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Daluwatte starts work as GOC - JOC without being appointed
Who’s in charge of the war?

By Our Defence Correspondent
Confusion reigned supreme amongst the armed forces this week, with General Rohan Daluwatte giving instructions and signing letters with the designation of General Officer Commanding the Joint Operations Headquarters, even though the President has not appointed him to the post.

Up to the time this column was written, no Gazette notification has been made appointing anyone to the post of GOC-JOH.

Neither has any public announcement been made by any person in authority that Gen. Daluwatte has been appointed to the post.

Many top officers were confused over the change, since none of the three armed services or the police issued any instructions about Gen. Daluwatte or the post of GOC-JOH.

Attempts by The Island to contact General Daluwatte were unsuccessful, and members of his staff refused to comment on the matter.

Since January, Gen. Daluwatte has been signing letters and issuing orders as the head of the Joint Operations Bureau, which was created at the beginning of the year by the publication of a Gazette Extraordinary.

On May 27, 1999, President Chandrika Kumaratunga issued a Gazette Extraordinary, creating the new post of Chief of Defence Staff. Another Gazette Extraordinary followed on June 3, 1999, appointing Gen. Daluwatte to the post of Chief of Defence Staff. (See Defence Column of June 6, 1999 "Daluwatte given over-riding powers over service chiefs.")

Gen. Daluwatte then began signing correspondence as Chief of Defence Staff.

But less than two weeks later, the President made a further proclamation in another Gazette Extraordinary, abolishing the post of Chief of Defence Staff. (See Defence Column of June 13, 1999 "Services command control structure changed for the third time.")

What this means, as we understand it, is that with the post being abolished, Gen. Daluwatte ceased to hold office as well.

We are not aware of any Gazette notification since then, appointing Gen. Daluwatte to any post.

The Gazette Extraordinary of last week also reconstituted the existing Joint Operations Headquarters, making two key changes. One was the creation for the post of GOC-JOH to head it, and the other was the inclusion of a representative of the Directorate of Foreign Intelligence in the JOH.

The latter is very clear, since there is a head of the Director of Foreign Intelligence, who will send his representative for each JOH meeting.

But no-one was appointed to the post of JOC-JOH.

Yet, soon after the Gazette notification that the post of GOC-JOH was created, Gen. Daluwatte began signing correspondence in that capacity.

Fortunately, the smooth running of the war has not been affected, so far, since most officers who received instructions from Gen. Daluwatte chose to follow them.

But defence circles were buzzing with talk that Gen. Daluwatte’s demotion from Chief of Defence Staff to GOC-JOH was due to his falling out of favour with President Kumaratunga.

And many officers are nervous lest Gen. Daluwatte not be appointed GOC-JOH, in which case the orders they followed would be nullified.

However, there is no talk of any other officer being appointed to the post, and since the post was created by the President, it seems fairly logical that she would appoint him to it. Of course, given the manner in which she changed her mind about Gen. Daluwatte’s post in recent months, one can never be sure what the President will actually do.

Many find it baffling that the President has given no public explanation as to why she changed her mind regarding Gen. Daluwatte, or why she created the all-powerful post of Chief of Defence Staff in the first place.

The President’s favorite mouthpiece, the Daily News, has stayed silent on the issue, not mentioning Gen. Daluwatte at all.

Interestingly, Gen. Daluwatte’s dubious status has had no impact on the war at all.

The army, air force and navy launched a series of operations on June 10, in several different areas of the Wanni, succeeding in their aim of confusing the LTTE as the real line of advance, and capturing a significant swathe of jungle area.

Army units at Paranthan advanced and then retreated, drawing the Tigers into a battle.

At the same time, a combined assault by air and sea also distracted the LTTE’s attention at Pooneryn. The Tigers rushed reinforcements to both Paranthan and Pooneryn.

The combined attack on Pooneryn ended with troops making a tactical retreat under heavy fire, their objective of distracting the Tigers having been successful.

Meanwhile, at Palampiddy, north of Madhu, troops began an advance westwards towards the coast.

With many cadres having been rushed north already, the LTTE had no choice but to retreat quickly, and there was no resistance at all as troops marched swiftly all the way across to the coast and reached Vidattaltivu.

This extended the coastline under government control north of Mannar, by 11 kilometers, and significantly, reduced whatever little pressure there was on the Mannar town area.

The capture of the Palampiddy-Vidattaltivu road also widened the belt of land along the Mannar-Medawachchiya road which is in army hands, further restricting movement of the LTTE.

From the Tigers point of view, the advance of the army further north up from Mannar is bad news. This road leads all the way along the coast to Pooneryn, going across a host of coastal villages which are the main bases of the Sea Tigers, on the northwest coast.

If the army chooses to continue up the coast, it can count on gunfire support from navy gunboats, as well as air support from Kfir and F-7 jets, and MI-22 helicopter gunships.

From any point on this road, troops could turn inland on one of the many roads leading into the heart of the Wanni, and the main Tiger strongholds of Mallavi and Tunukkai will not be far away.

Although it will take many months for such strategies to be converted to reality, the hard fact for the LTTE is that the Tigers are now firmly on the defensive, having to try to defend against advancing troops without getting their precious few remaining cadres trapped.

At the same time, the presence of soldiers on the Jaffna-Kandy road up to Mankulam is a constant threat from their east, which the tigers have to guard against.

Meanwhile, the strong army contingent at Elephant Pass-Vettilaikerni-Paranthan requires the LTTE to keep a significant portion of its forces in the Kilinochchi area, and the presence of at Oddusudan is a constant threat to Mullaitivu.

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