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Lions and Tigers

D. B. S. Jeyaraj examines the phases of a bestial war fought under the banners of beasts, and concludes that it will have to run its fearful and self-destructive course.

Himal, the South Asian news magazine has devoted much of its April issue to Sri Lanka. The cover story is titled "Sri Lanka: Unending war." We reproduce here a piece on Lions and Tigers by D.B.S. Jeyaraj whose byline will be familiar to readers of The Island.

Himal's editors have said that "the issue goes into the technical aspects of the Sri Lankan conflict. It seeks to cover the war as war, taking in military strengths, strategies, losses, gains and the receding chances for a negotiated settlement. Rather than take away from the ethnic and political origins of the strategy, we feel this will help in providing a better perspective on the horrors in Serendib."

In terms of proportion in the scales of death, destruction, displacement and despair, this has been one of the most intensely brutal conflicts of the century worldwide. But despite the enormous human suffering, the war in Sri Lanka grinds inexorably on, largely ignored by the international media, and with no settlement in sight.

Mythological history traces Sinhalese origins to Prince Vijaya who in turn is believed to have had a leonine ancestor. Sinhaya is the Sinhala word for "lion" and the Sinhalese themselves are called "People of the Lion" or the "Lion Race". The Sri Lankan national flag bears a sword-bearing lion, which is a replica of the one used by Kandy, the last Sinhalese kingdom to fall to the British colonialists. Attempts after Independence to adopt a non-racial flag instead of the one with Sinhalese lion was rejected but with a minor compromise-two ribbons were added to denote the country's Tamil and Muslim ethnicities. When Tamil nationalism reached warring proportions it had an appropriate counter symbol-the roaring tiger, which was used by the most martial Tamil dynasty in India, the Cholas. Today, the Sri Lankan army has regiments called Sinha, or lion, and its adversary, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE popularly known as Tamil Tigers, have leopards, panthers and cheetahs in their ranks.

Alien boundaries

The savage conflict in Sri Lanka has now become one of the longest-running armed combats in South Asia. The fighting that began in the early 1970s as a low-level insurgency waged by a handful of Tamil militants against the might of the Sinhalese-dominated state, has escalated over the years into a full-fledged fratricidal war between the Sinhalese majority (74 percent) and Tamil minority (18 percent) of this island nation.

In terms of proportion in the scales of death, destruction, displacement and despair, this has been one of the most intensely brutal conflicts of the century worldwide. But despite the enormous human suffering, the war in Sri Lanka grinds inexorably on, largely ignored by the international media, and with no settlement in sight.

"War is nothing but the continuation of politics by other means," wrote Clausewitz in his book on military theory. This seems more true in the case of the fighting in Sri Lanka, rooted as it is in complex reasons and factors of Sri Lanka's political history.

Sri Lanka's pre-colonial history is full of instances where Tamil kings of the Chera, Chola and Pandyan dynasties of South India conquered Sinhalese kingdoms. In many instances, Tamil kings also acted as kingmakers and Sinhalese rulers legitimised themselves by acquiring mahesis, or royal queens, from the South Indian aristocracy. Sinhalese kings sometimes also employed Tamil mercenary armies and captains, who in turn enjoyed influential positions at the court.

Through much of this historical period, power struggles between the powerful and those trying to achieve power could have been of little importance to ordinary people, although their existential plight could only have been worsened by these conflicts. Sri Lankan historians have yet to present a subaltern perspective to the past. The focus has been on the phases of intermittent conflict and virtually ignores the periods of tranquillity and amity. Thus we have a Sri Lankan history that is projected as Sinhalese history alone-a chronicle of a beleaguered people struggling to survive as an entity in the face of overwhelming odds.

This history is emphasised as a glorious past where the assertion of independence against alien hegemony is portrayed heroically. An illustrative example is that of the story of Duto Gemunu, the Sinhalese prince whose dethroning of the "just and prosperous" reign of the Tamil king Ellalan in Anuradhapura is accepted as the high water mark of Sinhalese history. In a well-known anecdote, Gemunu's mother Vihara Maha Devi asks the child Gemunu why he curled his legs instead of stretching them freely while lying on the bed, to which the son replies, "How can I do that when the sea is constricting us on one side and the Tamils on the other?"

The prevalent atavistic paranoia got further complicated with the advent of colonialism. The first colonial power, Portugal, arrived in 1505. At that time, there were at least three kingdoms on the island, one of which was in the Tamil north and which had evolved as a separate entity a few centuries earlier, encompassing what is now the Jaffna district and the upper portions of Mannar, Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu districts in the present-day Northern Province. This Shaivite kingdom's flag was that of the crouched bull, or Nandi, the vehicle of Lord Shiva.

After the Portuguese conquered Jaffna in 1619 and executed its king, they administered much of Jaffna separately as the Jaffna commandery. The Dutch, who took over in 1658, continued the practice. Finally, in 1796, came the British who, in 1815, defeated the last remaining kingdom in the island, the Sinhalese kingdom of Kandy and brought the island under a single unified administration in 1832. Colombo became the administrative, political and economic capital of the country.

In the run-up to independence, Sri Lanka, then still Ceylon, did not experience a mass struggle for freedom as in India. Sinhalese political leaders preferred a cooperative path through staggered constitutional reforms. The little militancy there was, came from the Jaffna Youth Congress with its slogan of Poorana Swaraj (Complete Self-Rule). This group launched several agitations, including a boycott of elections, demonstrations to protest the visit of the Prince of Wales, and the hoisting of the Nandi flag in place of the Union Jack. But the Tamils never demanded partition.

When Britain granted it full independence on 4 February 1948, Ceylon was a unitary state. But a truly national identity had not been forged. What followed thereafter was another, and a very tragic, example of post-colonial conflict among ethnicities compelled to coexist within boundaries of a modern nation state demarcated by their erstwhile rulers.

Sinhalisation

British rule was characterised by its familiar stratagem of divide and rule, separating politically what they united administratively. The principle of communal representation was introduced, a practice that aroused ethnic consciousness and prevented the evolution of an overarching national identity. There were other reasons too that drove the wedge deeper between the Sinhalese and Tamil communities.

Mission schools proliferated in the arid Jaffna peninsula and provided Tamils with better educational facilities. This helped the Tamils, aided perhaps by deliberate colonial policy, to dominate the professions and administrative services. Tamil entrepreneurs also began setting up commercial ventures in all parts of the island. All this led to increased Sinhalese rancour against Tamils.

There was also the matter of the Tamil presence on the island with the import of Tamil labour from South India to work the tea and rubber plantations established by the British. (One of the first acts of independent Ceylon was to deprive the "plantation Tamils" of their citizenship and franchise rights. Two pacts signed with India in 1964 and 1974 ensured the repatriation of nearly a million back to India. Today the Tamils of Indian origin constitute about six percent of the population, and together with the indigenous Sri Lankan Tamils, make a combined Tamil strength of 18 percent.)

