal is an independent state of Eelam. When they choose to negotiate, it is to gain time to regroup, or to win some concession on the path to Eelam. They exploit to the hilt the foreign factor and our vacillation, lack of professionalism and simple-mindedness. Their tough, able negotiators can run rings round anyone not totally familiar with all the intricacies of the subject. Indeed, they have usually scored a sort of victory before negotiations even start, by holding fast until our governments back down in stages, from their original insistence on negotiating only if the LTTE will disarm and renounce its objective of Eelam, to a weak appeal that the LTTE must promise to disarm, to a final submission to the position that the LTTE will not accept any pre-conditions at all. The LTTE then succeed in imposing conditions of their own with its euphemistic terms such as "congenial environment" and "peaceful climate"!

There is an emerging trend in the international approach to peacemaking which countries facing secessionist groups need to wake up to, particularly where foreign mediators are involved. A typical scenario would be where Group X is fighting to secede from Country A. Peace talks takes place, with or without a foreign mediator. A deal is struck, the essence being that Country A confers more powers on Group X, in return for Group X disarming and renouncing claims to secede. County A and Group X agree to the deal - Country A reluctantly, because it doubts whether X's undertakings will be kept, Group X with utmost enthusiasm. Time passes. Group X drags its feet on disarming, then announces that it will not disarm unless Country A affords some other concession. Group X may also announce that its aim remains secession at some future date. Country A balks at this development and the peace process is stalled, with Group X having gained certain concessions which may be irreversible.

Elements of this scenario are familiar to us, but the sting is in the tail - in the emerging international and even national reaction to such a state of affairs. That reaction is not, as may be expected, to exert pressure on Group X as the violator of the agreement, but to pressurise Country A not to be a spoilsport! Never mind, they say, the peace process must go on ! Local peacemakers must be forewarned of this phenomenon.

Preparing for Talks

If peacemaking has to have any hope of success, the peacemakers must

I Correct all the shortcoming listed above;

II. Take note of the vested interests of foreigners in turning Sri Lanka's predicament to their own advantage; and

III. Beware of the strange tolerance of national and international communities to the violation of peace deals by secessionists.

If the peacemakers are prepared to spend the time and effort to equip themselves to negotiate with the LTTE on equal terms, the nation will applaud them. If they are not, and rush in with only their goodwill and sermons at their disposal, God help us all.

Wicked View

One hesitates to introduce a jarring note, but if there is a fourth fiasco, even the peacemakers may begin to wonder whether there may be something in the opinion expressed in an Indian newspaper which has no special axe to grind. Consider the Indian Express editorial of January 13, 1997, quoted in The Island of January 15, 1997:

"..there is no way in which Colombo can find a meeting ground with the Tigers. For a start, the LTTE rejects any solution which stops short of conceding an independent sovereign Eelam,. Second, ...democracy itself is anathema to the LTTE. Prabakaran has no time for the niceties of pluralism and dissent, the reason why more Tamils have been killed by the LTTE than by the Sri Lankan army. India... has now more or less conceded its inability to influence a fascist force which uses every truce to re-group and unleash a fresh bout of terroris. An enduring peace in Sri Lanka necessarily involves the destruction of the LTTE".

The choice, sadly, may not be between war and peace, but between destroying the LTTE and being destroyed by it.

BJP Government marks its first anniversary
Resilient Vajpayee wins round number one

by Dr.Stanley Kalpage
Only Congress governments have lasted an entire five-year term in India. Of six previous non-Congress coalitions only the government of Morarji Desai (1977-79) survived for more than one year. All others: those of V. P. Singh (1989-90), Chandra Shekhar (1990-91), A. B. Vajpayee (13 days in 1996), H. D. Dev Gowda (1996-1997), I. K. Gujral (1997), were dislodged within a year.

The same fate was predicted for the second Vajpayee government when it assumed office on 19 March 1998. One year later, although the parliamentary arithmetic has changed little, and the BJP coalition government has been beset with formidable problems, some of them self-inflicted, Prime Minister Vajpayee has steered his minority government with considerable skill in keeping together a fractious coalition and in keeping at bay a Congress (I), flexing its muscle but not quite sure of its own strength or when to strike.

