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Sri Lanka gets new Super-Dvora, but Tiger supply line still not cut

By our Defence Correspondent
A brand new Super Dvora type fast attack craft (small gunboat) arrived in Colombo this week from Israel, the latest boost to the armed forces’ urgent need to seal off the LTTE’s coastal supply lines, as the war on land continues to drag on with no end in sight.

Meanwhile, fierce fighting raged in the southwestern side of the Wanni, where troops attempting to advance further into LTTE territory encountered fierce resistance from the Tigers. Four days of fighting saw 22 soldiers killed, with the army claiming to have killed nearly sixty Tigers.

Unfortunately, in the teeth of such fierce resistance, the going has been slow for the soldiers, as the Tigers are not giving up ground easily. The area immediately north of Periyamadhu is still not secure.

The army is hampered by the fact that the LTTE is well aware that the strategy is now to advance in the Madhu area, after operations in all other parts of the Wanni, namely the Jaffna-Kandy main highway, and the Mankulam-Mullaitivu road, fizzled out over the last two years.

The LTTE has had time to prepare its defensive tactics, and going forward has been quite tough in the wild jungle areas of the western Wanni, where the roads have always been merely dirt tracks.

In addition, the army is hampered by the need to control all of the huge area that the government has recaptured in the north, and is very thinly strung in many areas, which means that the shortage of troops is still the major factor in the war.

The end of May marks three years since the army began operations in the Wanni, with the entire Jaffna Peninsula having been secured in May of 1996. What has been clear is that the army is sorely lacking in the resources and manpower it needs to capture and hold on to vast stretches of wild areas, and although a lot of land has been brought under government control.

With a land victory obviously little more than a pipedream in the foreseeable future, it is clear that the armed forces need to concentrate more resources and planning on cutting off the LTTE’s supply lines. After all, without weapons and ammunition, the Tigers can’t run an armed campaign. Looting army camps is always a tactic, of course, but it involves huge battles with the army; battles which inflict heavy casualties that the LTTE cannot afford any more.

Meanwhile the debate over whether or not to reopen negotiations with the LTTE raged this week, with newspapers quoting some of the Mahanayakes on the subject, and those venerable priests then saying they were totally misquoted.

A radical group added fuel to the fire by staging public demonstrations against peace talks, and demanding that there be a military end to the war.

However, President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga and her government seem to be totally disinterested in how the war is going, since they are too busy campaigning for yet another election, this one in the Southern Province.

Once this election ends, it is quite apparent that the two main political parties, as well as the JVP, SLMC, CWC, and others, will switch to the task of preparing for next year’s general elections and presidential election. Thus it is quite clear that the armed forces are being left to their own devices in running the war.

With land resources being inadequate, it is time that the forces spend more time and energy on blocking the Tigers’ supplies.

One problem which needs to be addressed remains the smuggling of supplies from government areas to the north, almost always with the connivance of corrupt government and army officers.

The only way to stamp this out is through better intelligence in the border areas, especially the Vavuniya, Anuradhapura and Medawachchiya regions, where the smugglers must pass through.

Smuggling from India, through the use of small craft across the shallow waters of the Palk Strait, can only be stopped by increasing the number of gunboats and fast attack craft. A program is already in place for this, with more warships of these types joining the fleet, like the Super Dvora this week.

However, it is the Mullaitivu route which is the cause of most concern to the armed forces.

The LTTE has always used this stretch of coast, which they have dominated for nearly nine years now, to bring in small ships. These vessels have a far greater capacity than the small boats which come across from India. In addition, they also begin their journeys from ports in Southeast Asia, where they are free to gather lethal cargo without hindrance. This is unlike in India, where the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), India’s main intelligence agency, is constantly hunting for LTTE operators and arresting them.

Close to Mullaitivu itself, the Sri Lanka Navy maintains a blockade by night and day, aided by Beechcraft and Y-12 reconnaissance planes of the Sri Lanka Air Force during daylight.

But unfortunately, the navy lacks the larger warships which are needed to patrol deeper waters far from shore. The Dvoras and gunboats just don’t have the seagoing abilities to stay far out at sea for long periods.

This means that while LTTE ships are at risk when they come in close to shore, they are relatively safe if they manage to avoid detection and stay out at seas.

The recent incidents of the MV Mariamma and MV Showa Maru are clear examples.

The Mariamma fled back across the Bay of Bengal, but Sri Lanka lacked the heavy warships needed to hunt it down and catch it in mid-ocean. It was only the presence of the Indian Navy and Coast Guard which forced the Tigers to scuttle their own ship near the Andaman Islands. (see ‘’CORNERED BY WARSHIPS, LTTE SCUTTLES ITS OWN ARMS SHIP," March 21, 1999).

The Showa Maru is an even more damning example.

Having unloaded at least some of its cargo, it fled back into the sealanes and vanished. The navy had no deep-sea warships to catch it.

The air force also lacked aircraft with the necessary range to keep track of the Showa Maru.

What this means is that the Showa Maru will soon be back, with more lethal cargo for the Tigers.

What needs to be done now is to purchase a few larger warships for the deep sea, and longer range planes. That would ensure that any LTTE arms ship approaching Sri Lanka would be coming on a suicide mission. Whether or not it succeeds in delivering its cargo, it would not survive for another such mission. That factor in itself will strangle the supply line.

Until such time that such planes and ships are made available, the forces need to better organize the resources that they have. This includes basing more reconnaissance planes at China Bay, right on the east coast, instead of flying from bases further away and reducing their patrolling range.

It would also be much more useful if the squadron of Kfir jets at Katunayake could be based at China Bay. This would increase their operational range by more than 400 kilometres. That’s 400 kilometres of ocean they could range over to attack ships.

The argument against basing the Kfirs at China Bay for long periods, is that the LTTE once managed to sneak in a team which blew up a Y-12 on the ground there. But this is something which can be guarded against.

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