The decades preceding Independence saw the first visible signs of ethnic discontent. There were politicians who took advantage of the majority Sinhalese resentment over the perceived dominance of the Tamils in the educational, professional, administrative and commercial spheres. The Sinhalese were stronger only in political terms due to their numerical superiority.

During the post-independence years, the empowered Sinhalese polity sought to remedy the situation by using its political clout. Tamils were rendered officially illiterate by the adoption of Sinhala as the sole official language of administration through the 'Sinhala Only' Act of 1956. From the late 1950s through the mid-1970s, most trading and manufacturing establishments were nationalised and converted into semi-government institutions. The British system of recruitment through open, competitive examinations was scrapped in the 1960s and instead, jobs were made available through political patronage. All these measures tended to reduce the dominance enjoyed by the Tamils in employment and commerce. The anti-Tamil card had become a political ace.

Further, the demographic patterns in Tamil areas were systematically altered by settling Sinhalese through state aided irrigation schemes. This practice, begun in the early fifties, continues still. Communal violence was unleashed on several occasions against unarmed Tamils by Sinhalese mobs, which at various times, was abetted unofficially by sections of the government. The proverbial straw that broke the camel's back and set Tamil youths onto the separatist path was the introduction in 1970 of a 'standardisation' scheme for higher education, whereby Tamil students were required to gain more marks than their Sinhalese counterparts for university admissions.

Bookworms to bombers

The Tamil road to secession has gone through different phases of attitudinal change. A people whose self-perception in the early part of the 20th century was that of being one of two equal nationalities on the island began to think later in terms of being the principal minority. After clamouring for balanced representation for the minorities vis-a-vis the Sinhalese majority in pre-independence times, the Tamils tried to accommodate themselves to new realities by adopting a policy of 'responsive cooperation' immediately after freedom and participated in government. But as a 'majoritarian democracy' continued to exercise state power in a manner that was clearly detrimental to Tamil interests, hopes of unity faded.

The Tamils who thought in terms of being an island-wide majority now thought of themselves as belonging to only the Tamil dominated Northern and Tamil-majority Eastern Provinces. The harsh reality of Tamils from the South compelled to seek refuge in these provinces after being threatened by physical violence further reinforced notions of their being a territorial minority. Thus began demands for a federal unit comprising the Tamil areas, which was rejected outright by the Sinhalese hierarchy. Finally, the Tamils demanded secession in the form of a socialist, sovereign, secular state of Tamil Eelam (Eelam was the ancient Tamil name for the island), comprising the Northern and Eastern Provinces.

The idea of separation gained further impetus after the 1977 parliamentary elections. Leading moderate Tamil parties had come together in 1976 under the umbrella Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) and asked the Tamils to vote for it in the parliamentary elections and sanction a mandate for Tamil Eelam. TULF garnered 81 percent of the Tamil and 57 percent of the total votes cast in the North and the East, winning 18 out of 19 Tamil majority seats. This result conferred upon the Tamil Eelam demand a public endorsement of sorts. Even while this was happening, however, the Tamil youth had already wrested the initiative to achieve a Tamil state-through armed struggle.

The militant views of the young Tamils were in marked contrast to the earlier moderate Tamil political leadership who were prepared for compromise. For instance, they formerly had been ready to accept limited devolution through district or regional councils instead of the full federalism which was their original demand. Their political strategy had been similar to that of the Indian National Congress' agitation/negotiation during the Indian freedom struggle. The Tamil leaders led civil disobedience campaigns while engaging in talks with Colombo governments. It was the failure of this Gandhian approach that led to the more extreme demand of secession.

Until the emergence of armed Tamil youths, it had been the Tamils who had been at the receiving end of violence, at the hands of Sinhalese mobs, the armed forces or both. There had been two types of political violence perpetuated against Tamils. The first was Sinhalese mob violence against unarmed ordinary Tamils living in areas of mixed ethnic composition. These were more like limited pogroms than spontaneous riots. The second was the deployment of the 'Sinhalese' armed forces and police in Tamil-speaking areas to suppress political protests.

Having been for decades at the receiving end of state-sponsored violence a deep sense of resentment and frustration had been instilled in the Tamil collective consciousness. It was felt that the community was being treated in this way because of its passive resistance. Thus, when armed struggle was taken up, there was a sense of redeemed self-respect and pride, and the young militants were called "our podial (boys)".

Few had expected Tamil youths, stereotyped till then as "bookworms" interested only in pursuing higher education, to launch an armed insurrection, let alone sustain it. The earliest acts of violence were not systematically organised and more in the nature of reflex reactions to perceived injustices of the Sri Lankan state. Much of it hinged around the promulgation of the new constitution of 1972, which enshrined the supremacy of Sinhala and Buddhism.

Cyanide guerrillas

The war that began in 1972 with a loose coalition of Tamil youth groups indulging in sporadic violence has now evolved into a full-scale conflict between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the state security forces.

According to an estimate by Asiaweek magazine, Sri Lanka currently has the 34th largest army in the world, with a strength of 122,000. (The rate of desertion is high- 24,000 at one point). This figure does not include the 17,000 navy and 15,000 air force personnel. In addition, there is a special task force of police commandos numbering around 10,000, which is separate from the regular police force of 50,000. There is an auxiliary civilian force, the Home Guards, deployed in Sinhalese and Muslim villages bordering Tamil areas, who total more than 15,000. There are also about 3000 Tamil para-military forces supporting the armed forces. These were once members of organisations fighting for Tamil separation but are now mortal enemies of the LTTE and on the side of the government.

Together, the array of forces facing the LTTE number around 200,000. The numerical strength of the LTTE is at best a tenth of that. A 1995 estimate put it at 23,000. Current figures are not available, but given the high rate of casualties as well as dwindling recruitment, a rough assessment would be 12,000-14,000 cadres. Of these, about 4000-5000 would be women.

The LTTE is organised on the lines of a conventional army. The ground forces include infantry divisions, brigades and battalions, although the numerical strength of the various units is less than generally found in a regular army, which is also the case with the Sri Lankan army. There is also an artillery brigade, and an armoured corps is being raised, both of which mainly use weapons and vehicles captured from government forces.

The LTTE is perhaps the only guerrilla force in the world to possess a naval arm-the "Sea Tigers", whose arsenal consists of a wide range of marine craft, including captured, purchased and self-assembled vessels. The LTTE also has a fleet of merchant ships under front companies which generally carry out legitimate international trade, but at times are used for arms and ammunition procurement. The Sea Tigers also has a "frogman" unit for undersea operational attacks.

In recent times there have also been reports of the LTTE having set up an air wing with at least two helicopters and two light aircraft, although these have not been used so far. The LTTE also has an anti-aircraft unit equipped with anti-aircraft guns as well as the deadlier surface-to-air missiles.