A long wait on the road to power

The BJP had waited patiently in the political wings for many years before reaching the pinnacle of power. It had come a long way since 1984 when it scraped only two seats in the 545-member Lok Sabha. Its representation rose steadily to 88 in 1989, 119 in 1991 and 195 in May 1996.

When the Congress (I) withdrew its parliamentary support and toppled the United Front coalition of I. K. Gujral, it looked as if the BJP would romp home to a decisive victory with a clear majority. But Sonia Gandhi's belated entry into active politics galvanised the Congress rank and file and robbed the BJP of the outright victory that it had hoped for. In the event, the twelfth Lok Sabha elections produced another hung parliament.

The BJP and its allies won 252 seats (still short of an overall majority), the Congress (I) and its allies won 166, the United Front (including allied and regional parties 97), and independents 21.

Vajpayee's attempts to induce some of the other groups to join him did not succeed and he was forced to form a minority government and to rely on the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) abstaining on the vote of confidence in the Lok Sabha for his parliamentary survival.

Problems of being in power

The first year in office has not been easy for the BJP: managing a fractious coalition, reining in the more extreme groups in the BJP, facing the local and international fall-out from the nuclear test explosions, steadying an economy wobbled by US and EU sanctions and IMF reluctance to assist, problems with minority groups like the Christians in Gujerat and elsewhere, and most recently, the embarrassment of being forced to withdraw presidential rule in Bihar. All these have tried the Hindutva government and often brought it to the verge of collapse. The government has weathered many a storm but it has survived and shows no signs of leaving the scene early.

The crises affecting the government have usually whirled around controversial personalities like Home Minister, L. K. Advani or Defence Minister, George Fernandes. But invariably the deft interventions by a patient and imperturbable prime minister has saved the day. A less phlegmatic person would probably have wilted or eased himself out of the stormy weather.

One such storm developed in the large but poverty-stricken and least progressive state of Bihar, where violent feuding erupted over land between high-caste landowners and lower caste (Dalit) groups. The BJP-Samata Party-led government at the Centre decided to use Article 356 to dismiss the Babri Devi-led Rashtriya Janatha Dal (RJD) state government and impose President's rule. Thereafter, in the face of continuing massacres, Governor Sunder Singh Bhandari, a former BJP vice-president and veteran RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) leader, was embarrassed when he too found it difficult to prevent the "caste and class" massacres in central Bihar..

On 8 March, after a three-week long political drama, Union Home Minister L. K. Advani moved in the Lok Sabha to revoke the 18 February presidential decree dismissing the Babri-Devi government. This became necessary following the failure of the government to muster enough support in the Rajye Sabha to ratify the presidential proclamation made earlier, on the basis of a Cabinet Resolution.

The Congress (I) had previously denounced the Babri Devi government for its inability to maintain law and order in Bihar, saying that the latter "had no moral authority to rule". Later, the Congress (I) changed its stance and refused to support Vajpayee to get the imposition of President's Rule Resolution passed in the Rajye Sabha. The motives of the Congress were not clear. Was the Congress trying to detract from Vajpayee's successful bus ride to Pakistan?

Managing a fractious coalition

During the one year of its existence, managing a disparate coalition took much time and considerable effort. Coalition partner Jayalalitha threw tantrums from the beginning when she delayed sending President Narayanan a letter indicating her support for the BJP coalition. Soon afterwards, Jayalalitha was critical of the Cauvery river dispute award acceptable to both Karnataka and Tamil Nadu. Again, Trinamul Congress leader and stormy petrel Mamata Bannerjee had her own agenda for West Bengal, and George Fernandes, Samata Party leader, experienced, but unpredictable was "a potential unguided missile".

The BJP itself, steeped in ideology and often unable to understand the compulsions of the regional partners, had to be tamed so that the government it led would not be derailed. Quite early, the RSS, a close associate of the BJP, succeeded in keeping Jaswant Singh out of the governing team, but Vajpayee has more recently inducted the talented Singh as Minister of External Affairs. At the Bangalore. National Executive, Vajpayee finally extracted from a dejected BJP a commitment not to interfere in the final decisions of the government.

Generally, the prime minister would concede on details but rarely compromised on principles. For example, he refused to yield to Jayalalitha's demand for the dismissal of the DMK government in Tamil Nadu because he thought it was plain wrong.

