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Gunboats kill 50 LTTE cadres in 6 days with no loss to the navy
Strangling the Sea Tigers
by Our Defence Correspondent
In a week of hectic fighting at sea, gunboats of the Sri Lanka Navy struck fast and furious all around the northeast coast, destroying at least seven LTTE boats, killing more than 50 Tiger cadres, with no losses on the government side.
The victories, in three separate incidents, continued a remarkable run of successes at sea for Sri Lanka in a little less than three years, which have seen the vaunted Sea Tiger wing of the LTTE smashed beyond recognition, with their once mythical strength reduced to tatters.
Beginning in January of 1997, hundreds of Sea Tiger boats have been sunk in all parts of the northern waters, with well over a thousand cadres killed.
The Sea Tigers’ who once ruled the waves of the entire northeast, mustering fleets of more than 30 attack boats at a time for any battle from Kalpitiya through Mannar, the Jaffna Peninsula, Mullaitivu, Trincomalee and Batticaloa, have now been reduced to desperate supply runs to and from India with two or three boats at a time.
The LTTE, which boldly ventured down the coastline to attack boats and harbors as far afield as Colombo and Hambantota, is scarcely capable of even mounting an attack on a single naval Dvora patrol craft now.
In fact, the only reason that the navy has not swept the sea clear of all Sea Tigers, is that the last few remaining LTTE boats spend much of their time in the shelter of their coastal artillery guns and mortar units on the coastline of the Mullaitivu district and north of Mannar on the coast of the Mannar and Kilinochchi districts.
In return, the navy has suffered no significant losses since January 1997.
This week’s action began on October 1, when naval craft patrolling 40 miles from Mullaitivu, spotted several Sea Tiger boats racing in towards the Sri Lankan coast at 10:15 p.m. From the large size of the boats, it was obvious that they were carrying supplies for the Tigers.
The gunboats attacked quickly and fought a five and a half-hour battle that ended at 4 a.m. the next day.
By this time, one big LTTE boat caught fire and sank, and another was badly damaged before escaping. So confident were the naval sailors, that they even boarded the sinking enemy craft and found it to be abandoned. Before it sank, the sailors found that it was carrying 20 barrels of oil, which were destroyed.
The sailors managed to remove and take back a 12.7-mm General Purpose Machine gun (commonly called ‘’five-zero"). Also on board the craft were three other such machine guns and a rocket-propelled grenade launcher.
Intelligence later confirmed that 15 LTTE cadres were killed in the battle. There were no casualties or damage on the navy side.
The coastal incidents then shifted to the northwestern side, and on Tuesday, October 5, craft of the Pallimunai naval detachment detected three boats on the beach at Usimukkanthurai near Mannar.
When the navy craft approached, several men near the boats opened fire.
The navy sailors quickly called in reinforcements and surrounded the area, before advancing in. They quickly captured all three boats, and even more significantly, the six Tiger cadres with them surrendered, something which was unusual in the heyday of the LTTE, but which is happening more and more frequently.
The boats were apparently smuggling goods from government-held areas of Mannar. Their cargo included a huge variety of goods, including 159,000 rupees, a dozen bicycles, more than 100 blank video cassettes, a large quantity of kerosene, frocks, saris, trousers, several dozen boxes full of Lux and Sunlight soap, and 200 sarongs.
Among the more colorful items were nearly a thousand packets of Bingo toffee and bubble gum, more than 500 brassieres, and 150 pairs of men’s underwear.
Interestingly, the boats had been bound for the town of Vedithaltivu, which is now a government-controlled area. It is the first time that the LTTE has been found smuggling within government areas, and indicates that the terrorists are now diversifying into more commercial activities.
The next incident was on Wednesday, October 6, off the Mannar coast, near the island of Katchativu, where gunboats detected two large LTTE boats racing across the Palk Strait towards India, at about 5:30 p.m.