Then there are the two formidable units of the LTTE: the Leopards and the Panthers. The Leopards are the LTTE version of a rapid deployment commando unit, while the Panthers, or Black Tigers, are emotionally schooled and physically trained for suicide attack operations. The LTTE has developed kamikaze-type attacks to a very high degree of sophistication and calls its cadres embarking on suicide attack missions ayiraayutham, or "live weapon". The Leopard and Panther units operate both on land and sea, and membership consists of both sexes.

Embodying the LTTE cadres' resolve to sacrifice their lives for their cause is the potassium cyanide capsule they wear around their necks. LTTE fighters are expected to use it if and when captured. An LTTE commander once said: "We are the cyanide capsule guerrillas. No force on earth can defeat us when we have these."

For their part, Sri Lankan armed forces are also well equipped and adequately armed. Neither the former United National Party nor the present People's Alliance governments has hesitated to spare expenses and support on the military. Defence allocations, now amounting to nearly a quarter of the total national budget, have progressively increased over the years, and an impressive state-of-the-art arsenal, complete with armoured vehicles, ships, gunboats, bombers, helicopters, etc., have been put together over the years.

The overwhelmingly Sinhalese army is motivated by its dedication to preserve the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. Initially, there was much criticism of the government forces for their callous disregard for Tamil civilian lives and brutal reprisals. In recent times, however, the better-trained and -equipped army has acquired a much more positive image. Despite the high desertion rate and dwindling recruitment, the soldiers continue to display a high degree of morale and commitment in the field.

The LTTE's breaking-off of peace talks and resuming the current phase of the conflict, along with the terror tactics employed by them, has also helped the army take the moral high ground. There is an increasing feeling among soldiers that they are waging a just war. Equally encouraging for the military has been the fact that India has distanced itself from the Tamil cause and Western sympathies are clearly on the side of Colombo. (There is still a lot of sympathy for the overall Tamil plight, but international opinion remains hostile to the LTTE)

Army-militia-guerrilla-terrorist

The terrain of the North-East does not have the mountains and dense forests traditionally associated with classical guerrilla warfare, but the bush country of the North-East continues to be used successfully as a cover by the Tamil rebels. However, it is not only as a guerilla outfit that the LTTE operates. Like the Greek chimera that has a head of a lion, body of a goat and tail of a serpent, the LTTE possesses three combat characteristics. It is simultaneously a conventional army or militia, a guerrilla force, and a terrorist movement.

The LTTE fights like a conventional army when it holds and defends, or tries to capture territory. Adopting positional warfare is an attribute that makes it akin to an army or at least a militia. The Tigers are like a guerrilla force when they take on or ambush an army or police patrol. But when the LTTE explodes a powerful bomb resulting in loss of civilian life, or when it attempts to terrorise through civilian massacres or assassinations, it becomes classified as a terrorist outfit (and not only because the US designated the LTTE a "terrorist organisation" in 1997).

The ongoing war has not been one of a continuous unchanging conflict. It has gone through five distinct phases:

Pre-1983 preliminary conflict
1983-1987 Eelam War 1
1987-1990 Indo-Eelam war
1990-1995 Eelam War 11
1995-present Eelam War III

Pre-1983 phase: The beginnings of Tamil militancy was in the semi-urban Jaffna peninsula. This was initially of the urban guerrilla hit-and-run kind. The LTTE originated in this period as one of the many groups in operation. Beginning as the Tamil New Tigers, it restructured itself as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in 1976. The organisation then split into three factions in 1980: one became the People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE); another disintegrated over the years; and the third continues to flourish under the present chief Vellupillai Prabhakaran.

The militancy among the Tamils in this period met with a carrot-and-stick response from the state. Limited devolution in the form of district development councils were set up but were never allowed to function effectively. A draconian piece of legislation known as the Prevention of Terrorism Act was introduced and massive repression unleashed. A state of emergency was declared in Jaffna and army rule imposed. The military was given orders to "wipe out terrorism in all its forms" by the then president J.R. Jayewardene. Human rights violations were rampant. In 1981, the Jaffna Public Library was burnt down by the police, an act that enraged Tamil sentiments. Then, on 23 July 1983, an LTTE ambush that killed 13 Sinhalese soldiers near Jaffna University triggered off a nationwide carnage against unarmed Tamil civilians.

1983 to 1987: The 1983 anti-Tamil violence was a watershed in the history of the war. The embryonic armed Tamil militancy moved to a more advanced stage. Seething with anger, and hurt by the July events, now the overwhelming Tamil mood was for a separate state to be attained through armed struggle. Thousands of young men and women started flocking to the mushrooming militant movements (at one point there were 34 of them). The response of the state was again predictable. After passing a constitutional amendment outlawing separatism, the government of the day started beefing up its armed forces and geared to crush Tamil dissent militarily.

By then, India had entered the scene, having gained a locus stand) to get involved because of the influx of more than 230,000 Tamil refugees into its southern state of Tamil Nadu. When the Jayewardene government declined any direct talks with moderate Tamil leaders, India offered its 'good offices'. The chief consequence of India's new policy was the financing, arming and training of Tamil militant groups on Indian soil. Various organisations were allowed to open propaganda offices in Madras, the capital of Tamil Nadu. Delhi had its own agenda in promoting the Tamil cause, but it cannot be denied that there was genuine widespread concern and sympathy among the 55 million Tamils of India for the plight -of their ethnic brethren in Sri Lanka.

Militarily, this period saw almost all guerrilla attacks on the army resulting in retaliatory attacks on Tamil civilians. The BBC described the war at that time as a "series of massacres". However, by mid-1985, the various Tamil groups had succeeded in confining the army within its camps, and the peninsula assumed a semi-liberated nature. Then began a fratricidal power struggle between the Tamil groups, out of which Prabhakaran's LTTE emerged the lone star.

At the same time, the army's conduct of the war changed drastically. Gunboats began shelling coastal areas, and long-range artillery began firing into civilian areas. Aerial attacks and bombardments became common. In May 1987, in a bid to wrest back territorial control of Jaffna, the armed forces launched Operation Liberation in Vadamarachchi, the northern sector of the Jaffna peninsula.

The LTTE withdrew from the area and it was clear that it was going to lose control of Jaffna. Just then, the India factor loomed large. India sent a silent warning by way of airdropping food parcels over Jaffna on June after which the Sri Lankan forces stopped their advance.

Rapid political manoeuvres by President J. R. Jayewardene led to the signing of an accord with the late Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi. No Tamil organisation was a signatory to the pact, but India guaranteed its implementation on behalf of the Tamils. All attempts to get Prabhakaran into supporting the pact before signing failed. Rajiv Gandhi was later to describe the accord as a "marriage without the consent of the bride". The end of fighting marked the end of Eelam War I.

1987 to 1990: The accord and its aftermath saw the Sri Lankan forces ceasing operations, and the Indian army stationed in the North-East as the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF). Amnesty was granted to all Tamil guerrillas. A staggered surrender of arms was set in motion. The pact promised official language status to Tamil and devolution of power to Provincial Councils. The Northern and Eastern provinces were recognised as areas of "historic habitation" by the Tamils. The North and East were merged into a single province under one chief minister, subject to the provision that the merger had to be ratified subsequently in a referendum in the Eastern Province. An interim administrative council with a majority of LTTE nominees was appointed for the transition period.