The economy

On the economic front the BJP government has a mixed record. The Budget of 1998 was a disaster and showed the government to be inept and amateuriish. Due to the price of onions escalating beyond the reach of consumers the BJP was defeated resoundingly in state assembly elections in Rajasthan, Madya Pradesh and Delhi in November 1998.

The 1999 Budget is reported to be better. Yet one analyst has described finance Minister Yashwant Sinha's second budget as being "long on rhetoric but short on all other counts". Critics say that, on an overall view, the 1999-2000 budget will neither stimulate growth nor control inflation but will contribute to greater inequality. The finance minister has tried, they argue, to meet IMF-World Bank targets in respect of their holy cow, the fiscal deficit. Critics feel that present policies are importing crisis, instead of importing growth.

Bus to Wagah

During his first year in office, Vajpayee's "defining moment" was his bus journey from Amritsar to Wagah and thence to Lahore where he discussed with prime minister Nawaz Sharif the entire range of bilateral relations. In the resulting Lahore Declaration, the Joint Statement and the Memorandum of Understanding, the two prime ministers agreed to 'intensify their efforts to resolve all issues including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir. Moreover it was agreed that the two foreign ministers would meet periodically to discuss "all issues of mutual concern including nuclear-related issues".

The Pokhran nuclear test explosions

If the Lahore meeting on 20 February 1999, was a high water mark for the prime minister, he seemed to have made an error in judgement on the timing of, and in explaining the rationale for, the five underground nuclear tests at Pokhran on 11 and 13 May 1998. International reaction was generally adverse while the initial euphoria in India turned to misgivings about possible repercussions.

Two months earlier, on assuming office, the government had promised in its National Agenda for Governance that India's first ever Strategic Defence Review would be held and that the option to induct nuclear weapons would be taken after that. Vajpayee gave the impression that the BJP government had decided to keep the nuclear issue aside until a national consensus was reached.

The initial euphoria over the attainment of unofficial nuclear club status turned sour when it was realised that not only Pakistan but even China had been unwisely targeted and relations with India's giant neighbour nose-dived temporarily.

Prospects for the future

On the achievements of his government Vajpayee claims: "We have virtually restored peace in Jammu and Kashmir. Last year was almost free of communal clashes and the death toll the lowest in 10 years.... Agricultural growth was declining. We have nursed it back to health and given agriculture its due share. We have made the social sector our primary focus".

In making a virtue out of necessity, the unflappable Vajpayee argues: "We believe in democracy, both inside and outside the party, not in dynasty. In the National Agenda for Governance we pledged ourselves to governing by consensus as opposed to governance based on parliamentary arithmetic".

Though public opinion polls indicate that the BJP may not be re-elected in a mid-term poll, Atal Behari Vajpayee is still the most popular, charistmatic and articulate leader in India today. Asked by India Today magazine to identify his most difficult moment in the past year, Vajpayee retorted: "It's still to come".

Legal Watch
Human rights judgments - past and present

by Nayana
The promotion of two police officers by the Government of President J. R. Jayewardene immediately after the Supreme Court had found them guilty of violating the fundamental rights of citizens still tends to be viewed as one of the most cynical acts that ushered in the "dharmishta" society.

Whether due to amnesia or cynicism, the reported presence recently of the President on a political stage to welcome Nalin Thilaka Herath into the ranks of the People's Alliance was similarly unfortunate.

For Ms. Herath, Attorney-at-Law and former (UNP) Mayoress of Nuwara Eliya, is also a person found to have violated fundamental rights. The infringement took place in 1992 when she used the full weight of her mayoral office to seize 450 copies of the "Yukthiya" newspaper which had been sent to Nuwara Eliya for distribution.

Right to feedom of speech

Holding that the right to freedom of speech and expression of its editor and proprietor had been violated, the Supreme Court Bench comprising Justices Fernando, Dheeraratne and Wadugodapitiya declined to limit the award of compensation to the actual value of the seized newsprint and instead ordered the Mayoress to personally pay the petitioners Rs. 100,000 by way of compensation and Rs. 10,000 by way of costs.

This remains one of the largest reported damages awards against an individual in a fundamental rights case. Fernando J delivering judgment, set out the reasoning of the Court thus:

"It would not be right to assess compensation at a few thousand rupees simply because the newspaper was sold for seven rupees a copy; that would only be the pecuniary loss caused by the violation of the petitioners' rights of property under ordinary law. We are here concerned with a fundamental right which not only transcends property rights but which is guaranteed by the Constitution; and with an infringement which darkens the climate of freedom in which the peaceful clash of ideas and the exchange of information must take place in a democratic society. Compensation must therefore be measured by the yardstick of liberty, and not weighed in the scales of commerce."