The gunboats gave chase and in the resulting battle, one of the LTTE boats caught fire and sank. The other enemy boat managed to make it to Indian waters, and the gunboats didn’t pursue it.
One navy sailor was slightly wounded, and one navy fast attack craft suffered some minor damage.
However, Indian newspapers reported that this boat was later spotted by Indian fishermen, who informed police in that country. The Indian navy investigated, and found the bodies of two LTTE cadres, wearing body armor that had been riddled with gunfire.
Mounted on the vessel were one 23-mm heavy gun, and a rocket-propelled grenade launcher. The boat was fitted with four powerful outboard motors.
From the location of the boat, it is clear that all those who were on board must have perished and probably fell into the water.
From the size of the two LTTE boats, it is likely that they were carrying about 15-20 cadres, who are believed to have been killed in the fighting.
However, unaware that both their large boats had been sunk, two more Sea Tiger craft came out the next day from the Nachchikudah area in the Kilinochchi district, apparently waiting to escort the two boats home on their return journey. They took cover near a cluster of fishing boats about five miles from Talaimannar pier, at 3:30 a.m.
But their approach had been seen by a navy gunboat, which called in reinforcements and attacked.
The battle, another one-sided affair, ended with one boat being set on fire and sinking, and the other escaping to the coast, heavily damaged.
Again, there were no casualties on the navy side.
Intelligence officers later discovered that the battle that morning off Talaimannar had caused the deaths of no less than 15 Sea Tigers, including no less than 12 of officer rank.
They were Lieutenant Colonel Niroshan, Major Nahulan, Maj. Selliah, Maj. Solan, and an unnamed major, Captain Ilanailavan, Lt. Potco, Lt. Pavendran, Lt. Nagamani, Lt. Thamilnambi, 2nd Lt. Iseivanan, and 2nd Lt. Maran. The other three cadres were named as Mudalvan, Sembian, and Iniavan.
The loss of Lt. Col. Niroshan is considered very significant, since he was an officer of considerable fame among the Sea Tigers. With a large number of other Lt. Colonels and even Colonels being killed in the past three years, Lt. Col. Niroshan was one of the Sea Tigers’ most senior commanders.
These bitter defeats are very likely to cause the LTTE to try to retaliate, and naval bases and warships should be on their guard, as should senior officers like navy chief Vice Admiral Cecil Tissera.
Meanwhile, the low intensity of the war in recent times has drawn a number of foreign warships to the port of Colombo, for refueling and courtesy visits. Other countries had shied away from sending their warships to Sri Lanka since April 1995, due to the high risk, especially after Colombo harbor was attacked in April 1996, and the city was devastated by bomb blasts in 1996 and 1997.
The Portuguese destroyer Vasco da Gama came and left last month. The British destroyer HMS Glasgow paid a visit while returning from duty off East Timor, where it was part of the international peacekeeping force.
The newly purchased Thai corvette Lat-Ya, also stopped while on its way from Italy to Thailand. A patrol boat from the Maldives, Iskandhar, is currently in Colomho for repairs. And finally, two warships of the Pakistan navy are due shortly, the destroyer PNS Tariq. and the tanker PNS Nasar.
by Shamindra Ferdinando
Sri Lanka’s military brass will keep their collective fingers crossed that the LTTE will make no waves today, either in Colombo or outside, when a couple of hundred guests including two army commanders from the subcontinent join the Sri Lanka Army in its fiftieth anniversary celebrations today.
This is the army’s last big bash for the millennium. It concludes a series of events held countrywide over the last couple of months to mark a significant milestone. Obviously no hiccups are wanted and the preventive machine is on top gear.
For troops deployed in operational areas, particularly the Wanni frontlines, there will be no change of routine today. Soldiers will continue patrols, man bunkers and engage in all other tasks that duty demands. Over and above that they will be on high alert. Nobody wants a Tiger calling card on the army’s jubilee celebrations.