The Indian-brokered peace was short-lived. Its end came with the arrest of 12 LTTE members, including some senior leaders, at sea by the Sri Lankan navy. When, in a clear violation of the accord, the government prepared to take them to Colombo for questioning, the 12 took cyanide and died. The fragile ceasefire broke, and a vengeful LTTE went on a killing spree. In the end, referee India got into the ring, and in a remarkable change of roles, India started fighting the LTTE.

A major five-pronged thrust was made into Jaffna city in the face of stiff resistance from the LTTE. A large number of Tamil civilians were killed through accident and/or design by the Indian forces. The LTTE later withdrew from the peninsula and established jungle bases in Wanni in the Northern mainland. In Jaffna, India propped up a puppet administration for the North-East through a fraudulent election.

Meanwhile, after a 12-year tenure, President Jayewardene retired and was succeeded by known Indophobe, Ranasinghe Premadasa. And, most unbelievable, Premadasa and the LTTE began talks. A ceasefire was signed obliging India to end direct operations against the LTTE. Premadasa also called for the withdrawal of the Indian army which New Delhi had to acquiesce to. A phased departure was announced by Rajiv Gandhi just before the 1989 Indian parliamentary elections. But, at the same time, Indian espionage agencies instigated the North-Eastern provincial administration into setting up a civilian volunteer force to double up as the Tamil National Army (TNA). It was aimed at creating a conflict situation so that the IPKF could stay on, but with clandestine support from the Sri Lankan government, the LTTE virtually annihilated the TNA.

With the coming to power of the VP Singh government in Delhi after the 1989 elections, the phased withdrawal of the IPKF was expedited. The Indo-Eelam or IPKF-LTTE war was over. The India-installed North-East chief minister, Annamalai Varadharaja Perumal, fled the country after unilaterally declaring Tamil Eelam. It was a foolish and empty gesture and only served as a pretext for Premadasa to dissolve the Council. The LTTE re-entered the North and East and began re-asserting its dominance over the Tamil areas.

1990 to 1995: Within three months of the last Indian soldier leaving the island, war broke out again, sparked off by a Sinhalese police assault on a Muslim tailor stitching uniforms for the LTTE in the eastern town of Batticaloa. Sri Lankan forces now concentrated on establishing control over the Eastern Province. The UNP government's strategy of controlling the East had a political objective. It wanted to undermine the demand of a North East merger in either a separate state of Eelam or a merged provincial council.

A bitter consequence of this move was the growth of Tamil-Muslim tensions aided and abetted by interested third parties, most significantly the Sinhalese state. The early weeks of the conflict saw Muslim home guards and Sinhalese soldiers engaging in massacres of Tamil civilians suspected of being pro-LTTE. The LTTE responded through horrible revenge massacres of Muslim civilians and the expulsion of about 50,000 Muslim civilians from the LTTE-controlled North.

In terms of military control, the eastern sector consisted of three zones. The first was the littoral area which was totally cleared of the LTTE. The second was the immediate hinterland where the army dominated by day and the Tigers moved about only on nocturnal excursions. The third was the remote forest hinterland. Here, the LTTE was strong, and though it could not take on the army directly, neither could the armed forces establish a permanent presence.

It was different in the North, where the LTTE ruled the roost. The greater part of the peninsula and the northern mainland, with the exception of offshore islands, remained in LTTE hands despite several attempts by the army to dislodge them. The LTTE set up a parallel civil administration within its territory. Structures such as a police force, law courts, postal services, banks, administrative offices, etc., were established. Even a television broadcasting station was set up. Sweeping changes were made in the educational system. The LTTE was also able to develop its military machine to a very great extent during this period. It was also during this time that the LTTE assassinated Rajiv Gandhi in Tamil Nadu (1991) and Premadasa in Colombo (in 1993).

Chandrika Kumaratunga, campaigning on a platform of peace, emerged triumphant in the November 1994 presidential elections. Earlier in August, her People's Alliance had also won the parliamentary elections. On 8 January 1995, Kumaratunga and Prabhakaran entered into a cessation-of-hostilities agreement. Thus ended the Eelam War II phase.

1995 to date: The brief respite from fighting lasted only a hundred days. During negotiations, the LTTE wanted day-to-day problems to be resolved before fundamental political problems were addressed. It had four demands. Two of those relating to the lifting of the economic embargo and the ban on fishing were accepted. Two others, of a military nature, including the demand for the removal of a camp and authority for eastern province cadres to carry arms in public, were not immediately accepted. Colombo requested some time to consider the demands. The LTTE lost patience. A fax was sent at 9:30 pm on 18 April 1995 stating that it was revoking the ceasefire. (See pages 30-32.) Three hours later, Tamil Tigers attacked Trincomalee harbour and destroyed two ships. This was the beginning of Eelam War III, so far the most brutal phase of the conflict.

After some initial setbacks, the government got its act together. In opposition to its previous strategy of concentrating on the East, Colombo decided to capture and consolidate the North. An elaborate operation codenamed "Riviresa" (Sunray) was conducted from 1 October 1995 to 27 May 1996, in three stages. After resisting fiercely during the first phase, the LTTE began withdrawing from the peninsula in what turned out to be a replay of its encounter with the IPKF. Colombo's writ began to run in Jaffna, in its control after nearly a decade.

The LTTE withdrew into the Wanni after trying to engineer an exodus of the people from their homes. The idea apparently was to create a 'floating state'. The move was only partially successful. Hundreds of thousands of people defied the LTTE and refused to vacate the peninsula. Others who left began trickling back.

The government subsequently launched another operation, Jaya Sikuru (Certain Victory), in the Wanni region. The avowed purpose was to establish a land route to Jaffna and curb LTTE activity. This time, the Tigers offered fierce resistance in the form of a counter-offensive named "Do or Die". Jaya Sikuru, which began in May 1997, was suspended at the end of 1998. During all this time, the army had not been able to go beyond Mankulam. Only 44 km of the 76 to the target destination had been covered, and the armed forces incurred tremendous losses. The inability to achieve its publicised goal was demoralising. The only compensation was that the operation's partial success helped to sever territorial contiguity between the North and East, thereby preventing a permanent merger of both provinces. On the other hand, the LTTE has gained the upper hand in the East because of the vacuum caused by re-deployment of security personnel to the northern front.

The LTTE does not have: territorial control over the Jaffna peninsula now, but its cadres have started infiltrating the area again. Their agenda seems to be that of conducting a lowkey campaign that would prevent normalcy. In recent times it has been systematically killing elected officials of local government body

Human shield

The long war, spanning close to three decades, has resulted in over 60,000 lives being lost so far, with more than half of them civilians. Some 55,000 have been maimed, 750,000 Tamils have fled the country, and nearly a million Lankans are internal displaced.