Returning to the present, judgment was delivered last week in a case flowing from the 1997 local government elections. It was prefaced with an apology from the Court for the delay which was said to be due to the record getting misplaced.

This fundamental rights case was brought by Dr. Abaya Aryasinghe, who was described as the Secretary of the Sinhalaye Mahasammatha Bhoomiputhra Pakshaya which is a recognised political party. The respondents were the Returning Officer of the Mawanella Pradeshiya Sabha, Kegalle, the Commissioner of Elections and the Attorney General. The dispute involved the rejection of the nomination list of the party for the election.

It would appear that the petitioner in his capacity as Secretary had personally handed over the nomination list within the required time in keeping with the relevant provision of the Local Government Elections Ordinance. The Returning Officer had duly checked and satisfied himself of the petitioner's identity but had, for some unknown reason, returned the party's copy of the list to one Rohana Dharmapriya who had accompanied the petitioner and who had, when asked, described himself as the "kandayame nayaka". The nomination papers had been signed by the petitioner as Secretary.

There were no objections taken at the time but three days later the petitioner received a letter from the Returning Officer purporting to reject the nomination papers on the grounds that they had been presented by Dharmapriya who was not the party secretary as required by law.

The Court found that it was the first respondent and his staff who had acted wrongfully in apparently recording Dharmapriya as the person tendering the nomination papers, and also found it to be an arbitrary act given the fact that the first respondent must have known the correct facts, being the person who accepted the papers and even went to the trouble of checking the petitioner's identity.

The Court (Wadugodapitiya J with Fernando J and Weerasekera J in agreement) "having regard to the importance of the right to contest elections and the arbitrary manner in which that right was denied" awarded the petitioner Rs. 50,000 as compensation payable by the State and Rs. 5,000 personally payable by the first respondent.

Notable

This case was notable because it recorded an instance of non-compliance with the law by an election official without any of the threats or intimidation that have sometimes forced non- compliance with the provisions of election laws on poll days.

Fear that relevant officials will not be able to safeguard the rights of voters on polling day was the cause for two petitions by voters of the Western Province claiming an imminent infringement of their fundamental rights at the forthcoming Provincial Council elections.

The petitioners fears were based on the violence and malpractices which were reported to have taken place at the North-Western Provincial Council election last January.

However, with the next series of elections fixed for April 6, there seemed little point in taking the case to a full argument which would have resulted in a judgment of only academic value many months after the poll.

Hence the Court invited the petitioners' Counsel and the Attorney-General's representative to endeavour to reach some common ground on the measures that should be taken to ensure a free and fair poll. Additional Solicitor-General Marsoof who appeared stated that the events at Wayamba had been an "eye-opener" and produced a number of circulars issued by the Commissioner of Elections and the Inspector General of Police to their respective officers, which the Court directed him to file for the record.

Some of these circulars dealt with routine procedures such as the maintenance of special information books at every police station for the recording of election-related complaints.

Wayamba

However, as these were matters which had reportedly not been satisfactorily handled at Wayamba, the fact that these circulars now form part of the court record may have a salutary effect, besides making their contents accessible to interested candidates, party officials and members of the public.

Significantly, a number of circulars had been issued after the filing of the two petitions, and these dealt with such matters as directions to Senior Presiding Officers on how to deal with attempts at interference with ballot boxes, and an emphatic statement to SPOs, POs and election staff that they are responsible to the Commissioner of Elections and not to any political authorities.

The Court also recorded the concerns of the petitioners that matters relating to the safety of voters, polling agents and counting agents on their way to and from polling stations and counting centres had not been adequately covered in the circulars issued so far, and expressed confidence that the Commissioner and the Inspector-General will give these matters due consideration.

Ultimately a court cannot guarantee law and order at an election. That is the job of the law enforcement authorities, assisted, one would hope, by a co-operative attitude on the part of the participants and their leaders.

However the authorities will at least not be able to claim that they were taken by surprise. They have admitted the need to avoid a repeat of "Wayamba" and have stated that measures are being taken to counter the threat. The ball is in their court.

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