In recent years, the customary celebrations that marks the raising of the Sri Lanka Army has been in low profile because of the war that is now being fought. But this year the military brass was determined to have a celebration befitting fifty years of national service and brave the possibility of any spoiler tactics by the LTTE with tight preventives.
In the past 16 years, the SLA has considerably increased its strength acquiring tanks, artillery and other armaments to counter the LTTE’s growing capability. The Tigers, naturally, are not static. Their most recent acquisition is a wire guided missile system that can take on the army’s Russian and Chinese built Armoured Fighting Vehicles [UAVs].
After today’s celebrations end, the brass must return to pressing problems. The SLA’s ongoing operations and those planned in the Wanni have been hurt by the failure to inspire the country’s youth to join the fighting battalions. Recruitment remains the biggest problem. The ``anti war’’ campaigns of some politicians, both from the government and the opposition, and some NGOs have hurt army efforts to raise the manpower it needs.
Allegations of human rights abuse levelled against the fighting forces are also troubling. The military brass’ sincerity in countering any possible abuse is demonstrated by their invitation to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to educate soldiers on their duties and obligations and many other measures that are in place to ensure that the army is a disciplined force not wreaking reprisals on civilians for acts of the LTTE.
Despite the problems and challenges it faces, the Sri Lanka Army continues to grow. It is the single biggest hurdle in the way of the LTTE in their professed march towards Eelam and the security cover the peace loving people of this country has against the separatist terrorists.
There were less than 200 officers and men when the Ceylon Army was raised on October 10, 1949. The Ceylon Light Infantry [CLI] now known as the Sri Lanka Light Infantry [SLLI] was the first regular infantry unit of an army that remained for the next two decades a largely ceremonial force whose chief preoccupation was the spit and polish of the annual Independence parade. There were, of course, internal security duties at times of need.
But that changed in 1971 a year after Mrs. Sirima Bandaranaike’s United Front (UF) government came into power. The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna [JVP] launched its first abortive bid to seize power in early April of that year but the police with the backing of the SLA and other services crushed the insurgency within a few months. The powers of the day myopically failed to see that this was possible because the opponents were ill organised and ill equipped novices.
Despite the first straw in the wind, the UF government which somewhat expanded the army after the first JVP adventure, failed to see the gathering storm particularly in the Northeast of the country as conditions and politics changed. The UNP that succeeded the UF in office also lacked the sagacity to see the developing threat despite attacks on police stations in the north. Hindsight now tells us that the non-development then of our security forces was a grievous error of both the blues and the greens.
By a strange coincidence, the LTTE signalled the beginning of what has now grown to be a full blown civil war on the 32nd anniversary of the army on October 10, 1981 when it shot two soldiers dead at Kankesanturai. That provoked no serious counter of beefing-up the military and the way was clear for the upstaging of the conflict when the LTTE launched its first major attack on the army killing 13 soldiers at Tinnaveli in July 1983. What followed is now history.
The escalation of the conflict by the LTTE forced the UNP government of the day to substantially improve both the manpower and the fire-power of the army as well as the navy and air force between 1983 and 1987. There was massive recruitment, foreign training, and procurement of foreign military advisors and armaments as the country prepared to take the battle to the Tiger heartland.
After some relatively small scale operations, the strike at Vadamarachchi code named Operation Liberation was launched in May 1987. It ended with Big Brother across the Palk Strait flagrantly interfering in the internal affairs of this country with the barely veiled ``parippu drops’’ signalling Indian military interference if Colombo did not accept New Delhi’s terms of settling the so-called ethnic problem.
President J.R. Jayewardene capitulated and the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) arrived here to disarm the LTTE and bring the Tigers to heel. The Indo-Lanka agreement kept the SLA confined to barracks as the LTTE and other ``militant’’ groups went on the rampage. Meanwhile the JVP, on an anti-Indian plank, had embarked on its second adventure which made the first look like a school children’s tea party forcing the President to order the army south to quell the second rebellion.