A tragic feature about this war has been its brutality and callous disregard for humane concerns. International monitoring agencies have observed the conspicuous absence of prisoner-taking by both sides, and of civilians being used as human shields. Another aspect has been the use of landmines, which has resulted in the major portion of casualties. Civilians, 40 per cent of them children, continue to be landmine victims in the cleared areas, but Sri Lanka has so far refused to sign the landmine ban treaty.

Although the war is supposedly waged on behalf of the people, neither the LTTE nor the Colombo government has ever given them much importance. Provoking attacks on civilians through agent provocateur tactics has been part of the LTTE game plan. The armed forces, meanwhile, are yet to display genuine concern for the Tamil civilian. Indiscriminate aerial bombing and artillery shelling take great tolls. There are the mass arrests, the detentions without trial, torture and 'disappearances'. There is also the deliberate deprivation of food and medicine to civilians living in LTTE-controlled areas, where malnutrition and disease are rampant.

Both sides have the capacity to prolong the conflict indefinitely, but complete victory by neither side is possible. A negotiated peace would be very desirable, but sadly there isn't any effective push, either nationally or internationally for peace. Without such initiatives, this bestial war fought under the banners of beasts will continue to run its fearful and self-destructive course.

Vajpayee's BJP-led coalition in trouble

by Dr. Stanley Kalpage
Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's first BJP government in May 1996 lasted only 13 days. His second government is already 13 months old. It seemed as though it would continue for some more months at least. Vajpayee is still the most popular leader in India today and most parliamentarians would not favour another general election so soon. But Ms Jayaram Jayalalitha thinks otherwise. And the former movie star-turned politician has decided to challenge the government of which her All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (AIADMK) is a vital component.

Jayalalitha controls 19 seats in the Lok Sabha (18 from her AIADMK and one seat held by her ally, the maverick leader of the Janata Party, Dr. Subramaniam Swamy). From the outset, Jayalalitha has been conscious of her importance to the BJP government. It was generally believed that the volatile Tamil Nadu politician was more concerned in paying off political grudges against her bete noir, the Tamil Nadu chief minister, Muthuvel Karunanidhi, and in having the several court cases instituted against her for corruption withdrawn.

To this end she brought argument and pressure to bear on the Vajpayee government. But nothing seemed to work to her satisfaction. That was until the Union Minister of Defence, George Fernandes, sacked India's naval chief, Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat, on 30 December 1998 for his "defiance of established cabinet control on armed forces". Fernandes later suggested that Bhagwat "deserved to be court-martialled for leaking cabinet secrets." Bhagwat has in turn accused Fernandes of "corruption in defence deals".

Jayalalitha's demands

Jayalalitha seized the opportunity and intervened to demand the reinstatement of Vishnu Bhagwat, a Joint Parliamentary Committee to investigate Bhagwat's removal, and the dismissal of George Fernandes from the cabinet. When the prime minister refused to give into these demands, Jayalalitha decided to withdraw her support to the government. Accordingly, her two ministers in the government, M. Thambidurai, Minister of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, and Mr. M. R. Janarthanam, Minister of State for Personnel, resigned their portfolios.

According to political sources, in addition to the demands widely reported officially, Jayalalitha had personally presented to the prime minister a long wish-list and then, without waiting for the prime minister's response, had started attacking the Bharatiya Janata Party.

Vajpayee's response

Vajpayee decided to play it cool. He ruled out any reconciliation with the AIADMK in the wake of its decision to pull out its nominees from the ministries. He insisted that he would survive the crisis and would "sail through the confidence vote if the AIADMK withdrew their support." He asked the Opposition to play a "constructive role" for survival of parliamentary democracy in the country.

The Prime Minister expressed the view that in coalition politics the individual (party) interests had to be "sacrificed" to serve the larger national interest. He relied for his survival on the improved relations with Pakistan, the major achievements of the government and the new agricultural policies, including crop insurance, which would benefit the farmers and consumers.

The government is wooing other groups, reportedly non-committal at present, to offset the loss of Jayalalitha's support. It is seeking to use the good offices of Telugu Desam Party leader N Chandrababu Naidu to intercede with some of latter's erstwhile United Front (UF) associates. In Jammu, National Conference president Farooq Abdullah says his party, with four Lok Sabha members, is keeping its options open. Approaches are also being made to Kanshi Ram's Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), with 5 seats, and Om Prakash Chautala's Indian National Lok Dal (INLD), with 4 seats.

The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and Tamil Manila Congress (TMC), with six and three Lok Sabha seats respectively, are being approached for support in the event of a motion of confidence. Both these regional parties in Tamil Nadu were associated with United Front governments and would hesitate to support the Congress(I), especially if Jayalalitha's AIADMK backs the Congress.

Congress(I)

If the BJP-led coalition is defeated when the Lok Sabha meets on 15 April, the Congress(I) as the second largest group will probably be asked to form a government. Sonia Gandhi has indicated that she is not in a hurry to seize power by destabilising the BJP but that she was not averse to accepting constitutional responsibilities if called upon to do so. She has appointed a group of six senior advisers as a think tank to discuss the modalities of government formation should this become necessary.

The "secular" forces are in favour of supporting the Congress(I). Prominent among these are the leaders of the Rashtriya Loktantric Morcha (RLM) - with 38 members in the Lok Sabha - comprising the Samajwadi Party, the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), and the Rashtriya Janata Party (RJP), who are urging their allies to sink their differences "to rid the country of the curse of BJP rule". Others so inclined are the members of the Left Front, including the communist parties, the CPI and the CPI (M). Active in the anti-BJP movement are the AIADMK and its ally, Dr Subramaniam Swamy.

The difficulty, however, is not in causing the downfall of the BJP but in deciding what happens next and who will lead a new coalition. Moves and counter moves are gaining momentum.

The United Front

The RLM which includes breakaway groups from the former United Front, was united on rallying behind the Congress to force the government out. Regarding the more thorny issue as to who should lead the alternative government, the RLM opted to defer its consideration for the time being. It preferred to keep its options open.

In contrast to the RLM's muted response in respect of the Congress, the Left Front (LF) itself seemed to be a divided house on the question of supporting a Congress-led alternative. Two LF constituents, the Revolutionary Socialist Party and the Forward Bloc, are firm on maintaining "equidistance" from the BJP and the Congress alike. In other words, they would want to oppose both main parties.

This line is in sharp contrast to the position adopted by the two dominant Left parties, the Communist Party of India (CPI) and the Communist Party of India (Marxist) [CPI(M)], who advocate extending issue-based support from outside to a Congress-led government.

The economic fallout

The economic consequences of Jayalalitha's destabilisation move would be more damaging than the political fallout. Stock markets have fallen and look like beginning a steady slide. The fate of Yashwant Sinha's widely welcomed budget hangs in the balance. Political uncertainty will scare away foreign investors as they are likely to worry more about the future of economic reforms than about the fate of the government.

One year of the BJP-led government had raised hopes that economic reforms can go on despite political changes and internal conflicts. Without a strong and stable government, the progress of reforms will be halting and uneven. As a result, foreign as well as domestic investors will hesitate to undertake new investments. The government, which is already expecting a substantial revenue deficit, will now receive even less revenue than anticipated because of low tax compliance.

The fate of the important telecom sector reforms remains clouded. Several desirable changes introduced in the new telecom policy may not be in place. Similarly, any further delay in implementing the recommendations of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on insurance reforms will entail a huge economic cost. The opening up of the insurance sector may be delayed and the long-due infrastructural investments postponed..

Increasing political uncertainty is likely to impact on consumer expectations. The possible fall in levels of consumption, will stagger the revival of consumer goods industries and will lead to the further slackening of industrial demand. Political instability often leads to deteriorating law and order situation and curtailment of production and is often accompanied by inflation. The current low rate of inflation has raised hopes of lower interest rates, vital for kick-starting the economy but the crisis at the Centre will force the Reserve Bank of India to resort to tightening of credit and checking inflation both of which will further affect revival prospects.

India's next prime minister

Vajpayee was India's fourth prime minister in three years. Much speculation exists as to who would be the fifth. Prime ministerial aspirants are as numerous as the number of political groupings anxious to bring about the downfall of the BJP government. The Congress (I) is not likely to forego its claims to the coveted position. However, Sonia Gandhi appears reluctent to head a government without an electoral mandate. In that event she may nominate one of her senior party colleagues like Manmohan Singh to head a coalition in the present parliament.

The RLM leaders, Mulayam Yadav and Laloo Prasad Yadav, have their own ambitions. The reluctant CPI (M) leader, Jyoti Basu, may find himself elevated to the top position and, unlike on a previous occasion, his party may not be averse to his accepting the responsibility. And there is H.D. Dev Gowda, who would always be on hand to help.

The strangest rumour though is that Jayalalitha herself has ambitions. Her political ally, Subramaniam Swamy has been mentioning her interest in becoming prime minister of India to some of the groups that he has approached to defeat Atal Behari Vajpayee. Jyoti Basu's retort was: "What? A prime minister with 19 MPs ?" In the present state of flux and uncertainty, and before the voters give another verdict, strange things can happen on the political scene in India.

L E G A L W A T C H
Electoral law reform: Keeping sight of the principles

by Nayana
There have been calls from many quarters, including the Commissioner of Elections, for changes in the laws governing the conduct of elections. However, not all these calls have focused on the same issues.

The principal request of the Commissioner was to amend the law to allow for a repoll in areas where conditions had not permitted a free and fair poll. At present, the law only allows the Commissioner to cancel the poll in such areas and declare the District result without those votes. While this allows for the elimination of rigged votes, it also effectively disenfranchises the legitimate voters of the area. Only the right to order a repoll would rectify this anomaly.

The Government in its draft new constitution has left the area of election law virtually untouched, except to make provision for the Commissioner of Elections to be appointed by the proposed "Constitutional Council" - an apex body which is to oversee various public appointments such as those of the Attorney-General, the Heads of the Armed Forces and Police and the members of the Public Service Commission.

Since the Supreme Court has subsequently affirmed that the Commissioner of Elections even under the present Constitution, is not only empowered to act independently but duty bound to do so, the relevance of the Constitutional Council in this area may not be as important as it first seemed.

The far more important question is whether the Government will be willing to consider electoral law reform independently, or whether it will insist on tying everything to the "package" which effectively means consigning it to limbo for the time being.

Nevertheless the proposed Constitutional Council requires some scrutiny, as this is an idea that has caught the imagination of others outside the Government as well. The Government's proposal, as last published, was for the Council to comprise the Speaker, the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, the Chairman of the (Provincial) Chief Ministers' Conference, seven Members of Parliament reflecting different ethnic and interest groups, and two retired Judges of the Supreme Court or Court of Appeal to be nominated by the Speaker.

As pointed out in this column at the time, this arrangement could in fact leave the Leader of the Opposition in a minority of one. His or her presence on the Council will merely give a veneer of bipartisanship to what will in fact be a Government controlled decision.

Without intending any disrespect to any individual, we must also repeat that there is nothing sacrosanct about retired judges. The institutional independence of the judiciary springs from the security of tenure and other safeguards that surround serving judges. The post-retirement appointments of judges to State office (prohibited in many countries) is entirely at the discretion of the Government of the day. It will be noted that the choice of retired judges for the Constitutional Council will lie in the hands of the Speaker who, in our Parliament, usually belongs to the ruling party.

The Constitutional Council, in a modified form, was also recommended by the "Citizens Consultation on Free and Fair Elections and Depoliticization of Key Institutions" -which was convened on an initiative of the United National Party, although it comprised professionals and retired public servants who were not necessarily members of that party.

According to their recommendations, the Constitutional Council would appoint, among other officials, the members of a "National Elections Commission" comprising a Chief Elections Commissioner and two Elections Commissioners, which would replace the present day office of Commissioner of Elections. This is similar to the Indian model and is also similar to the five-member Election Commission recommended by the UNP in its own proposals to the Parliamentary Select Committee. Significantly, however, the UNP had not asked for a Constitutional Council but had merely recommended that appointments to the Elections Commission should be by the Head of Government with the concurrence of the Leader of the Opposition.

The Constitutional Council as proposed in the Report of the Citizens Consultation is to have a similar membership to that proposed by the Government, save that the number of MPs is reduced from seven to five and there shall be an additional five persons from outside Parliament who "have rendered distinguished public service or are persons of eminence in professional, commercial, industrial or agricultural life and who do not hold any political office".

The distinguished persons who drew up this Report were no doubt trying in good faith to grapple with the problem of widespread politicization of public institutions that has become a feature of modern Sri Lanka. However, they may inadvertently have produced a cure that is worse than the disease. Apart from the potential lack of impartiality that was already evident in the multi-member Council proposed by the Government, the Citizens' Report proposes to bring in persons who hold neither elected nor judicial office and give them a say in making appointments to the highest public posts in the land.

In doing so, they have lost sight of the principle of accountability which is an essential requirement of a functioning democracy if the words "sovereignty of the people" is to have any meaning.

In all countries which recognize the need for the independence of judicial and public officers, there nevertheless has to be some authority with the ultimate power of appointment and dismissal of such officers. Most democratic countries in their wisdom have left this power to their elected legislators, because they in turn are accountable to the people - the ultimate "sovereign". The professionals, retired judges and retired public servants on the proposed Constitutional Council, however distinguished, will be accountable to no one.

Of course the irony is that the type of distinguished persons referred to in the Report of the Citizens Consultation are the very people who should be entering the legislature and contributing to the governance of this country. Unfortunately, with a few notable exceptions, such persons today would not touch electoral politics even with the proverbial barge pole.