The SLA was under orders to destroy the JVP and it played a key role in launching a bloody anti-insurgency operation to crush what was popularly known as the southern insurrection. The army was accused of engaging in extensive extra-judicial executions and gruesome incidents associated with Embilipitiya and Sooriyakanda are too well known to merit repetition.
The IPKF was still here when President R. Premadasa took office succeeding J.R. Jayewardene. Always a firm opponent of the Indian presence, Premadasa and Prabhakaran made common cause to get the IPKF out and the year between May 1989 and June 1990 saw the army, under orders from its commander-in-chief, helping the Tigers to inflict losses on the IPKF.
This was a bad time for the army and its senior officers who caved into political demands leading to the dismantling of strategic bases at Point Pedro and Velvettiturai at LTTE instigation. Arms procurement was put on hold. Recruitment and training stopped. The Tigers had played a brilliant game of chess and ensured that the army was least prepared for the battles ahead when the honeymoon eventually ended. The LTTE demonstrated frightening military capacity when the war began all over again.
June 1990 was a watershed with the covert relationship between the army and the LTTE that Premadasa put in place ended two months after the IPKF had been ``de-inducted’’ to borrow the description favoured by the Indians. Eelam War 2 began, the first phase embracing the pre-IPKF period. That was to end in August of 1994 when the UNP lost the parliamentary election and President D.B. Wijetunga played a lame duck role in the interim period up to the Chandrika Kumaratunga presidency in October.
By then the army had lost the overland main supply route (MSR) to Jaffna from Vavuniya. Camps along the way had either been overrun or vacated except for Elephant Pass, Palaly and KKS. All other bases including the Jaffna Fort in the peninsula and the islands were abandoned.
When the UNP lost the 1994 elections, the LTTE was in command of the Jaffna peninsula and the Wanni and maintained a strong presence in the east where the bulk of the government forces were deployed. The rest of the army bases were under constant mortar attack and little had been done to correct the situation.
The PA which came to power promising to end the war made its own blunders worsening the situation. Not learning from the Premadasa experience, the new government too made the same mistakes. Military procurements were put on hold as the political leaders entered into a 100-day truce with the Tigers. The army watched as the LTTE began building strength all over again in the Northeast.
A second honeymoon was over in April 1995 when the Tigers resumed hostilities. This time the targets were the Sri Lanka Navy and Air Force as the Tigers prepared for a massive assault on the Palaly base jointly held by the army and the SLAF.
What was trumpeted as the army’s biggest success and the beginning of the end of the war occurred with the military took the battle to Jaffna, the symbol of the LTTE’s power. Operation Riviresa launched in August 1995 was over early next year with the capture of Jaffna and the other main population centres in the peninsula. The army moved south from its Elephant Pass base and took Kilinochchi before it suffered its biggest defeat when the Mullaitivu Brigade Complex was overrun and destroyed by the LTTE.
An year after that massive reverse, the army embarked on an operation that some observers say was more designed to suit a political agenda than military imperatives. The ill fated Operation Jayasikurui to re-take the Vavuniya - Jaffna was launched. This objective was not realised and in the process a loss bigger than the Mullaitivu debacle was suffered when the Kilinochchi base was lost and the Paranthan defence lines overrun. The fatalities were over 2,000 officers and men killed.
Despite the failure of Jayasikurui and the loss of Kilinochchi, the SLA changed tactics and conducted a string of operations mainly in the western Wanni considerably reducing the area under LTTE control. To the SLA’s credit it must be mention that just over 1500 square kms of LTTE held territory along with thousands of people were brought under its control during the March-August period of 1999. But the going was never easy.
One of the most significant developments in SLA’s history was the US government’s decision in 1995 to include Sri Lanka in US Army’s Extended Relations Programme [ERP] thus giving it recognition. The unexpected inclusion in the ERP had given the SLA a place among the international "military" community and had tremendously improved its standing.
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