The remedy, however, is not to sacrifice the principles of democracy and accountability, but to clean up our political act so that the right type of people will be willing to participate in it. For this, what is required in the context of electoral reform is not top-heavy structures which make decision-making more complex and less accountable, but direct practical measures to make the electoral process free, fair, peaceful and financially manageable.

Meanwhile, as a simple and constitutionally sound alternative to the Constitutional Council for taking politics out of the appointing process, one can suggest a rule that appointments to specified public posts be made by the government with the consent of all the political parties represented in Parliament. This is the process followed by parliaments in the Scandinavian countries in the appointment of their Ombudsmen and has helped to ensure the high stature of that office.

Outcome of the latest PC polls
Can the UNP win... and will it?

by Dayan Jayatilleke and Tisaranee Gunasekera
The most significant point about the recent Provincial Council polls is that it was an election without any real winners. It has both resulted in as well as reflected a ' hurting stalemate' in real terms between the two main contenders. It is however, a stalemate in which the PA still (and regrettably) has an edge.

The PA came first in all five councils - as the regime's propagandists have been trumpeting ad nauseam. But a closer look at the electoral statistics clearly demonstrate that this was something of a Pyrrhic victory. The PA's average vote has decreased by 3% between the 1994 General election and 1999 and by 0.6% between the 1997 Local Government election and 1999. The number of votes it obtained has also decreased drastically - by 524,670 between 1994 and 1999 and by 259,551 between 1997 and 1999, despite the natural increase in the number of registered votes.

The UNP's tragedy is that this was an election the party should and could have won with considerable ease - but didn't.

After nearly 5 years in opposition and despite the manifest and well deserved popular dissatisfaction with the regime, the UNP has once again failed to come close to (let alone better) its performance at the 1994 Parliamentary election - both in terms of the average vote and the total number of votes. The UNP's average vote decreased by 4.5% between 1994 and 1999; so did its total number of votes - by 473,085. Between 1997 and 1999, the UNP's average vote increased by a minuscule 0.59%; however its total number of votes actually decreased by 105,846.

This is indeed a unique situation. Shockingly so. Both the PA and the UNP are more unpopular today than they were in 1994. And between 1997 and today both the PA and the UNP have been unable to attract a single vote more. In fact both parties have repelled voters. We therefore have an unpopular government and an Opposition which lacks the ability to benefit from that unpopularity. A government which wins only by default; and an opposition whose defeat is self-inflicted.

Opposition Strategy

The results clearly prove the fallacy of the belief that any increase in the government's unpopularity will automatically work in favour of the UNP. For the last four years the UNP leadership followed a policy of minimal effort, energy expenditure and outreach to the masses (specially the poorer youth) in the belief that all it has to do is to wait for the government to defeat itself. And unfortunately for the UNP it looks as though its leadership will continue to cling to this mistaken notion of a party and campaign operating on 'auto-pilot', despite the disappointments it suffered at the recent elections. In fact it looks as if the UNP leadership believes that the results are actually a 'victory in disguise' for the UNP! Indeed if the UNP does not get its act together - and fast - all it can look forward to is a series of victories of the same thickly disguised nature.

This becomes clear when scenarios are constructed and statistical projections are made, based on the current electoral figures. Between April 1997 and April 1999, during a period of two years, the PA's average vote decreased by 0.6%; and the UNP's average vote increased by 0.59% during this same period. The Parliamentary and Presidential elections have to be held by mid/late 2000 - i.e. in less than two years. Therefore if we project the current figures forward, the PA will get 46.37% of the vote while the UNP will get 43.14%. This means that in these five provinces the UNP will still lose by a margin of 3.2%. If the Presidential/Parliamentary elections are held early, the outcome is likely be slightly more unfavourable to the UNP, not the PA. Therefore the UNP cannot and should not continue as before and expect to win. It will be able to achieve victory only if it can gather all its forces and take a leap forward.

There are two equally important pre-conditions for the victory of any opposition party. One is the unpopularity of the incumbent regime and the other is its own politico-organisational ability to fill the vacuum created by that unpopularity. Both are necessary pre-conditions and neither on its own is sufficient. The PA is certainly doing its best to ensure an Opposition victory with its unpopular policies and povertising socio-economic performance. Unfortunately the UNP is not doing what it has to do - which includes saying what it has to say, with credibility - to defeat the PA. The Party's organisation is in tatters; in the last five years it has failed to come up with a single attractive slogan.

It has no known policy platform. Its leader is unimpressive and communicates poorly, be it on the public platform or on T.V. - demonstrating neither substance nor style. Its campaigns lack verve and momentum. To cap it all, it actually boasts of its determination not to make a single promise to the electorate.

Obviously the UNP has forgotten its own history. During the 70's the UNP's opponent was a government which was ruining the economy and the living standards of the people at a rate unprecedented in the post 1948 history of Sri Lanka. If the UNP could ever have had victory on a platter, it would have happened during that time. Yet the UNP under JR Jayewardene left nothing to chance, on any front. Instead of waiting for the detested government to defeat itself, the UNP worked tirelessly to ensure the defeat of the regime. As the biography of JR Jayewardene states: "Throughout 1975 JR had kept his party machinery ready for immediate action in case the government called or was compelled to call a general election... Even after this date had passed the UNP electoral machinery was kept on the alert. It was used with great effect whenever a by-election was called. Candidates had been chosen for each parliamentary constituency; district coordinators, generally senior parliamentarians had been picked and committees of the party had been selected to provide candidates with legal advice, propaganda material and where and when necessary with money to sustain their local campaigns and campaign workers". (J. R. Jayewardene of Sri Lanka. A Political Biography Vol. II. K. M. de Silva and Howard Wriggins).

It must be emphasised that this was at a time when the economy was stagnant, unemployment was sky high, queues and shortages had become the norm, the death rate had increased due to hunger and malnutrition and a relatively bloodless youth insurrection had been suppressed with enormous bloodshed and ruthlessness. However complacency and slow pace were not things the UNP leadership of that time indulged in. "Those who worked with JR at this time speak of his deep anxiety bordering sometimes on desperation" (Ibid.). Being an astute leader Jayewardene neither overestimated his chances of victory nor underestimated his opponent. "Not for a moment did JR underestimate the SLFP's electoral appeal and Mrs. Bandaranaike's... Lalith Athulathmudali... recalled how JR had responded when he heard them make their calculations in 1975, electoral by electorate, a win here, a loss there. Let us be done with these calculations, he asserted, let us prepare ourselves instead for something better, a landslide win " (Ibid.) Everything Jayewardene did, from his promise to the electorate to end the era of queues and shortages to his choice of Ranasinghe Premadasa as the Deputy Leader, was aimed at achieving this one aim.

The behaviour of the UNP leadership today is reminiscent not of the conduct of the UNP leadership in the 1973-77 period but that of the SLFP leadership during a large part of its 17 year long stint in the opposition. Unlike the leadership of JR Jayewardene from 1973 to 1977 and much like the leadership of Mrs. Bandaranaike from 1977 to 1993, the UNP leadership of today is engaging in self-delusionary antics, seeing defeat as victory and setback as advance. In fact, going by what some of its spin doctors say, the party leadership seems to think that the UNP losing all five councils is... a jolly good thing!

Going by the damnage done by the PA to the country, the economy and the living standards of the people in four and a half years, a PA victory at the upcoming national elections is clearly undesirable. It may even prove catastrophic. But if the UNP does not change its attitude and approach it will fail to defeat the PA, despite the regime's massive loss of popularity. That failure may be a narrow one, but never was the saying " a miss is as good as a mile" truer than in the realm of electoral politics. And will the UNP survive a second - this time avoidable - national level defeat intact, as a single party? Furthermore, what would be the impact on the democratic system as a whole, if the UNP succeeds in snatching defeat from the jaws of victory? A third insurgency?

The week that was
Hectic manoeuvres to set up Central Province administration

by Shan Wijetunga
Several United National Party MPs led by A. C. S. Hameed and Tissa Attanayake tried to canvass the support of the National Union of Workers organised by Minister Saumyamoorthy Thondaman to form a coalition with the United National Party and form the government in the Central Provincial Council.

Tissa Attanayake contacted his party leader Ranil Wickremesinghe and informed him of their proposal to coalesce with the National Union of Workers to form the Central Provincial Council government. Ranil rejected the proposal as not workable.

Hameed's attempt to influence his leader on this matter too failed. M.P. Abdul Cader who is presently in remand too contacted Wickremesinghe proposal.

Subsequently the UNP leader contacted Karu Jayasuriya, Chairman UNP and Gamini Athukorale, Secretary General on the subjects. They decided against coalitions.

Meanwhile, Minister Thondaman met his councillors at the CWC headquarters, in Kollupitiya and decided to support any party that favoured granting citizenship rights to those estate workers of Indian origin, or else remain as independent members.

Nandimithra Ekanayake, the government nominee for the Chief Ministerial post in the Central Provincial Council perturbed over the decision of the National Union of Workers urged several ministers to persuade Thondaman to support the government party.

Among the ministers discussing the issue with Thondaman was Minister S. B. Dissanayake who had so far had several rounds of discussions with Thondaman and his party.

Cabinet meeting

The usual Wednesday Cabinet meeting was held on Friday this week due to provincial elections being held on Tuesday.

All the Cabinet ministers were present at the Temple Trees meeting to know the President's views regarding the Western, Central and Sabaragamuwa PCs where the PA held the majority of seats.

The President was unable to attend the Cabinet meeting as she had to leave on a holiday with her family to Nuwara Eliya.

The security had advised her to emplane to Nuwara Eliya before dusk.

MEP discussion

The Mahajana Eksath Peramuna members after several rounds of discussions regarding supporting of other parties in forming governments in provincial councils finally agreed to keep faith with those who had voted for the MEP by remaining independent.

When Susil Premjayanth, the People's Alliance Chief Minister - designate for the Western Provincial Council last Monday morning contacted Bandula Gunawardena regarding his party's support to form the Western Provincial Council, Gunawardena had informed Premjayanth the decision of the party was to remain independent, but they would take no action to disrupt the administration of the provincial council.

When Premjayanth contacted Wimal Weerawansa of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, he was told virtually the same thing.

In addition, Weerawansa informed Premjayanth that his party would be tabling several proposals as policy declarations to the Western Provincial Council. If their proposals were not considered the party would protest against the policy declarations.

Premjayanth informed Weerawansa if the proposals were given to him early, due consideration could be given.

The election fever is gradually focussing on the Southern province. Though a date for the election has not yet been fixed nominations would be received within the next two weeks.

The total number of seats in the Southern Provincial Council, other than the two bonus seats is 53.

According to political analysts, the fate of the Southern Provincial Council would be the same as that of the Western Provincial Council.

Two reasons they attribute for this condition are the gradual increase in the popularity of the JVP and the proportional decrease in the People's Alliance votes.

The UNP and the PA therefore would have to field a list of candidates who could counter the rising popularity of the JVP.

Power in the Southern Provincial Council was held by the People's Alliance and its Chief Minister was Mahinda Yapa Abeywardena. He believes the president would name him the chief ministerial contestant of the PA this time, too.

Meanwhile government party members consider the most suitable candidate for the Chief Ministerial post is Dallas Alahapperuma with his experience as a minister and the Chief Minister of Southern Provincial Council once before.

He is also considered a person with considerable influence to counter the JVP's popularity.

Mulberry Group

Last Friday when the Mulberry Group members in the government canvassed support for Dallas Alahapperuma to be Chief PA Ministerial candidate in the Southern Provincial elections he protested against such a move.

Meanwhile M.P. Chamal Rajapakse is also proposed as a Chief Ministerial candidate for Southern Provincial Elections. He supported by his minister brother, Mahinda Rajapakse along with certain other ministers. As Chamal Rajapakse, though a very senior parliamentarian without so far not holding a portfolio.

President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga who is still holidaying in Nuwara Eliya will ultimately decide on the PA's chief ministerial candidate for the Southern Provincial Council.

Meanwhile, UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe is determined to win the Southern Provincial Council election because of his party loss of the former five provincial council elections.

Mr. Wickremesinghe summoned all his party MPs in the south to his office at Cambridge Place last Thursday, for a discussion.

Accordingly Ronnie de Mel, Ananda Kularatne, Mervyn Silva, Lakshman Yapa Abeywardena, Vajira Abeywardena, Sarath Gunawardena, Upali Amarasiri, Rupa Karunatilake and H. R. Wimalasiri were present at Cambridge Place.

The UNP leader was associated with Karu Jayasuriya, chairman of the party and Gamini Athukorale, Secretary General at this discussion.

After lengthy discussions it was decided to select the party's candidates at the interview, in addition to nominating members already in the Southern Provincial Council.

After the meeting was over Mr. Wickremesinghe informed Lakshman Yapa that he wished to nominate him as the chief ministerial candidate of the party for Southern Provincial elections. But Mr. Yapa declined the offer excusing himself on personal grounds. When Mr. Wickremesinghe persisted with his request Mr. Yapa said he would give a reply later.

UNP Parliamentary Group meeting

The UNP Parliamentary Group met last Friday at the Parliamentary Conference hall.

After listing members who should speak on the Emergency Law debate in the parliament that day, Gamini Athukorale, Secretary General of the party informed that the party's May Day rally would be held in the Galle Town targetting the Southern Provincial elections.

After Gamini Athukorale, Mr. Ranil Wickremesinghe clarified election propaganda matters in connection with the forthcoming Southern Provincial Council elections.

He also spoke of the election malpractices experienced during the last five provincial council elections.

The UNP leader further stated that he intended finding action in courts regarding election malpractices and discrepancies and wanted particulars of such discrepancies within two or three days as election petitions have to be filed within 20 days of declaration of the election results and action against violation of human rights within 30 days of declaration of results.

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